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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light 
Weapons (SEESAC) has identified that BiH is facing “a potentially significant threat to 
human life due to the storage conditions and the physical condition of their 
ammunition stockpile”. SEESAC judge that a co-ordinated international effort to 
establish a safe and effective Logistic Ammunition Disposal system is necessary to 
mitigate the hazard and associated risks. 
1.2 There are 38 major ammunition storage sites under control of the Entity Armed 
Forces (EAF) in BiH, which they intend to reduce to only six to meet planning 
requirements recently published by the Office of the High Representative (OHR). 
SEESAC asserts that “little technical ammunition advice was taken to support this 
decision and no formal risk analysis was conducted”, concluding that it is “probably 
unachievable logistically, and that there would certainly be major explosive safety 
concerns should any large-scale physical movement of ammunition take place”. 
1.3 The Stabilisation Force (SFOR) estimates the total ammunition stock levels are in the 
region of 67,000 tonnes All Up Weight (AUW), of which at least 50% has already 
been identified as requiring disposal.   This figure is almost certainly likely to rise 
within the next three years as the BiH Armed Forces reorganise.   Due to its age the 
remainder of the stockpile could require destruction over the next ten years.  An 
immediate cause for concern is the chemical stability of the mortar and gun propellant 
in storage.    
1.4 The Feasibility Study is sponsored by the UNDP BiH SALW Reduction Project 
(SARP), which has a demilitarization capacity building component included in its 
project document.    
2 AIM 
2.1 The aim if the Feasibility Study is to examine the detailed practicality, humanitarian, 
environmental, technical, security, financial and political requirements for the 
establishment of an Ammunition Disposal Facility (ADF) in BiH in order to provide the 
necessary information for potential international donor investment in the project. 
3 THE STUDY 
3.1 The Threat Resolution Ltd (TRLtd) Study Team possessed the significant advantage 
of extensive knowledge and experience of a recent project in Albania, which has 
substantial synergy with the situation in BiH.    
3.2 Despite persistent efforts by the Study Team and UNDP staff in Sarajevo neither the 
EAF nor SFOR were able to provide lists of the ammunition already identified for 
disposal, or indeed the full stockpile.   Therefore, the Study Team was unable to 
clearly identify the full range and quantities of ammunition natures involved, but 
nonetheless obtained sufficient data from which to formulate a strategic plan to 
resolve this challenge. 
3.3 Members of the Study Team made two field trips to BiH, the first of which was to 
conduct a technical assessment of existing ammunition storage facilities.   During the 
second potential sites for demilitarization, at Government Ordnance Factories (GOF) 
in Vitez, Bugojno and Vosgoca were visited to assess their suitability for the future 
construction and operation of an Ammunition Disposal Facility (ADF).  
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4 CONCLUSIONS 
 The study team’s conclusions are summarised below: 
4.1 Humanitarian 
4.1.1 The EAF ammunition stockpile presents a genuine and current threat to the civilian 
population living nearby for the following reasons: 
 The age and inappropriate storage conditions of the ammunition. 
 The critical nature of safety infringements. 
 The lack of inspections to verify the condition of ammunition or a surveillance 
system to establish the chemical stability of propellants.  
 The excessive Net Explosive Quantities (NEQ) of the ammunition held in the 
ESH.
4.1.2 The OHR action plan, to consolidate the ammunition stockpile in only six sites, is 
unworkable, since it will significantly increase the already excessive Net Explosive 
Content (NEC) of these sites and therefore increase risks. 
4.1.3 The chemical analysis facility in Vitez is not capable of undertaking the significant 
number of analyses likely to be needed to bring the surveillance of propellant stability 
up to date.  The facility requires refurbishment and investment in new equipment. 
4.1.4 Although the ADF project will initially require the employment of international 
technical managers this reliance will diminish as the competence and experience of 
local staff is enhanced.   The project will offer sustainable employment opportunities 
for BIH citizens. 
4.2 Environmental 
4.2.1  Whilst necessary as emergency measure current demilitarization techniques, 
especially Open Burning and Open Demolition (OBOD) of certain ammunition 
natures, present a significant environmental threat.   Although there will be a 
continued requirement for OBOD to destroy unstable ammunition, its long-term use 
can only be applied to specific munition types.   Evidence has been presented to 
demonstrate the considerable opposition shown by the civilian population in specific 
areas to these methods of demilitarization.      
4.2.2 Proven environmentally benign demilitarization technology that meets the 
requirements of applicable EU Legislation is commercially available.   Its introduction 
in BiH would dramatically decrease the environmental impact currently experienced. 
4.3 Technical 
4.3.1 The Study Team found that the physical condition of the BiH ammunition is generally 
visually acceptable but that poor storage conditions are contributing to rapid 
deterioration. Of most significant concern was is the lack of basic safety measures in 
storage, in direct contravention of applicable NATO regulations, issued in the 
Instructions to Parties (ITP) as part of the 1995 General Framework Agreement for 
Peace.   The resultant hazard is significantly exacerbated by the presence of a 
considerable amount of ammunition, which is not properly packaged, and further 
stocks that are stored in the open, between storehouses.  
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4.3.2 The Study Team was unanimous in the conclusion that the GOF at Unis Pretis was 
the most appropriate site for development as an ADF. 
4.3.3 A phased approach to the building of an indigenous Ammunition Disposal Facility 
(ADF) is proposed using the principle of technical ease commensurate with highest 
risk, which allows considerable stocks of surplus ammunition to be quickly destroyed 
and reducing the significant hazard caused by overstocked ammunition storage 
facilities.   Furthermore, a phased approach offers greater project visibility and is 
more likely to attract donor interest. 
4.3.4 The team compared the cost and performance of different technologies available but 
advises that the most appropriate technology for BiH is an Explosive Waste 
Incinerator (EWI) and appropriate pre-processing equipment. 
4.3.5 An outline of the proposed development of an ADF is follows: 
 Phase A – An incineration facility designed to dispose of unstable and obsolete 
ammunition. 
 Phase B – Upgrading the Phase A facility to include the salvage of TNT 
explosive from large calibre shell. Alternatively, the Project Execution Agency 
may consider exporting of this element of the stockpile to the European 
demilitarization industry,   
 Phase C – Viability to be confirmed by Project Executing Agency. Possible 
further enhancements of the existing facilities to process more complex munitions 
and compete in the European marketplace. 
4.3.6 The team has identified that there may be difficulties in logistic support for the 
proposed ADF since the EAF in BiH appear not to currently possess the resources 
needed to support a major demilitarization operation. Some vehicle and mechanical 
handling equipment enhancements may, therefore, be necessary.  Additional training 
in procedures and applicable regulations will be necessary to mitigate risks in the 
movement of the ammunition stockpile. 
4.4  Financial 
4.4.1 The Study Team concludes that the approximate cost of the project to destroy 33,500 
tonnes of surplus munitions would be approximately US$20m over a period of up to 
6.5 to 7 years. The cost per tonne is approximately US$ 570 based on the 
assumption of an amortisable life of 7 years1. When the revenue generated from sale 
of recovered metals is taken into consideration, this cost may be reduced by up to 
13% to US$ 527 per tonne.   A detailed financial summary is at Annex A.  
4.5 Security 
4.5.1 Overall security precautions at the weapons and ammunition storage sites are 
inadequate. The Study Team have made general recommendations to bring the 
facilities up to a minimal standard.  
4.5.2 Security arrangements at the working GOFs (potential demilitarization facilities) is 
considerably better and appropriate for demilitarization work. 
4.6 Training 
4.6.1 There was little evidence that the EAF is complying with regulatory requirements 
regarding training levels for those undertaking ammunition duties, which are laid 
                                                          
1 This figure includes capital expenditure of the EWI and pre-processing equipment. 
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down in Chapter 13 of the ITP, specifically “only those individuals with sufficient 
technical training and experience should be employed within ammunition related 
appointments”.
4.6.2 Urgent training is required to improve the safety of ammunition in storage at all EAF 
locations and eliminate the critical safety infringements identified during a technical 
assessment of ammunition storage sites. 
4.6.3 It is improbable that the EAF will succeed in meeting the December 2004 deadline of 
the Compliance Schedule specified in Annex H to Chapter 13 of the ITP, which 
requires the presentation of a strategy to develop Ammunition and Explosives 
Specialist Training.    
5 KEY RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 The Study Team makes the following recommendations in order of priority: 
5.1.1 The introduction and maintenance of an effective ammunition surveillance system, to 
identify threats from potentially unstable ammunition including propellants.
5.1.2 The facility at Vitez is upgraded to conduct propellant testing of the EAF stockpile.   
This is necessary to reduce the possibility of an unplanned explosive event, prioritise 
ammunition stock for disposal and to continue to monitor propellant stability in the 
residual operational stockpile.  
5.1.3 A short-term ammunition management-training course for EAF personnel is 
conducted at the earliest opportunity.  In the interest of expediency, it is 
recommended that UNDP/SFOR endeavour to arrange direct bilateral support for the 
training aspect, rather than inclusion in the proposed ADF project. 
5.1.4 Weapon and ammunition storage site security is enhanced to provide a basic level of 
effective security.
5.1.5 A 100% technical audit of the weapons and ammunition stockpile is undertaken by a 
competent, external organisation and the data is captured in an electronic database. 
5.1.6 Urgent action is taken to remove anti-personnel mines from the perimeters of 
ammunition storage sites and Government Ordnance Factories in order to improve 
human safety and comply with the terms of the Mine Ban Treaty which BiH signed on 
3 December 1997 and ratified on 8 September 1998. 
5.1.7 An ADF, capable of handling large quantities of ammunition2, is constructed to destroy 
the estimated 33,500 tonnes of ammunition currently earmarked for disposal.  The 
Study Team recommends that the proposed ADF is operated within the existing GOF at 
Unis Pretis. 
5.1.8 The introduction of long-term training of ammunition specialists at a suitable NATO 
military or commercial training establishment is introduced to develop a core of 
experienced ammunition specialists within the EAF.  
5.1.9 That the appointed Executing Agency capacity build the BiH GOFs already 
undertaking demilitarization work with a view to attaining compliance with EU 
legislation. 
5.1.10 EU environmental legislation relating to emission levels is used as the basis for any 
Invitations to Tender (ITT) for the emission control system for the proposed EWI. 
                                                          
2 Up to 5,000 tonnes all-up weight per annum. 
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5.1.11 A full Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) on the proposed technical solution is 
conducted prior to project implementation. 
6. SUMMARY  
6.1 The Study Teams confirms the concerns of SEESAC and the requirement to 
demilitarize up to 33,500 tonnes of ammunition in BiH. The existence of this 
ammunition poses a significant threat to human security.  
6.2 Suitable conditions prevail in BiH for the development of an indigenous industrial 
based ADF and that existing, proven technology can be effectively operated under 
current political conditions.
6.3 The cost of the project is very favourable compared with demilitarization at 
commercial facilities in Europe and has the added advantage of offering suitable 
employment to the local populace.  
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 ANNEX A TO 
        EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
FINANCIAL SUMMARY 
Item
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4-7 Totals
Capital Equipment
Installation of EWI 2,680,000 0 0 0 2,680,000
Pre-processing equipment 422,800 0 0 0 422,800
Sub total 3,102,800 0 0 0 3,102,800
In Country Project Management
Supervisory Team 474,000 412,800 220,800 883,200       1,990,800
Sub total 474,000 412,800 220,800 883,200 1,990,800
Propellant testing
Capital equipment 65,000 0 0 0 65,000
Running costs 18,000 18,000 18,000 72,000 126,000
Sub total 83,000 18,000 18,000 72,000 191,000
ADF Operation
EWI Running costs 0 355,680     711,360 2,845,440 3,912,480
Pre-preparation costs 0 231,192     462,384     1,849,536 2,543,112
Other ADF Overheads 0 320,112     640,224     2,560,896 3,521,232
Sub total 0 906,984 1,813,968 7,255,872 9,976,824
Totals 3,659,800 1,337,784 2,052,768 8,211,072 15,261,424
Project Overheads
Executing Agency costs at 14% 512,372     187,290     287,388     1,149,550 2,136,599    
Total Budget 4,172,172 1,525,074 2,340,156 9,360,622 17,398,023
Contingency at 15% 625,826     228,761     351,023     1,404,093 2,609,704    
Grand Totals 4,797,998 1,753,835 2,691,179 10,764,715 20,007,727   
Cost US$
GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
A/C Aircraft
ACA Ammonical Copper Arsenate - A toxic chemical historically used to 
preserve wooden ammunition packages 
ADF Ammunition Demilitarization Facility 
AEA Atomic Energy Authority (UK) 
AFAM  Armed Forces Ammunition Manager 
AFBiH Armed Forces of Bonsia and Herzegovina 
ANFO Ammonium Nitrate and Fuel Oil – A common mining explosive 
AP  Armour Piercing 
APCS Air Pollution Control System 
APE Ammunition Peculiar Equipment 
APM Anti Personnel Mines 
AP-T Armour Piercing Tracer 
ASA Ammunition Storage Area 
ASS Ammunition Storage Site 
A/Tk Anti Tank 
ATO Ammunition Technical Officer 
Autoclave Equipment for the removal of high explosive from ammunition by the 
injection of steam 
AUW All Up Weight 
BHMAC Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre 
BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina
CCA Chromated Copper Arsenate - A toxic chemical historically used to 
preserve wooden ammunition packages 
CCTV Closed Circuit Television
CG Compatibility Group 
CMD Conventional Munitions Disposal – The detection, identification, field 
evaluation, rendering safe, recovery and final disposal of unexploded 
ordnance (except improvised explosive devices, biological, chemical 
and nuclear weapons) which has become hazardous by damage or 
deterioration.  
CO2 Carbon Dioxide 
COMSFOR Commander of the Stabilisation Force 
COTS Commercial Off-The-Shelf 
CSS Centre for Security Studies (Sarajevo)
CWP Contaminated Waste Processor (Car-bottom furnace) 
DERA Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (UK) 
DOD Department of Defense (USA) 
EAF Entity Armed Forces 
ECA Explosion Consequence Analysis 
EEI Eldorado Engineering Incorporated
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment
ELL Explosive Limit License
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal - The detection, identification, evaluation 
and final disposal of unexploded explosive ordnance.   It may also 
include the rendering safe and/or disposal of such explosive ordnance 
which have become hazardous by damage or deterioration when the 
disposal of such explosive ordnance is beyond the capabilities of 
personnel normally assigned the responsibility for routine disposal 
EPA Environmental Protection Agency (USA) 
ES Exposed Site – Any building, structure, facility or place of assembly 
that is hazarded by a Potential Explosion Site (PES)     
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ESH Explosive Store House
EU European Union 
EWI Explosive Waste Incinerator
FFE Free From Explosives
GFAP General Framework Agreement for Peace – signed in Paris in 1995
GOF  Government Ordnance Factory
HD Hazard Division 
HDZ Croatian Democratic Union 
HE High Explosive
HEAT High Explosive AntiTank 
HEI High Explosive Incendiary 
HEI-T High Explosive Incendiary Tracer 
HGV Heavy Goods Vehicle
HQ Headquarters
HVO Croatian Defence Council 
IED Improvised Explosive Device 
IEDD Improvised Explosive Device Disposal 
IT Information Technology
ITP Instructions To Parties – Introduced in 1995 to implement military 
aspects of the GFAP
ITT Invitation To Tender
IQD The distance from a PES to an ES (other magazines and process 
buildings) inside ammunition storage or processing facility 
JMA Joint Military Affairs (SFOR led)
JNA (or VJ) Yugoslav National Army 
KM Konvertible Marka – Currency in BiH
LSU Logistic Support Unit 
MANPADS Man portable Air Defence Systems – See also SAM 
MHE Mechanical Handling Equipment 
MIP Mission Implementation Plan 
MNTF Multi National Task Force (SFOR Led) 
MoD Ministry of Defence 
MoFTER Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations (BiH)
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NAMSA NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency 
NEC Net Explosive Content 
NEQ Net Explosive Quantity 
NEW Net Explosive Weight (USA) 
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation 
NHI New Croat Initiative 
NOx Nitrous Oxides 
OBOD Open Burning and Open Demolition –  Demilitarization techniques 
OEW Ordnance and Explosive Waste 
OHR Office of the High Representative – responsible for implementing civil 
aspects of the 1995 Dayton Peace agreement
OQD Outside Quantity Distance – The distance from a PES inside an 
ammunition storage or processing facility to an ES outside the 
perimeter (Inhabited buildings, vulnerable buildings and public traffic 
routes)
OSCE Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PATO Principal Ammunition Technical Officer (UK) 
PCP Pentachlorophenal – A toxic chemical historically used to preserve 
wooden ammunition packages 
PCS Pollution Control System 
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PEP Propellant, Explosives and Pyrotechnics 
PES Potential Explosion Site – Any building or site that contains, or is 
intended to contain ammunition 
PfP Partnership for Peace – NATO programme 
PIC Peace Implementation Council 
PiP Project implementation Phase
PM Project Manager 
PST Project Supervisory Team 
QA Quality Assurance 
QC Quality Control 
QD Quantity Distance – The distance from a PES to an ES which is used 
to calculate the amount of ammunition which can be stored in a 
particular building.    
QRF Quick Reaction Force 
RDX Research Developed Explosive – Cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine, a high 
explosive commonly used in military ammunition 
Retort The cylindrical sections of a rotary kiln furnace 
RPG Rocket Propelled Grenade 
SAA Small Arms Ammunition – munitions equal to or les than 12.7mm 
calibre.
SAM Surface to Air Missile 
SAP Small Arms and Light Weapons Reduction Project –  A UNDP 
sponsored project in BiH 
SCC Secondary Combustion Chamber 
SDP Social Democratic Party
SEESAC South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms 
and Light Weapons
SFOR Stabilisation Force – A NATO led multinational military force
SFRY Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SNSD Alliance of Independent Social Democrats  
SOP Standard Operating Procedure 
SPRS Socialist Party of the Republica Srpska
SPSEE Stability Pact for South East Europe 
TNA Training Needs Analysis 
TNT Trinitrotoluene – A high explosive commonly used in military 
ammunition 
TOR Terms of Reference
UK United Kingdom 
ULC Unit Load Container – A method of bulk packing for ease of 
transportation and storage 
UN United Nations 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
USA United States of America
UXO Unexploded Ordnance – Explosive ordnance which has been primed, 
fuzed, armed or otherwise prepared for action and which has been 
dropped, fired, launched, projected or placed in such a manner as to 
constitute a hazard to operations, installations, personnel or material 
and remains unexploded either by malfunction or design or for any 
other reason 
VAT Value Added Tax 
VBIED Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device 
VF Federation Army 
VOC Volatile Organic Compounds
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VRS Army of the Republika Srpska 
WP White Phosphorous
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1.1 The South Eastern Europe Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Monitor1,
published by the South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of 
Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) describes the recent history of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) as follows: 
“Previously a key country in the former socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (SFRY) defence complex, Bosnia and Herzegovina produced a 
substantial amount of military equipment, including the bulk of Yugoslav-
manufactured SALW.2   When war broke out in 1992, thousands were killed 
by small arms as BiH society split into different factions contesting the 
secession of the country from the federal republic.   Domestic arms 
production and holding facilities were a source of supply during the fighting 
and additional weapons were smuggled into the country from neighbouring 
countries and further afield in spite of a UN embargo;3 the then Yugoslav 
state army, the JNA or VJ, and territorial defence also distributed substantial 
amounts of weapons to local militias.”4
1.2 SEESAC has a mandate from the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) and the Stability Pact for South East Europe (SPSEE) to provide 
assistance and support to the partner nations within South Eastern Europe 
(SEE) on SALW destruction issues.  Under that mandate they are 
responsible, in line with their operational objectives, for the identification of 
knowledge gaps and assistance in the design, and implementation where 
necessary, of projects to meet specific needs for the destruction of weapons 
and ammunition in the region.   
1.3 As a result of recent meetings of the national SALW coordination committee, 
combined with a brief analysis of the major SALW problems within Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, SEESAC has concluded that5:
 “It is apparent that the management of SALW, (particularly the related 
ammunition), is an area that has not received sufficient attention from the 
international community”.
 “The recent decision by the Office of the High Representative (OHR) to 
reduce ammunition storage areas within BiH from forty-eight to eight is 
probably unachievable logistically, and that there would certainly be major 
explosive safety concerns should any large-scale physical movement of 
ammunition take place”. 
                                                          
1 South East Europe SALW Monitor, p35. 
2 “Development Denied”, Small Arms Survey 2003, OUP, 2003, p43. 
3 BICC Survey 2002, p131. 
4 “The links between Belgrade and the Serbian paramilitary forces were so substantial that the 
republic’s forces were considered to be a “branch of the Yugoslav Army”, with officers holding dual 
rank in both military formations and salaries being paid from clandestine Yugoslav sources”, Ibid  
5 See Terms of Reference at Annex A. 
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 “BiH is facing a potentially significant threat to human life due to the 
storage conditions and the physical condition of their ammunition 
stockpile.   It has been assessed by SEESAC and the NATO Stabilisation 
Force (SFOR) Ammunition Technical Officer (ATO) that the only realistic 
solution to this problem is a co-ordinated international effort to establish a 
safe and effective Logistic Ammunition Disposal System”. 
 The Establishment of an Ammunition Demilitarization Facility(s) in BiH is 
the only practical, safe and financially viable alternative for the mid and 
long term, whilst open burning and open detonation techniques may 
provide a solution to the short term destruction of ammunition with 
chemical stability problems.    
1.4 Between the publication of the UNDP Request for Proposal on 3 March 2004 
and the award of contract on 21 April 2004 estimates of the Entity Armed 
Forces (EAF) stockpile, provided for use in the Study, decreased by more 
than 50%.6   Verification of the latest figures was sought by TRLtd and on 7 
August 2004 the SFOR ATO confirmed the latest stockpile estimate to be 
67,000 tonnes in 38 storage sites, of which 33,500 tonnes is for disposal.   
However, despite many requests to date, the Study Team has been unable to 
clearly identify the full range and quantities of ammunition natures involved.   
Nonetheless, they obtained sufficient data from which to formulate a strategic 
plan to resolve this challenge.
1.5 The Feasibility Study is sponsored by the UNDP BiH SALW Reduction 
Project (SARP), which has a demilitarization capacity building component 
included in its project document.    
2. AIM OF FEASIBILITY STUDY 
2.1 The aim of the Feasibility Study is to examine the detailed practicality, 
humanitarian, environmental, technical, security, financial and political 
requirements for the establishment of an Ammunition Disposal Facility (ADF) 
in BiH in order to provide the necessary information for potential international 
donor investment in the project. 
3. TERMS OF REFERENCE   
3.1 The UNDP and SEESAC agreed Terms Of Reference (TOR) for the 
Feasibility Study are at Annex A. 
4. METHODOLOGY 
4.1 The detailed requirements for the deliverables and outcome were extracted 
from the TOR.   The requirements were analysed and detailed tasks were 
allocated to the relevant consultants. 
4.2 The methodology matrix, summarising the detailed tasks undertaken by the 
Feasibility Study team is at Annex B. 
                                                          
6 See paragraph 5 of Annex A – Terms of Reference and footnote 11.   
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5. SYNERGY WITH THE ALBANIA SITUATION
5.1 There is a great deal of synergy between the situations in Albania and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina involving the challenge of removal and destruction of surplus 
weapons and ammunition. Personnel from TRLtd and Eldorado Engineering 
Incorporated (EEI) have been heavily involved in the Albania situation and have 
drawn on experience gained in the development and execution of weapons and 
ammunition demilitarization projects there.  
Annexes:
A. SALW Ammunition Demilitarisation Feasibility Study BIH Technical 
Consultancy Team Terms of Reference. 
B. Methodology Matrix.  
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 ANNEX A 
  TO CHAPTER 1 
SALW AMMUNITION DEMILITARISATION FEASIBILITY STUDY 
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
TECHNICAL CONSULTANCY TEAM – TERMS OF REFERENCE7
BACKGROUND
1. SEESAC has a mandate to provide assistance and support to the partner 
nations within South Eastern Europe (SEE) on SALW8 destruction issues.   Under 
that mandate they are responsible, in line with their operational objectives, for the 
identification of knowledge gaps and assistance in the design, and implementation 
where necessary, of projects to meet specific needs for the destruction of weapons 
and ammunition in the region.  Therefore SEESAC has agreed to partially fund (50%) 
of the costs of a weapons and ammunition demilitarization feasibility study, to be 
conducted through the UNDP Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) SALW Reduction 
project (SAP), (which has demilitarization capacity building component included in its 
project document). 
2. As a result of recent meetings of the national SALW coordination committee, 
combined with a brief analysis of the major SALW problems within Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, it is apparent that the management of SALW, (particularly the related 
ammunition), is an area that has not received sufficient attention from the 
international community. 
3. A recent decision of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) requires the 
entities to decide future force structures by the end of 2003, with a concurrent 
reduction of the ammunition storage areas from forty-eight to eight.   Little technical 
ammunition advice was obtained to support this decision, and no formal risk analysis 
was conducted.  It is the technical opinion of SEESAC that this decision is probably 
unachievable logistically, and that there would certainly be major explosive safety 
concerns should any large-scale physical movement of ammunition take place. 
4. BiH is facing a potentially significant threat to human life due to the storage 
conditions and the physical condition of their ammunition stockpile.   It has been 
assessed by SEESAC and the NATO SFOR ATO that the only realistic solution to 
this problem is a co-ordinated international effort to establish a safe and effective 
Logistic Ammunition Disposal system. 
5. In Bosnia and Herzegovina there are 47 major ammunition storage sites 
under control of the Entity Armed Forces (EAF).9  The total stock levels are in the 
region of 137,760 tonnes All Up Weight (AUW)10, of which 34,000 tonnes11 has 
already been identified as requiring disposal.   This figure is almost certainly likely to 
rise within the next three years as the BiH Armed Forces (AFBiH) reorganise. Due to 
its age the remainder of the stockpile could require destruction over the next ten 
                                                          
7 Terms of Reference provided by the UNDP on 22 April 2004.    
8 SALW includes weapons and ammunition by definition. 
9 20 VRS and 24 VF. 
10 VRS = 66,470 tonnes, VF(B) Bosnian  = 25,200 tonnes and VF (H)  Croat = 46,090 tonnes. 
11 Updated figure from ATO HQ SFOR suggest that the stock figure is now nearer 67,000 tonnes.  No   
information as to the apparent discrepancy has been received from SFOR. 
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years. An immediate cause for concern is the chemical stability of the mortar and gun 
propellant in storage. Further advisory information is at Annex A. 
6. It has been suggested that the establishment of an Ammunition 
Demilitarization Facility(s) in BiH is the only practical, safe and financially viable 
alternative for the mid and long term, whilst open burning and open detonation 
techniques may provide a solution to the short term destruction of ammunition with 
chemical stability problems.    
PROJECT DELIVERABLES 
7. A high quality consultancy report, covering in detail all of the relevant factors, 
to be used as the base document for future donor investment in the establishment of 
an Ammunition Demilitarization Facility in BiH, and to identify appropriate weapons 
destruction capacities.   Recognised leading experts in their area must compile the 
report in order to give it the credibility necessary to attract international donor 
interest.   The following areas must be covered. 
7.1  Humanitarian
 The humanitarian effects of any unplanned explosive events in the 
current BiH ammunition storage environment.  This should take the 
form of a Consequence Analysis of an accidental explosive event at 
an above ground Explosive Storehouse. 
 Identify employment opportunities for BiH citizens during the design, 
development, construction and operation of the proposed facility. 
7.2 Environmental
 The environmental impact of the establishment of a Demilitarization 
Facility, (the Facility). 
 Recommendations as to the use of environmentally benign 
demilitarisation techniques compliant with European Community 
environmental directives. 
7.3 Technical
 Assess the overall condition of the BiH ammunition stockpile. 
 Quantify the immediate, short term and long term demilitarization 
requirements.
 Identify the potential technology for an environmentally benign Facility. 
 Identify explosive safety factors for the development of a Facility and 
make recommendations.
 Develop process flows for the demilitarization and the scrap/salvage 
processes.
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 Identify the explosive hazards in storage at, and transportation to the 
Facility and make recommendations. 
 Identify the engineering dimensions of the project together with 
specific requirements. 
 Determine the project engineering phases of the development process 
and evaluate the relationships with other components of the project. 
 Identify technical legal requirements. 
 Identify appropriate capabilities for the destruction of weapons. 
7.3 Security
 Examine the security factors for the weapons and ammunition storage 
at, and movement to the proposed Facility(s). 
 Make recommendations for the physical security of the weapons and 
ammunition storage at the proposed Facility(s). 
7.4 Financial
 Develop a financial model for the proposed Facility(s). 
 Quantify the projects key fixed costs including equipment and 
appropriate building and infrastructure renovations. 
 Estimate operating costs taking into consideration local labour market 
conditions and expatriate staff requirements. 
 Compare the different legal structures available for the management 
of the proposed Facility and their taxation implications. 
 Carry out a preliminary study on the national and international market 
for the various grades of scrap that could be produced. 
7.5 Political
 Identify potential locations for the proposed Facility and on this basis 
put forward alternative schemes for the development of the project. 
 Develop options for the acquisition of the necessary real estate, 
together with anticipated problems and recommended solutions. 
 Liaise with national authorities to obtain information on the necessary 
statutory and regulatory approvals. 
7.6 Training
 Evaluate training levels of BiH ammunition specialists and make    
recommendations for training requirements to international best 
practices.
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7.7 Diary
 The final report should include a diary of activities for the Project 
Team.
7.8 Contact Details
 Details of all individuals consulted in the preparation of the report are 
to be submitted as part of the final report. 
COMPETENCY AND EXPERTISE REQUIREMENTS 
8. General.   The complex and highly technical nature of the Feasibility Study 
demands that a composite team should be assembled with individual expertise in the 
various technical areas.   Prior knowledge and experience in BiH would naturally be 
highly advantageous.  The final selection of the successful tender will be largely 
based on CVs of proposed consultants. 
9. Project Manager.   The Project Manager (PM) should be experienced in the 
management of multi-disciplined consultancy projects.   It is likely that s/he will have 
worked for an international organisation at a senior level, and it is highly desirable, 
but not essential, that the individual has specialist knowledge of BiH.  The PM may 
be ‘double-hatted’ as one of the specialist consultants. 
10. Technical Consultant.   The consultant will be a qualified Ammunition 
Technical Officer, or equivalent, with both Explosive Ordnance Disposal and 
Demilitarisation experience.  The individual will be familiar with the technology 
available and the potential demilitarisation techniques to be used.   The individual will 
be capable of analysing the recommended engineering processes in terms of 
explosive safety and developing a comprehensive explosive safety plan. 
11. Financial Consultant.   The financial consultant should have experience of 
operating in the Central and Eastern European financial environments and have 
knowledge of BiH.   The individual should have advised at governmental level and 
have worked with major donor institutions including UNDP, the European Union or 
the World Bank. 
CONDUCT OF THE WORK 
12. The work will be carried out under the direction of the Consultancy Team 
Leader.   It is anticipated that the full team will need to visit BiH for orientation, to 
determine the problem and to view the ground for approximately thirty days.   UNDP 
and SFOR will coordinate and arrange meetings and visits as necessary.  Other key 
team members will require longer in country.   The final report and recommendations 
will be compiled in the home location of the successful tenderer. 
TARGET DATES
13. To be discussed further during contract negotiations: 
05 April 2004  Consultant Appointed.  
05 June 2004  Draft Report submitted to UNDP BiH SARP 
Project/SEESAC.
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05 July 2004  Final Report submitted to UNDP BiH SARP 
Project/SEESAC.12
TRAVEL
14. It is anticipated that the consultant will have a need to travel to Sarajevo and 
around Bosnia and Herzegovina to consult with the all-appropriate stakeholders.  
Travel costs should be clearly indicated within the Financial Proposal element of the 
tender, and should not exceed current UN Daily Subsistence Allowance (DSA) rates.   
ANNEX A TO TOR 
FURTHER TECHNICAL ADVISORY INFORMATION 
An examination of the fundamental principles of ammunition management, when 
combined with the political and security interests of the international community, 
suggests that the following criteria should be considered when planning safe, 
effective and efficient stockpile management and destruction within BiH.  They are 
listed in human security priority order: 
A.1 Chemical stability
The stability in storage and degradation or deterioration rates of the explosive 
content will influence the degree of urgency for disposal, type of transport that can 
safely be used and destruction methodology.  The primary brisk is that of 
autocatalytic decomposition of propellant, which has the potential to result in 
spontaneous ignition leading to mass explosions in ammunition storage areas.  Such 
explosions will result in the requirement for long, dangerous and expensive explosive 
ordnance disposal (EOD) clearance operations.  Only effective ammunition 
surveillance systems combined with an effective explosive test laboratory can 
quantify this risk. 
A.1.1 VRS ammunition 
The VRS claim to have a limited ammunition surveillance system, but the SFOR ATO 
has seen little evidence to support this on the ground.  Their propellant lot samples 
are centrally held and tested in the Republika Srpska, with irregular bulletins 
informing them of the condition of their stocks.  The accuracy and efficiency of this 
system is not known. 
A.1.2 VF ammunition 
The VF seems to have a well organised ammunition tracking system but lack 
information on their holdings and do not have a standard testing system.  Their 
problem is compounded by the fact that their ammunition has come from a wide 
range of sources 13 and they have virtually no technical data.  Therefore they have no 
                                                          
12 Delays in the identification of accurate information in-country have led to an extension of the 
deadline.  This was agreed with UNDP. 
13 10% Former Yugoslavia, 60% war production of low quality, 20% from an international equipment 
programme (US, UK, Turkish origin ...) and 10% ‘spoils of war’. 
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means of identifying ammunition at risk from propellant instability, and the risks of 
an undesirable explosive event during storage must be assessed as very high.
A.2 Physical degradation of ammunition
This can impact on the inherent safety of safe to arm mechanisms, fuzing systems or 
explosive exudation.  This risk again requires an effective physical examination 
component of the ammunition surveillance system.  The Entity Armed Forces (EAF) 
appear to have a limited surveillance system in place, but the HQ SFOR ATO 
considers that they only tackle visible problems when they become obvious.  It is a 
reactive, rather than a pro-active system, and is dependent on the EAF identifying 
exudation or corrosion when they open the ammunition containers during training.  
The potential for major problems being missed is significant, which means that the 
risks of an undesirable explosive event during transport or use at training must 
be considered to be significant. 
A.3 Safe systems of work 
Safe systems of work are a pre-requisite when handling and processing any types of 
ammunition and explosives.  This includes the implementation of basic explosive 
safety systems in storage and processing and the imposition of adequate explosive 
danger areas.   The explosive safety standards of the EAF could, at best, be 
described as variable and they require international assistance to move towards 
NATO standards.
A.4 Security 
The security of ammunition natures that is attractive for terrorist use (SAM 7, RPG, 
bulk explosives and detonators) is a primary concern for the international community.  
It is recommended that a full security survey of their storage locations and systems 
be conducted.
A.5 Safe ‘Shelf Life’ of ammunition
The shelf life is an indication of the performance of the ammunition for operational or 
training use.  The effects of physical degradation and chemical stability determine the 
safety of ammunition in storage. 
A.6 Armed forces reform and restructuring 
Ammunition destruction planning should form part of wider planning for armed forces 
reform and restructuring.  ‘What are the future realistic and achievable ammunition 
requirements of the national Armed Forces’?  However, from a human safety and 
security factor this is the lowest priority criteria, yet the decision by the OHR has 
moved this to the top of the criteria priority list.  This cannot be supported by the 
limited available technical information without a formal risk analysis being conducted.  
Such an analysis would be a lengthy operation due to the wide spread dispersion of 
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1.1 The humanitarian effects of any unplanned explosive events in the current 
BiH ammunition storage environment.  This should take the form of a 
Consequence Analysis of an accidental explosive event at an above ground 
Explosive Storehouse. 
1.2 Identify employment opportunities for BiH citizens during the design, 
development, construction and operation of the proposed facility. 
2. BACKGROUND 
2.1 Ammunition Storage 
In BiH there are 38 major ammunition storage sites (ASS)1 under control of 
the Entity Armed Forces (EAF) which, according to a recent action plan from 
the Office of the High Representative (OHR), they intend to reduce to only 6.  
The total stock levels are in the region of 67,000 tonnes All Up Weight (AUW), 
of which the SFOR ATO estimates approximately 50% (33,500 tonnes) has 
already been identified as requiring disposal.2  The ammunition varies in age 
but much of the stock is in excess of 20 years old and comes from a wide 
variety of manufactures in many countries.   Full technical reports of the ASS 
which were visited are at Annex A.     
2.2 Ammunition Regulations 
Ammunition regulations concerning the safe storage of military ammunition 
and explosives are contained in Chapter 13 of the Instructions To Parties 
(ITP).   The ITP is published on behalf of the Commander of SFOR 
(COMSFOR) and is intended to give clear direction on compliance with the 
military aspects of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), 
which was signed in 1995.   The requirements of Chapter 13 have been 
drawn from NATO publications regarding the safe storage, movement and 
classification of military ammunition and are intended to be implemented by 
all armed forces in BiH     
2.3 Safety in Storage 
2.3.1 On the recommendation of the SFOR ATO3 technical inspections were 
conducted by the TRLtd consultant in June 2004, at only the 6 storage sites 
which are intended to remain in use.   A significant number of critical safety 
infringements were noted, which are summarised below: 
 In most locations ammunition is not correctly stored according to its 
Compatibility Group (CG), the purpose of which is to ensure the 
                                                          
1 Information provided by the SFOR ATO 7 August 2004. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Recommendation made by e-mail from the SFOR ATO on 21 May 2004. 
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segregation of sensitive natures to prevent them contributing 
unnecessarily to the effects of an explosion or fire.     
 There are large quantities of unpackaged ammunition, some of which is 
stored in the open or in temporary facilities such as steel storage 
containers.   Such conditions considerably increase the likelihood of this 
ammunition contributing to the effects of a fire or explosion. 
 Leaking containers of unidentified chemicals, possibly a liquid propellant 
oxidizer that presents both a significant fire and health risk, are stored 
alongside other explosives.   
 There is inadequate or out of date fire-fighting equipment at all locations.   
 There were no records of the conduct of inspections or the existence of an 
ammunition surveillance system. 
2.3.2 Potential Consequences 
Any failure to implement the highest standards of safety in ammunition 
storage will significantly increase the likelihood of an unplanned explosive 
event occurring.   For example, on 20th June 2003, an ammunition storage 
building near Derventa exploded, killing two soldiers4.    To date the cause of 
the explosion has not been officially ascertained, although apocryphal 
evidence suggests that tampering by unqualified personnel was the cause.  
3 CHEMICAL STABILITY OF AMMUNITION 
3.1 General 
Monitoring of the chemical stability of explosives in ammunition during 
storage is vital to ensure that those stocks that are deteriorating can be 
readily identified and removed for destruction in a timely manner.   
3.1.1 High Explosives 
With high explosives long term stability is not considered to be a problem that 
could compromise safety, providing reasonable levels of storage are 
maintained.   An efficient routine inspection programme will normally be 
sufficient to monitor the general condition of ammunition for signs of 
exudation of the main filling and other indications of deterioration, such as 
corrosion.
3.1.2 Propellants5
In March 2000 Dr Stephen Murray from the Royal Military College of Science, 
at Cranfield University in the UK, conducted an analysis of the potential for 
propellant instability during storage in Albania.   There, storage conditions 
exist that are very similar to those currently found in BiH and his report 
described the following hazards associated with propellants in storage: 
Propellants may be either Single Base containing only nitrocellulose as the 
energetic component or Double Base containing both nitrocellulose and 
nitroglycerine as energetic components.  Even if the propellant is kept in ideal  
                                                          
4 Gumley, J., “Weapon Storage Sites in BiH” NATO SFOR Informer, September 2003.   
5 S. G. Murray, Propellant Stability Analysis, Albania Demilitarisation Study, 31 March 2000.
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storage conditions these components will begin to decompose over time to 
form oxides of nitrogen, mainly dinitrogen tetroxide.  If these oxides of 
nitrogen are not removed from the propellant as they are formed they will 
catalyse further decomposition.  This is an example of autocatalytic 
decomposition since the impurity being formed accelerates the chemistry 
creating more of the same impurity, which, therefore, causes further 
decomposition and so on.   One factor that can increase the rate of chemical 
reaction is temperature.  Thus any increase above 20oC will have an adverse 
effect on the storage life of propellant.   
This autocatalytic decomposition of propellants is a serious safety issue, as it 
is known to lead to spontaneous ignition (see below).  To prevent this 
occurrence, chemical additives are introduced into the propellant formulation 
and are known as stabilisers.  They do not stop the slow decomposition of the 
nitrocellulose and nitroglycerine but rather prevent the accelerated chemical 
decomposition by removing the oxides of nitrogen, which would cause it to 
happen.  Thus, the stabiliser reacts chemically with these oxides removing 
them from the system.  Of course, to do this, the stabiliser will slowly be 
consumed.
Thus, the reduction in stabiliser content will lead to a point where it becomes 
insufficient to guarantee safety and this should be a measure of the storage 
life of that propellant.  Both chemical analysis and instrumental methods can 
be employed to measure the stabiliser content, the latter being a more recent 
advance in propellant analysis. 
Two chemicals are used routinely as stabilisers; one is diphenylamine (DPA) 
used in Single Base propellants from the early years to the present time.  
Chemically it behaves as a base reacting with the initial decomposition 
products of nitrocellulose, initially to form nitrosodiphenylamine, which is then 
converted into various nitro-derivatives of diphenylamine.  This stabiliser is 
too basic to be used if nitroglycerine is present and therefore is not used in 
Double Base propellants.  Instead the stabiliser of choice is 
diphenyldiethylurea also known as carbamite or ethyl centralite.  This acts as 
a weak base reacting with the decomposition products again to form nitro- 
and nitroso-derivatives. The overall chemistry of the action of stabilisers is 
extremely complex but the end result is to keep the propellant chemically 
stable.
Dr Murray also conducted a survey,6 which recorded more than 30 
ammunition accidents worldwide that were attributed to spontaneous 
propellant ignition.  In one accident 2,273 tonnes of mixed explosives and 
ammunition were present.  One explosion caused initially by ignition of 
unstable explosive there were fragments out to a distance of 360 m, concrete 
from the structure to 450 m and firebrands to 600 m.  Windows were broken 
by the blast wave at a distance of over 3 km.  A crater remained which was 
21 m in diameter and 5 m deep.  DR Murray concluded, “It is imperative that 
all propellant in magazines must be included in a surveillance programme”.
3.2 Chemical Analysis Facilities 
The GOF at P.S. Vitezit in Vitez includes limited facilities where propellant 
stability tests are conducted, but does not have any system capable of testing 
propellant manufactured elsewhere.   Only two qualified staff are employed 
there, using a minimal amount of old equipment, to conduct Quality Control 
                                                          
6 Ibid, p 28. 
Chapter 2 – Humanitarian Page 2- 4 
tests of propellant samples which are taken from the ammunition produced in 
the factory. The building, however, has a floor space of approximately 400 sq 
m and it is believed that there is adequate space for considerable expansion.     
4 EFFECTS OF UNPLANNED EXPLOSIVE EVENT IN AMMUNITION 
STORAGE AREA  
4.1 General 
An Explosion Consequence Analysis (ECA) for an unplanned explosive event 
in a typical BiH surface Ammunition Storage Area (ASA) was conducted as 
part of the Feasibility Study.  The following documents were used as the main 
source of technical reference material for the ECA: 
 NATO AASTP – 1, Annexes A and C. 
 Explosion Hazards and Evaluation, W.E. Baker et al, Elsevier, Oxford, 
1983.
 TRLtd Limited ESH Inspection Report of 03 June 2004. 
4.2 Methodology 
4.2.1 The ECA quantifies the effect of the following consequences of an unplanned 
explosive event on civilian houses, public traffic routes and other Explosive 
Store Houses (ESH), collectively known as Exposed Sites (ES), identified in a 
survey of the area:         
 Blast. 
 Fragmentation. 
 Ground effects. 
4.2.2 The following assumptions have been made:  
 Thermal Radiation effects have not been considered. 
 Due to the poor storage conditions all of the explosive contents will fully 
detonate.
 The worst case item of ammunition is a 152mm High Explosive shell 
4.3 Results 
 The detailed ECA for a typical surface ASA in BiH is at Annex B. 
4.4 Findings 
The ECA for this particular site clearly identifies that: 
 The physical infrastructure of the site means that individual ESH could not 
be licensed to store ammunition in accordance with NATO standards.  
The site would have to be treated as a single Potential Explosion Site 
(PES); even then the short safety distances to buildings inhabited by 
civilians (400m) means that the site could not safely store the quantity of 
ammunition that it currently holds. 
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 Personnel working in other buildings within the site would be seriously at 
risk should an undesired explosive event occur in ESH 25. They would 
certainly suffer from Eardrum Rupture, although it could safely be 
assumed that their injuries due to fragmentation injuries would be far 
worse.
 Civilian personnel in the nearest inhabited building would not suffer 
significant hearing or lung damage should an undesired explosive event 
occur.  Eardrum Rupture could be expected out to a distance of 207 
metres from ESH 25. 
 An explosive event in ESH 25 would lead to significant damage to the 
surrounding ESH, and there would be extreme structural damage. 
 Vehicles on the road are not at risk of overturning should there be an 
undesired explosive event. 
 Civilian personnel in the area would be at risk of death or injury from large 
metal fragments, which will travel between 99m and 269m from the site. 
 An undesired explosive event would inevitably lead to Unexploded 
Ordnance (UXO) contamination of the local area if either a high or low 
order detonation of the stocks occurs. Ammunition would be projected out 
of the ESHs at high velocity during the explosion in a ballistically unstable 
trajectory.  This “kicked out” ammunition could have been subjected to 
external forces similar to those found when fired from a weapon. These 
forces, (spin, set back, centripetal and set forward), are the forces used by 
the fuze designer to arm the munition, so that in effect, the ammunition 
could end up in an armed condition and therefore be unsafe. 
5. CONCLUSIONS  
 The ammunition stockpile held by the EAF presents a real and present 
danger to the civilian population living nearby for the following reasons: 
(1)   The age and storage conditions of the ammunition. 
(2)   The critical nature of safety infringements. 
(3)   The lack of inspections to verify the condition of ammunition or a 
        surveillance system to establish the chemical stability of propellants.  
(4)   The excessive Net Explosive Quantities (NEQ) of the ammunition 
  held (quantities held in the ESH. 
 The OHR action plan, to accommodate the ammunition stockpile in only 
six sites, is unattainable, as it will significantly increase the already 
excessive Net Explosive Content (NEC) of these sites.
 The chemical analysis facility in Vitez is not capable of undertaking the 
significant number of analyses likely to be needed to bring the 
surveillance of propellant stability up to date.  The facility requires 
refurbishment and investment in new equipment. 
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6. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 An ammunition surveillance system is introduced as soon as possible.    
 The capability of the facility at Vitez is upgraded to conduct propellant 
testing of the EAF stockpile.   This is necessary to reduce the possibility of 
an unplanned explosive event, prioritise ammunition stock for disposal 
and to continue to monitor propellant stability in the residual stockpile.  
 An Ammunition Demilitarisation Facility, capable of destroying large 
quantities of ammunition is constructed to destroy the estimated 33,500 
tonnes of ammunition currently earmarked for disposal.     
7. EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR BiH CITIZENS 
7.1 General 
The Feasibility Study team has examined the labour requirements to design, 
construct and operate both an ammunition demilitarisation and scrap 
processing facilities.  The methodology used for these assessments is 
contained in the relevant chapter of this report. 
7.2 Manpower requirements 
The estimated manpower requirements to operate the ammunition 
demilitarisation facility are at Annex C. 
 The estimated manpower requirements to construct the ammunition 
demilitarisation facility is at Annex D. 
7.3 Project Supervisory 
The ADF project Supervisory team will be responsible to the lead agency or 
authority that, it is assumed, will also be the fund holders.   The team 
assumes that this supervising role is likely to be an appointed agency such as 
the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA), which has an active 
interest and high profile in demilitarisation throughout Europe and in the 
Balkans.
The Team has identified the following political factors that will be essential to 
the success of Phase A and B Supervisory: 
 Maximum support from the BiH Government, Parliament and the MoD. 
 Project transparency and information flow for donors, the Government 
of BiH and the general public. 
 Maximum utilisation of local resources, facilities and personnel. 
The Team proposes a three-tier organisation consisting of an Executive
Board, the Project Supervisor and the Supervisory Team.
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7.3.1 Executive Board 
The role of the Executive Board is to create policy for the ADF Supervisory 
Team and to monitor progress against approved targets. Additionally the 
Board provides an essential level of local participation and therefore most 
likely to ensure continued support. A suggested structure for the Board is: 
 Chairman - BiH Minister BiH Minister appointed to implement 
Demilitarisation policy. 
 Ministry of Defence representative. 
 Representative(s) of donor/coordinator organisations. 
 EAF Chief of Logistics. 
 Other invited non-executive participants. (E.g. UNDP, SFOR, OSCE, 
SEESAC, etc) 
 Project executors. 
7.3.2 Executing Agency  
An agency appointed by the fund holders to provide contractual and financial 
control over the project. The executing Agency will award contracts to a 
variety of organisations and agencies to the Lead Agency shall appoint the 
supervisor team and shall develop and direct technical policy. 
7.3.3 Supervisory Team 
The Supervisory Team will execute the policy of the Executive Board. Primary 
responsibilities will be to oversee the construction, installation and 
commissioning of the proposed plan. The Supervisory Team will require a 
structure that dovetails to any continued SFOR effort and should be 
composed of lead personnel in the following areas: 
 In country Project management. 
 Local Finance. 
 Oversee construction engineering. 
 Demilitarisation equipment specialist. 
 Ammunition technical specialists. 
 Logistics. 
The ADF Supervisory Team will require full administrative support and 
operating bases in Sarajevo and the operating facility.  
The estimated manpower requirements to design and project manage the 
construction of the ammunition demilitarisation facilities are at Annex E. 
7.4 Summary.   
A summary of employment opportunities, for both International and Local 
personnel, at the peak periods for each activity is as follows: 
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   Role    Int Local 
 Supervisory Project Management   1     0  
  Finance        2 
    Technical    3     1 
    Construction        1  
    Secretarial        4 
    Other         3
    Total        5    12    
 Phase A7 Management     1     0 
Construct/ Demilitarization   3   43 
Administration     1            3  
Total      5    46  
 Phase B8 Management     1     2  
Demilitarisation    3          26  
Scrap Recovery    0     7  
Administration          6
Total      4   41 
      
                                                          
7 Phase A - Installation and operation of an incineration facility designed to dispose of unstable and  
obsolete ammunition.  
8 Phase B – Upgrade ADF to include facilities for the recovery of TNT.   
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            ANNEX A  
   TO CHAPTER 2 
AMMUNITION STORAGE SITES - VISIT REPORTS
ASSESSMENT OF AMMUNITION STORAGE SITE EF 007 – GABELA
1. INTRODUCTION
Gabela is an ammunition storage site for the Federation Army located 
approximately 5 Km SE from Capjlina and approximately 30 Km from Mostar.  
The site was originally built by the Yugoslavian Army in the 1953 and the 
majority of the buildings date from that period.  The site has been damaged 
during the conflict and many of the buildings show structural damage. 
The site contains 13 ammunition storage buildings of standard Yugoslavian 
Army construction.  There are also 2 ISO type containers used to store 
ammunition.  Due to the structural damage, lack of blast protection for the 
windows and the double skinned construction of the doors none of the 
buildings meet NATO standards. 
2. SECURITY 
2.1 Existing Measures    
 Perimeter Fence.  The perimeter fence is complete, but needs the barbed 
wire top replacing with razor wire. 
 Main Entrance.  There is only one entrance to the site which is 
permanently manned.  The entrance is closed by means of a heavy steel 
gate.
 Electronic Security.  There are no alarms on the ESHs or the perimeter.  
There is no lighting within the explosive compound.  There is no CCTV. 
 Guard Force  The guard force is adequate to secure the area, in the 
absence of any electronic security measures.  Any reduction in the guard 
force would severely compromise security. 
 Security of Weapons.  The weapons held for the guard are easily 
accessible by all guard force members.  The padlock securing the 
weapons is not high security. 
 ESH Security.  The ESH are secured by low quality padlocks and wire 
seals.  In addition to this many of the windows are broken, with security 
bars missing or loose. 
2.2 Recommended Improvements.   
 The perimeter fence should be reinforced. 
 The main gate requires replacement. 
 A lighting system should be installed in the explosives compound. 
 The ESHs require an alarm system 
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 The locks to the ESH should be replaced with integral locks or high 
security padlocks. 
3.  AMMUNITION STORAGE CONDITIONS 
3.1   Free Standing ESH
The buildings are generally in a good state of repair.  Some of the free 
standing ESHs have leaks from the roof but the stocks are not affected.  All 
the ESHs have double skinned doors and are not of NATO standard.  Several 
of the buildings have broken windows and bars missing. None of the buildings 
have any lighting. 
3.2   Outside Storage
A large amount of ammunition is stored in the open in close proximity to the 
ESH doors.  Although this ammunition is covered by tarpaulin, is still exposed 
some moisture and to extremes of temperature.  It is likely that the condition 
of this ammunition will degrade rapidly. 
3.3 Ammunition Stocks 
 General   The site is severely overstocked with a large amount of 
ammunition ageing and obsolete ammunition but there is no surveillance 
system. Large amounts of artillery shells, grenades and anti-tank mines 
are held, much of which is surplus to future requirements. The majority of 
the ammunition is locally produced, there are also natures from the Soviet 
Union, USA, China and Romania. 
 Fire Hazard.  Although there is a fire engine on site, there is a lack of fire 
fighting equipment available at the ESH.  Fire extinguishers are present 
but have not been checked or serviced.  The area is prone to fires in the 
summer, to date these have not affected the ammunition storage area. 
 Storage.  Although attempts have been made to store the ammunition 
with regard to Hazard Division (HD) and Compatibility Group (CG) 
overstocking has lead to multiple infringements.  There appears to be a 
lack of proper training and no inspection of the storage conditions.  
Inspections are carried out by SFOR in an attempt to enforce ITP chapter 
13, however the inspectors are not themselves technically trained.   
4 SUMMARY 
Gabela is a suitable location for an ammunition storage site, however safety 
is, at the moment, severely compromised by the overstocking. The storage 
buildings require considerable renovation to reach NATO standard and 
become properly licensed, and the staff are lacking in the basic knowledge of 
ammunition storage regulations.  Since there is no formal ammunition 
surveillance system the condition of much of the ammunition cannot be 
verified.  The storage of ammunition in large quantities outside the ESH will 
only accelerate the process of degradation, and poses a serious explosion 
risk in the event of fire. 
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ASSESSMENT OF AMMUNITION STORAGE SITE EF 024 – PAZARIC KRUPA
1. INTRODUCTION 
Pazaric Krupa is an ammunition storage site for the Federation Army located 
approximately 2 Km SE of Pazaric town and approximately 25 Km from 
Sarajevo.  The site was originally built by the Yugoslavian Army in the 1950s 
and the majority of the buildings date from that period.  The site is set in a 
steeply sided wooded valley, making access to the site difficult and providing 
no line of sight to civilian occupied buildings. 
The site contains 22 ammunition storage buildings, 4 earth covered Igloo type 
and 17 purpose built stone construction storehouses.  There is also a 
container used to store detonators. 
2. SECURITY 
2.1 Existing Measures 
 Perimeter Fence.  The perimeter fence is not complete, but due to the 
presence of minefields both inside and outside of the site repairs are not 
possible.  Demining is being conducted by the army, at the present rate 
of clearance it will continue for another four years. 
 Main Entrance.  There are two entrances to the site.  The second 
entrance is permanently blocked and cannot be easily accessed from 
any area where there are civilians.  The main entrance is closed by a 
steel gate, which is not sufficient to stop a vehicle. At night the access 
road is blocked. 
 Electronic Security.  There are no alarms on the ESHs or the perimeter.  
There is no lighting within the explosive compound.  There is no CCTV. 
 Guard Force  The guard force comprises 16 persons.  Two guards man 
the main gate, one of whom is armed. There are 3 static guarding 
positions within the compound, rising to 4 at night.  The remainder of the 
guard mount patrols and form a QRF.  At night 4 dogs patrol the 
explosives compound. 
 Security of Weapons.  The weapons held for the guard are easily 
accessible by all guard force members.  The padlock securing the 
weapons is not high security. 
2.2 Recommended Improvements  
 The perimeter fence should be replaced. 
 The main gate requires replacement. 
 A lighting system should be installed in the explosives compound. 
 The ESHs require an alarm system 
 The current guard force is adequate to provide security, however there 
are concerns over reduction in the size of the force as part of the army 
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downsizing.   Should the guard force be reduced security would be 
severely compromised. 
3. AMMUNITION STORAGE CONDITIONS 
3.1 Free standing ESH 
The buildings are generally in a good state of repair.  Some of the free 
standing ESHs have leaks from the roof but the stocks are not affected.  All 
the ESHs have double skinned doors and are not of NATO standard.  Several 
of the buildings have broken windows and bars missing.  Many of the ESHs 
have traversing on 3 sides, however this is not of sufficient height.  None of 
the buildings have any lighting. 
3.2 Igloos
The Igloos appear to be structurally sound; however again the doors are of 
double skinned construction therefore the building is not of NATO standard.  
The depth of soil on top of the building could not be ascertained. The Igloos 
have suffered from rock falls onto the top and back of the buildings; these 
falls have come from areas believed to be mined. 
3.3 Ammunition Stocks 
 General  The site is overstocked with a large amount of ammunition due 
to the closure of smaller sites.  Much of the ammunition held comprises 
HE artillery, MLRS type sub munitions dispensers and Grenades.  The 
majority of the ammunition is of Yugoslav or Russian origin. and dates 
from the last 20 years.  There is also a quantity of war production 
ammunition.  Large amounts of the ammunition stocks have already been 
earmarked for disposal. 
 Storage  The ammunition is generally stored with regard to HD and CG, 
however overstocking has lead to some infringements.  There appears to 
be a lack of proper training and no inspection of the storage conditions.  
Inspections are carried out by SFOR in an attempt to enforce ITP chapter 
13, however the inspectors are not themselves technically trained. 
4. SUMMARY 
Pazaric Krupa is a well-situated site with scope for expansion, once the 
demining is completed, if the buildings were improved to NATO standard and 
licensed.  The site is heavily overstocked and the staff are not trained for their 
tasks.  There is no verifiable program for inspection of the storage conditions 
or for technical inspection of the ammunition. The guard force is adequate but 
physical security measures need significant improvement. 
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ASSESSMENT OF AMMUNITION STORAGE SITE EV 076 - RUDO
1  INTRODUCTION 
Rudo is an ammunition storage site for the Army of the Republica Srpska 
located approximately 10km from Visegrad. The ammunition storage 
buildings within the explosives area were built by the Yugoslavian Army in the 
1950s.
The site contains 14 ammunition storage buildings of standard Yugoslavian 
Army construction.  The buildings are in a generally poor state of repair, with 
obvious cracks in the walls and water leaking in from the roof.  Due to the 
structural damage, lack of blast protection for the windows and the double 
skinned construction of the doors none of the buildings meet NATO 
standards.
2. SECURITY 
2.1 Existing Measures 
 Perimeter fence.  The perimeter fence is not complete, but repairs are 
not possible due to the presence of mines. 
 Main entrance.  There is only one entrance to the site which is 
permanently manned.  The entrance is closed by means of a 
dilapidated gate which is not sufficient to stop a vehicle. 
 Electronic Security.  There are no alarms on the ESHs or the 
perimeter.  There is lighting within the explosive compound but it is not 
sufficient to illuminate the whole area.  There is no CCTV. 
 Guard force  The guard force is adequate to secure the area, in the 
absence of any electronic security measures.  Any reduction in the 
guard force would severely compromise security. 
 Security of weapons.  The weapons held for the guard are easily 
accessible by all guard force members.  The padlock securing the 
weapons is not high security.  Ready use ammunition is stored with 
the weapons. 
 ESH security.  The ESH are secured by low quality padlocks and wire 
seals.  In addition to this many of the windows are broken, with 
security bars missing or loose. 
2.2 Recommended Improvements   
 The perimeter fence should be replaces, once demining has been 
completed.
 The main gate requires replacement. 
 A more efficient lighting system should be installed in the explosives 
compound.
 The ESHs require an alarm system 
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 The locks to the ESH should be replaced 
3 AMMUNITION STORAGE CONDITIONS 
3.1 Free Standing ESH
All but two of the ESH are traversed, however the traverses are not of 
sufficient height to prevent the ejection of high velocity projectiles and 
therefore cannot be considered for licensing purposes.  The ingress of 
moisture is affecting the ammunition and the damage to the buildings is in 
some cases severe. 
3.2 Ammunition Stocks 
 General  The site is heavily overstocked with a large amount of 
ammunition due to the closure of smaller sites.  There is a large amount of 
bulk HE and anti-tank mines along with large calibre HE shell and 
grenades. Much of the ammunition is not in its original container, many of 
the containers are damaged exposing the contents.  The majority of the 
ammunition is of Yugoslav or Russian origin. and dates from the last 20 
years.  There is also a quantity of war production ammunition.  Large 
amounts of the ammunition stocks have already been earmarked for 
disposal.
 Storage  The ammunition is stored with little regard to HD and CG, and 
there are multiple infringements.  There appears to be a lack of proper 
training and no inspection of the storage conditions.  Inspections are 
carried out by SFOR in an attempt to enforce ITP chapter 13, however the 
inspectors are not themselves technically trained. 
 Unidentified Chemicals   Building 21 contains fourteen containers marked 
“Toxic”.  There is concern that they may contain liquid propellant or 
oxidiser.  These items are stored along with large amounts of 
Compatibility Group  B and D ammunition, which considerably  increases 
the risk of a major explosion in the event of a fire   
4 SUMMARY 
Rudo is stocked far in excess of the NEQs which would be allowed were the 
site licensed. Furthermore, there is no ammunition surveillance system or 
evidence of the conduct of routine inspections.  The ammunition is generally 
of poor quality and is deteriorating.  The removal of much of the HE stores 
should be a priority.  The lack of regard for the correct mixing of Compatibility 
Groups is also a cause for serious concern, as is the storage of potentially 
toxic chemicals.  The condition of some of the buildings is so poor that 
renovation may not be possible.   This site is to be used for the Explosion 
Consequence Analysis as it is the closest to civilian habitation (300m).  
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ASSESSMENT OF AMMUNITION STORAGE SITE NB 075 - TUZLA 
1 INTRODUCTION 
NB 075 is an ammunition storage site for the Federation Army located 
approximately 20km from Tuzla. The ammunition storage buildings within the 
explosives area were built by the Yugoslavian Army in the 1950s with the 
exception of 1 smaller building that is of more recent construction 
The site contains 9 earth covered igloo type buildings and 7 free standing 
ESH.  Two buildings are currently empty.  A tenth Igloo was completely 
destroyed by an explosion in 1995, when it is believed that an Improvised 
Explosive Device was being constructed in a building containing 1800 Kg of 
HD 1.1 ammunition. 
2 SECURITY 
2.1 Existing Measures 
 Perimeter fence.  The perimeter fence is complete, but insufficiently 
robust.  There area inside the fence is mined.  There is only one entrance 
to the site which is permanently manned.   
 Electronic Security.  There are no alarms on the ESHs or the perimeter.  
There is no lighting within the ammunition storage area.  There is no 
CCTV.
 Guard force  The guard force is adequate to secure the area, in the 
absence of any electronic security measures.  Any reduction in the guard 
force would severely compromise security. 
 Security of weapons.  The padlock securing the weapons is not high 
security.  Control of access to the weapon storage area is good. 
 ESH security.  The ESH are secured by low quality padlocks and wire 
seals.  In addition to this many of the windows are broken, with security 
bars missing or loose.  The ventilation shafts are also insecure. 
2.2 Recommended Improvements   
 The perimeter fence should be refurbished, once demining has been 
completed.
 A lighting system should be installed in the explosives compound. 
 The ESHs require an alarm system 
 The locks to the ESH should be replaced 
3. AMMUNITION STORAGE CONDITIONS 
3.1 Igloos
The igloos are of a reasonable state of repair, with no obvious water leaks.  
The doors are not of NATO standard.  The soil depth is in excess of 60cm. 
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however there has been some soil slippage from the top of the Igloos that has 
been replaced. 
3.2 Free Standing ESH
The free standing ESH are also in a reasonable state of repair, but suffer from 
the same faults as the Igloos.  In addition, their proximity to the ESH  limits 
them to the storage of HD 1.4.  Attempts have been made to adhere to this, 
but there are still items of HD 1.1 and 1.2 in these storehouses. 
3.3 Ammunition Stocks 
 General  Large amounts of unserviceable ammunition has been destroyed 
by the US Army at Camp Commanche.  As a result Tuzla does not suffer 
from the severe overstocking common on BiH ammunition storage.  The 
majority of the ammunition is of Yugoslav or Russian origin and dates 
from the last 20 years.  There were no signs of corrosion or damage. 
 Storage  The site commander has ammunition storage experience, gained 
before the war, and is attempting to apply his knowledge.   There are still 
infringements of the rules regarding the storage of CG H, but some 
attention is being paid to the storage by HD. Inspections are carried out by 
SFOR in an attempt to enforce ITP chapter 13, however the inspectors 
are not themselves technically trained. 
4 SUMMARY 
Tuzla is a well-maintained ammunition storage area with buildings of a good 
standard and in good condition.  A relatively small amount of work would be 
required to raise the condition of the buildings to NATO standard and issue 
Explosive Limit Licenses (ELL). 
The positioning of the free standing ESH would severely limit the ammunition 
holdings were the site to be licensed as one PES.  Discounting these 
buildings would greatly increase the permitted holdings of HD 1.1 and 1.2. 
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ASSESSMENT OF AMMUNITION STORAGE SITE WV 096 – KULA 1
1 INTRODUCTION 
WV 096 is an ammunition storage site located approximately 5km from 
Mrkonjic Grad. The ammunition storage buildings within the explosives area 
were built by the Yugoslavian Army in the 1950s and consist of 14 earth 
covered igloo type buildings.
2 SECURITY 
2.1 Existing Measures 
 Perimeter fence.  The perimeter fence is complete, but insufficiently 
robust.  There are not believed to be any mines within the area of the 
ammunition storage.  There is only one gate on the route to both Kula 1 
and Kula 2, which is permanently manned.  Each storage site has it is 
own entrance; the gate to Kula 1 is not permanently guarded.  The fence 
has sensors fitted but the system is not operational. 
 Electronic Security.  There are no alarms on the ESHs or the perimeter.  
There is no lighting within the ammunition storage area.  There is a CCTV 
system within the depot, which has not been commissioned. 
 Guard force  The guard force has been drastically reduced recently and is 
comprised of junior soldiers.  It is unlikely that this small force of young 
and inexperienced soldiers is capable of providing effective security. 
 Security of weapons.  The padlock securing the weapons is not high 
security.  Control of access to the weapon storage area is good. 
 ESH security.  The ESH are secured by low quality padlocks and wire 
seals.  In addition to this many of the windows are broken, with security 
bars missing or loose.  The ventilation shafts are also insecure. 
2.2 Recommended Improvements   
 The perimeter fence is effective, but in view if the decreased guard force, 
requires reinforcement.  The sensor system should be reactivated. 
 A lighting system should be installed in the explosives compound. 
 The ESH require an alarm system. 
 The locks to the ESH should be replaced. 
3 AMMUNITION STORAGE CONDITIONS 
3.1 Igloos
The igloos are of a reasonable state of repair, with no obvious water leaks.   
The doors are not of NATO standard and the headwalls have glass windows. 
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3.2 Siting
The ammunition storage area has been designed in a rough oval, leading to 
the headwalls of most of the ESH facing each other.  This will greatly reduce 
the permitted NEQ in HD 1.1 and 1.2 unless remedial action is taken.  To 
allow the depot to reach its full potential the headwalls should be 
strengthened, the doors and windows replaced and a traverse built in front of 
the headwall.
3.3 Ammunition Stocks 
 General  Many of the ESH carry large quantities of HD 1.1, comprising 
mostly anti-tank mines. The majority of the ammunition is of Yugoslav or 
Russian origin and dates from the last 20 years.  Unserviceable 
ammunition is stored in the open next to the headwall of the ESH.  This 
ammunition is suffering considerable deterioration.  Large amounts of 
ammunition inside the ESH is not in its original packaging, in addition 
much of the packaging is damaged.   
 Storage  There is little attention to the basic rules of ammunition storage 
or accounting.  There are no stack cards within the ESH. There appears 
to be no appreciation of the special storage requirements of ammunition 
containing WP and there are numerous infringements of the rules 
governing the mixing of Compatibility Groups, most seriously the mixing of 
unboxed detonators with HE stores. 
4 SUMMARY 
Kula 1 has the potential to be a safe and effective ammunition storage site, 
however the remedial action to the headwalls is vital to allow the storage of 
significant quantities of the higher hazard divisions.  The current standard of 
safety in storage is low and without proper training for the site staff and a 
programme of inspections by technically qualified persons, is not likely to 
improve.
.
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ASSESSMENT OF AMMUNITION STORAGE SITE WV 261 KULA 2
1 INTRODUCTION 
WV 261 is an ammunition storage site located approximately 5Km from 
Mrkonjic Grad within a complex that also includes Kula 1. The ammunition 
storage buildings within the explosives area were built by the Yugoslavian 
Army in the 1950s and consist of 22 earth covered igloo type buildings.    
2 SECURITY 
2.1 Existing Measures 
 Perimeter fence.  The perimeter fence is complete, but insufficiently 
robust.  There are not believed to be any mines within the area of the 
ammunition storage.  There is only one gate on the route to both Kula 1 
and Kula 2, which is permanently manned.  Each storage site has it is 
own entrance; the gate to Kula 2 is not permanently guarded.  The fence 
has sensors fitted but the system is not operational. 
 Electronic Security.  There are no alarms on the ESHs or the perimeter.  
There is no lighting within the ammunition storage area.  There is a CCTV 
system within the depot, which has not been commissioned. 
 Guard force  The guard force has been drastically reduced recently and is 
comprised of junior soldiers.  It is unlikely that this small force of young 
and inexperienced soldiers is capable of providing effective security. 
 Security of weapons.  The padlock securing the weapons is not high 
security.  Control of access to the weapon storage area is good. 
 ESH security.  The ESH are secured by low quality padlocks and wire 
seals.  In addition to this many of the windows are broken, with security 
bars missing or loose.  The ventilation shafts are also insecure. 
2.2 Recommended Improvements   
 The perimeter fence is effective, but in view if the decreased guard force, 
requires reinforcement.  The sensor system should be reactivated. 
 A lighting system should be installed in the explosives compound. 
 The ESHs require an alarm system 
 The locks to the ESH should be replaced 
3 AMMUNITION STORAGE CONDITIONS 
3.1 Igloos  
The Igloos are in a reasonable state of repair, however there is evidence that 
water leaks in from beneath the doors. The doors are not of NATO standard.  
The headwalls have glass windows, which reduce their structural integrity. 
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3.2 Siting 
The ammunition storage area has been designed in a rough oval, leading to 
the headwalls of most of the ESH facing each other.  The distance between 
the ESH is, however, greater than that at Kula 1.  This will greatly reduce the 
permitted NEQ in HD 1.1 and 1.2 unless remedial action is taken.  To allow 
the depot to reach its full potential the headwalls should be strengthened, the 
doors and windows replaced and a traverse built in front of the headwall.  
3.3 Ammunition Stocks 
 General    Many of the ESH carry large quantities of HD 1.1, 
comprising mostly anti-tank mines. The majority of the ammunition is 
of Yugoslav or Russian origin and dates from the last 20 years.  
Unserviceable ammunition is stored in the open next to the headwall 
of the ESH.  This ammunition is suffering considerable deterioration.  
Large amounts of ammunition inside the ESH is not in its original 
packaging, in addition much of the packaging is damaged.   
 Storage   Attempts have been made to apply the basic rules of 
ammunition storage or accounting, however there appears to be no 
appreciation of the special storage requirements of ammunition 
containing WP and there are numerous infringements of the rules 
governing the mixing of compatibility groups, most seriously the mixing 
of unboxed detonators with HE stores.  There are large amounts of 
extraneous items within the ESH, including piles of wood and in 
ESH 4, a car.  These items will increase the risk of fire. 
4 SUMMARY 
Kula 2 has the potential to be a safe and effective ammunition storage site, 
however the remedial action to the headwalls is vital to allow the storage of 
significant quantities of the higher hazard divisions.  The current standard of 
safety in storage is low, and without proper training for the site staff and a 
programme of inspections by technically qualified persons, is not likely to 
improve.
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ASSESSMENT OF AMMUNITION STORAGE SITE WB 053 GREBEZ
1 INTRODUCTION 
WB 053 is an ammunition storage site located approximately 10 Km from 
Bihac. The ammunition storage buildings within the explosives area were built 
by the Yugoslavian Army in the 1950s and consist of 6 freestanding brick built 
ESH.
2  SECURITY 
2.1 Existing Measures 
 Perimeter Fence.  The perimeter fence is complete, but insufficiently 
robust.  Approximately half the area within the perimeter fence is still 
mined.  There is only one gate to the ammunition storage area, which is 
permanently manned.  All visitors to the area are searched for contraband 
on entry and again on leaving. 
 Electronic Security.  There are no alarms on the ESHs or the perimeter.  
There is no lighting within the ammunition storage area.   
 Guard Force  The guard force of 12 is sufficient to provide security for the 
site.
 Security of weapons.  The weapons are not secured, although the 
ammunition is secured by a high security padlock. 
 ESH security.  The ESH are secured by low quality padlocks and wire 
seals.
2.2 Recommended Improvements   
 A lighting system should be installed in the explosives compound. 
 The ESH require an alarm system 
 The locks to the ESH should be replaced 
3 AMMUNITION STORAGE CONDITIONS 
3.1 ESHs
The igloos are of a good state of repair, with no evidence of water leaks 
however, the doors are not of NATO standard and the walls have glass 
windows, which reduce their structural integrity.   All buildings have an earth 
traverse on 4 sides. 
3.2 Ammunition Stocks 
 General   All ESH are overstocked with ammunition in Hazard Division 
1.1.  There is a large range of natures, many of which have been deemed 
unserviceable or surplus to requirements. 
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 Storage   Ammunition in this site is stored in accordance with ITP chapter 
13.  The ammunition storage is of a high standard and there were no 
infringements of the rules governing the mixing of Compatibility Groups. 
4 SUMMARY 
Grebez is a well-maintained and run site with a high standard of ammunition 
storage.  The ESH are in a good condition and the traversing is the most 
effective seen in BiH. 
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 ANNEX B  
  TO CHAPTER 2 
EXPLOSION CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS
SURFACE AMMUNITION STORAGE AREA – EV 076 RUDO9
References: 
A. TRLtd Limited ESH Inspection Report of 03 June 2004. 
B. NATO AASTP-1, Annexes A and C.   
C. Explosion Hazards and Evaluation, W E Baker et al, Elsevier, Oxford, 1983. 
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Explosive Storehouse (ESH) 25 at the EV 076 RUDO Ammunition Storage 
Area (ASA) was chosen for the subject of this Explosion Consequence 
Analysis (ECA) as, although it does not contain the highest Net Explosive 
Quantity of the surface explosive storehouses (ESH) within Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, it is very close to human habitation and represents a typical 
ESH within an ammunition storage area (ASA) in BiH.   Although ESH 20 
within the site has a larger NEQ, the effects of an undesirable explosion at 
ESH 25 will illustrate the danger to the local populace. 
1.2 Appendix 1 to this paper summarises ammunition stock holdings found in this 
ASA at the time of the visit at Reference A.   There was a total Net Explosive 
Quantity (NEQ) of 670 tonnes of Hazard Division (HD) 1.1 and 1.2 
ammunition, (all of which must be aggregated as HD 1.1).  ESH 25 contains 
an NEQ of 84.8 tonnes. 
1.3 There was no adequate segregation of different ammunition natures in the 
ESH, therefore it is assumed that all of the ammunition will propagate and 
contribute to the explosive effects. 
1.4 The ammunition is stored in a single brick ESH with no effective traversing for 
protection.  NATO explosive licensing regulations would require that the 
whole ASA be treated as a single Potential Explosion Site (PES) due to the 
very low internal quantity distances (IQD) and lack of protection provided by 
the buildings and traverses.  However, for the purposes of this ECA, only the 
effects of an undesired explosion at a single ESH will be considered, as it is 
highly unlikely that there would be a mass detonation of the entire ASA.  
Experience from previous undesired explosive events in ASA suggests that 
the individual ESH detonate over a period of time.  Although this time could 
be measured in minutes, the shock and blast effects of the individual 
detonations occur in milli-seconds; hence the requirement to examine the 
effects of a single ESH explosion. 
2. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The important findings from the following Explosion Consequence Analysis 
can be summarised as follows: 
                                                          
9 The RUDO Ammunition Storage Area (ASA) is located approximately 10 km from Visegrad. 
Chapter  2 – Humanitarian Page 2-B-2 
 The physical infrastructure of the site means that individual ESH could 
not be licensed to store ammunition in accordance with NATO 
standards.  The site would have to be treated as a single Potential 
Explosion Site (PES); even then the short safety distances to buildings 
inhabited by civilians (400m) means that the site could not safely store the 
quantity of ammunition that it currently holds. 
 Personnel working in other buildings within the site would be seriously at 
risk should an undesired explosive event occur in ESH 25.  They would 
certainly suffer from Eardrum Rupture, although it could safely be 
assumed that their injuries due to fragmentation injuries would be far 
worse.
 Civilian personnel in the nearest inhabited building would not suffer 
significant hearing or lung damage should an undesired explosive 
event occur.  Eardrum Rupture could be expected out to a distance of 207 
metres from ESH 25. 
 An explosive event in ESH 25 would lead to significant damage to the 
surrounding ESH, and there would be extreme structural damage.
 Vehicles on the road are not at risk of overturning should there be an 
undesired explosive event. 
3. EXPLOSIVES LIMIT LICENCE (ELL) TO NATO STANDARDS
3.1 The NATO AASPT (Reference B) defines the internationally accepted safety 
distances to be followed for the safe storage of ammunition and explosives in 
order to reduce the risk to the general public to an acceptable level.    
3.2 The application of NATO AASPT regulations to the selected ammunition 
storage area would produce the following explosive limits. 












(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)
1 ESH 24 50 D 12 NIL 0.8Q1/3
2 Road 1 
(Group 3) 
400 D11 (>270) 18,000 3.6Q1/2
3 House 1 
(Group 4) 
400 D13 (>400) 5,500 5.5Q1/2
Table 1:  NATO Explosive Limits
3.3 The presence of the ESH 24 at 50m from the ESH would be the primary 
factor to preclude the storage of any Hazard Division 1.1 ammunition in 
this ESH under NATO regulations.  Should a technical waiver be granted, 
then the next limiting factor of House 1 at 400m would limit the NEQ to 5,500 
Kg.  The ESH currently stores over fourteen times the quantity that would be 
permitted under NATO AASPT limits, even with a waiver.
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4. EXPLOSION CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS
4.1 Blast Shock Effects 
4.1.1 Determination of Ps and I Limits for Personnel   
The peak side-on pressure (Ps) and Impulse (I) limits were initially derived 
from Reference B as follows: 
(1) For the first stage of the analysis the Threshold Eardrum Rupture Ps of 
34.5 kPa (Hirsch 1968) was taken as the acceptable blast damage 
level to personnel.  (Baker, Page 595).
(2) The total NEQ of 84.8 tonnes, (84,768 kg) was input into the Airburst 
Parameters v Blast calculation (Kingery and Bulmash).  This predicted 
the following Ps levels for the ES at the surface, (assuming TNT 
equivalence of ESH contents as 1.0): 














(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
1 ESH 24 50 699.21 3424.33 6865.46 20751.60 29.79 
2 Road 
(Group 3) 
400 12.58 26.56 1014.47 1924.46 889.49 
3 House 1 
(Group 4) 
400 12.58 26.56 1014.47 1924.46 889.49 
Table 2:  Pressure / Impulse Levels for PES (Ps = 34.5 kPa)
(3) These results show that military personnel working in the adjacent 
ESH 24 would suffer from Eardrum Rupture, should there be an 
undesired explosive event.  However, as the explosive event would so 
large, they are very likely to suffer from more significant injuries 
anyway, and therefore this particular effect can be discounted as 
minor compared to the other hazards.  
Civilian personnel at the House 1 would not be close to the 
Eardrum Rupture Threshold level and may only suffer some 
limited hearing damage.
If the Threshold Eardrum Rupture Ps of 34.5 K.Pa is input into the 
calculation, then it can be shown that significant hearing damage 
will be inflicted on any other personnel out to a distance of 207m.
(4) The Lung Damage Threshold levels at the House 1 were then 
investigated using the figures from Serial (3), Table 2 above.  The 
methodology at Baker, Page 593 was used to calculate the following: 
Scaled Pressure Psp  = Ps / Ambient Pressure (P0)
Ambient Pressure at Sea Level = 102 kPa. 
Peak Side On Pressure (Ps) = Ambient Pressure + Ps (Table 2). 
Therefore, Psp  =  (102 + 12.58)/102  =  1.123
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The Scaled Impulse,  Isi  =  Is / P01/2 m1/3, where m = mass of person 
was then investigated.  Assuming the Mass of an Adult Female as 
55kg, the Scaled Impulse at ESH 25 for the figures at Table 2 above 
are:
Isi  =  1014.47 / (102,0001/2 x 551/3)  =  0.8353 Pa1/2.s/kg1/3
These Scaled Pressure and Scaled Impulse figures are below the 99% Survival 
Curve for Lung Damage.  It can therefore be assumed that females will survive 
with minimal lung damage injury.
This methodology was then used to calculate the effects on a young baby at 
the House 1; (babies being the most vulnerable targets). 
The Scaled Pressure and Scaled Impulse for a young baby of Mass = 
5kg at the House 1 was then calculated from  
Scaled Pressure Psp  = Ps / Ambient Pressure (P0) and
Scaled Impulse  Isi  =  Is / P01/2 m1/3:
Psp  =  (102 + 12.58)/102  =  1.123 
    Isi  =  1014.47 / (102,0001/2 x 51/3)  = 5.432 Pa1/2.s/kg1/3
These Scaled Pressure and Scaled Impulse figures are below the 99% Survival 
Curve for Lung Damage.  It can therefore be assumed that babies will also survive 
with minimal lung damage injury.
4.1.2 Effect of Blast on Exposed Site (ES) Structures 
ESH 24
(1) General.   ESH 24 is of similar construction to that of ESH 25 and is 
designed to protect its contents from the explosion effects of an 
adjacent ESH.  There are no windows to be considered, only a single 
brick structure with no traverse protection. 
(2) Scaled Distance Evaluation.   Reference C, Page 567 - 568 discusses
the effects of blast on structures.  The US Department of Defense 
uses the criteria that Range / Charge Weight1/3 = Constant, (K = 
R/W1/3).  Although this criterion implies a constant overpressure, which 
infers response in the quasi-static loading realm, it is the basis of all 
blast pressure effect qualitative assessment.  Therefore it is used in 
this Consequence Analysis.  A comparison of the figures from Table 1 
v those obtained from Table 8.1 at Reference C is as follows at Table 
3:




(a) (b) (c) (d)
1 US DoD (Reference C) Requirements 4.4 55 
2 Kingery (Table 1 Above) 1.14 698.66 
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Table 3: Comparison of Data for ESH 25
(3) Conclusion.   The NEQ stored in ESH 25 will cause major damage 
to ESH 24 in the event of an undesirable explosive event as the 
R/W1/3 is approximately 25% of the DOD required level.
Reference C, Page 565 - 566 discusses the use of Jarret’s Equation 
to predict the damage level.  If the is and Ps figures from Table 1 
above are interpolated against Figure 8-1 in Baker then it can be 
predicted that there will be extreme structural damage, as the 
interpolated figures fall outside the parameters of the curve. 
House 1
(1) General.  The House 1 is a brick built structure with windows to be 
considered.  It is unprotected from the effects of an event in ESH 25. 
(2) Scaled Distance Evaluation.   Using the same methodology as that for 
ESH 24, a comparison of the figures from Table 4 v those obtained 
from Table 8.1 at Reference C is as follows at Table 4: 




(a) (b) (c) (d)
1 US DoD (Reference C) 4.4 55.0 
2 Kingery (Table 1 Above) 9.11 12.58 
Table 4: Comparison of Data for Range
There will be no significant structural damage caused by blast at 
House 1. 
(3) Effect on Windows.   It has been assumed that the parameters for the 
windows are: 
  Type of Glass:   Sheet   (Use Reference B, Figure 8-3)
  Pane Area:   0.5 m2
  Pane Thickness10:  0.003 m 
  Pressure (Ps):   12.58 K.Pa  (Window not in Line of 
Sight)
Interpolation of the graph estimates that there will be no glass 
breakage due to Ps loading resulting from an event in ESH 25, as the 
glass needs to be subjected to a side-on pressure of approximately 22 
N.m2.
Road
Assuming that the target to be considered on the Road is a large truck, 5m 
long, 2.7m high and 2m wide, with a high centre of gravity @ 1.35m and Mass 
of 6000 kg.    The following is derived in Excel from Reference B, Figures 8-4 
and 8-5 (Enclosure 4): 
                                                          
10 Equivalent to 1/8 inch. 
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Scaled Ps  =  Ps / P0    =   12.58 / 102 = 0.1233 
Scaled Free Field Impulse = (a0 CD Is)/P0 H) 
      = (329 x 1.8 x 1014.47)/(102000 x 
2.7)
      = 2.18 
Entering Figure 8.4 gives a Scaled Specific Impulse (IS) applied to the target 
vehicle of approx 0.18.  The Average Specific Impulse (It) can then be 
calculated from: 
It = (IS . P0 . H)/a0
It = 11.55    (Units not necessary as it is a 
direct comparison)
(where a0 = ambient sound velocity, CD = Air Drag Coefficient (taken as 0.5), 
H = Target Height) 
Then,
Scaled Target Height (h/w) = 1.35 
Scaled C of G Location  = 0.50 
Entering Table 8.5 gives a Scaled Critical Impulse Threshold (Isci) of 0.56.  
I

 = (Isci A hbl) / m g1/2 b3/2
 = (Isci m g1/2 b3/2) / A hbl




 = Critical Threshold Impulse, A  and hbl = Centre of Pressure 
Height (Assumed to be ½ Vehicle Height,  m = Vehicle Mass, g = gravity and  




 = 2020   (Units not necessary as it is a 
direct comparison) 
As It is less than I the vehicle will not overturn.
4.2 Effect of Fragmentation on ES 
4.2.1 General    
The lack of an effective Interceptor Traverse means that any Low Angle, High 
Velocity fragments from heavy cased munitions within ESH 25 will present a 
risk.  The threat to the ES is therefore from both Low Angle, High Velocity and 
High Angle, Low Velocity fragments. 
4.2.2 Calculation of Large Fragment Velocity   
It is assumed that the worst-case munition is a 152mm Shell HE with the 
following masses: 
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  Mass of Shell Body and Filling 30.87 kg 
  Mass of Filling    6.25 kg 
  Mass of Shell Body   24.62 kg 
Assume that on detonation the worst-case large fragment is the shell base, 
which is approximately 20% of the mass of the shell body, this equates to a 
maximum Fragment Mass of 4.924 kg.  Therefore, from the Gurney Equation: 
V0 = (2E)1/2 (/(1 + 1/2)1/2
  (Where (2E)1/2  = Gurney Constant and  = Charge Mass / Body Mass) 
 Gurney Constant for TNT    = 2097 m/s 
V0 = 995.28 m/s
4.2.3 Calculation of Large Fragment Throw Distance  
Two simple methods can be used to estimate the Fragment Throw Distance: 
(1) From Fragment Slowdown Equation.
Vs = Vd exp (-2Cd air A s)
               2m
(where Cd = Drag Coefficient (=0.64), air = Air Density (=1.225 
kg/m3), A = Base Area (=0.01815m2) and m = Base Mass 
(=4.924))   
Assuming vertical or horizontal throw for the fragment, then Vs
will be 0 in the vertical and horizontal directions.  Therefore: 
0 = 995.28 exp(-2.898 x 10-3 s) 
Taking logs: 
1 = -1.1854 x 10-3 s 
Vertical Throw Distance = 346 m 
The worst-case launch angle for maximum range can be 
assumed to be 390
Then assuming that the worst case fragment throw distance in 
the vertical plane is that predicted from the Gurney equation 
and Fragment Slowdown equation is 346m, using Hypotenuse 
predictions: 
Horizontal Distance Travelled   Dh = Cos390 x 
346
Dh = 268.9m
(2) From Ballistic Equation.  The range of a projectile can be estimated 
using the formula, (assuming  = 390 for maximum range): 
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R = V0 Sin2
     g
   = (995.28/9.81) Sin (2 x 39) 
   R = 99.24m       
4.2.4 Conclusions
The maximum fragment throw distance for a large fragment will travel 
between 99.24m and 268.9m, therefore all of the PES are vulnerable to base 
fragment attack from any base fragments of 152mm HE shell stored in ESH 
25.  Further quantitative assessment is required to evaluation the 
mathematical chance of such a scenario.
The danger area for more ballistically stable, smaller fragments from the shell 
will be equivalent to the danger area for the munition, which in this case can 
be expected to be in excess of 900m. 
4.3 Effect of Ground Shock on ES 
A simple formula, derived from experimentation, is used by the UK Defence 
Evaluation and Research Agency to estimate the distance over which the 
Ground Shock induced by an event is transmitted: 
D = 32 (NEQ)1/2
 = 32 (84768)1/2
D = 9316m
This estimated distance means that significant Ground Shock will be 
experienced by all of the ES.
5. ADDITIONAL TECHNICAL IMPACTS 
An undesired explosive event would inevitable lead to Unexploded Ordnance 
(UXO) contamination of the local area if either a high or low order detonation of 
the stocks occurs. Ammunition would be projected out of the ESHs at high 
velocity during the explosion in a ballistically unstable trajectory.   This 
“kicked out” ammunition could have been 
subjected to external forces similar to those 
found when fired from a weapon.   These 
forces, (spin, set back, centripetal and set 
forward), are the forces used by the fuze 
designer to arm the munition, so that in 
effect, the ammunition could end up in an 
armed condition and therefore be unsafe.
This “kick-out” scenario would require a full 
planned UXO clearance operation of the entire 
area around the demolition pits, an operation 
that is expensive, time consuming and 
dangerous.   It would add significantly to the 
workload of the BiH Mine Action Centre 
(BHMAC).
Lagos, Nigeria 2002:  Effects of ‘kick out’ scenario after 
an undesired explosive event.  This incident alone 
resulted in over 1500 civilian fatalities! 
(Photo courtesy PATO, HQ LAND Command, UK)
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Appendix:
1. Ammunition Stored in EV076 RUDO ASA. 
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APPENDIX 1  
TO ANNEX B 
EV 076 RUDO 
AMMUNITION STORAGE STATISTICS
ESH NEQ (KG) HD REMARKS 
(a) (b) (c) (d)
ESH 11 70,628 1.1  
ESH 12 45,631 1.1  
ESH 13 16,342 1.1  
ESH 14 60,464 1.1  
ESH 15 22,306 1.1  
ESH 16 72,850 1.1  
ESH 17 18,630 1.2  
ESH 18 53,007 1.1  
ESH 19 65,694 1.1  
ESH 20 92,036 1.1  
ESH 21 2,758 1.1  
ESH 23 22,242 1.1  
ESH 24 42,365 1.1  
ESH 25 84,768 1.1 Selected for ECA 
TOTAL NEQ 
669,721 1.1 (670 Tonnes) 
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          ANNEX C
TO CHAPTER 2
ESTIMATED MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
OPERATION OF AMMUNITION DEMILITARISATION FACILITY
1. Phase A11 - Demilitarisation Staff.   The following table provides an estimate 
of the manpower requirements for the initial phase of the demilitarisation 
project.
SER GRADE ROLE INT LOCAL
1 Project Manager General manager. 
Overall responsibility for demilitarisation,  
logistics and scrap recovery. 
1
2 Technical Manager Technical manager of demilitarisation
facility and logistics safety officer. 
1
3 Deputy Technical Manager Technical manager of demilitarisation
facility and logistics safety officer. 
 1 
4 2nd Shift Supervisor. Assistant technical manager.  1 
5 Engineer. Chief equipment engineer. 1
6 Deputy Engineer. Deputy equipment engineer.  1 
7 Lead Operators. Equipment operators supervisors.  2 
8 Equipment Operators. Operators of demilitarisation equipment.  10 
9 Labourers.  General duties personnel.  5 
TOTAL 4 19
2. Phase A - Administrative Support.   The following table provides an estimate 
of the manpower requirements for the initial phase of the demilitarisation 
project.
SER GRADE ROLE INT LOCAL
1 Finance & Administration. Financial and administration officer. 1
2 Ammunition Accounts and 
Audits
Control, issue & receipt of ammunition  
stocks. Auditing of technical accounts. 
 1 
3 Clerical Support / 
Interpreters. 
Act as clerical support for the admini- 
strative and technical management staff. 
 2 
TOTAL 1 3
3. Phase B12 - Demilitarisation Staff.   The following table provides an estimate 
of the manpower requirements for the second phase of the demilitarisation 
project.
SER GRADE ROLE INT LOCAL
1 Director General manager. 
Overall responsibility for demilitarisation,  
logistics and scrap recovery. 
1
2 Technical Manager Technical manager of demilitarisation
facility and logistics safety officer. 
1
3 Deputy Technical Manager Technical manager of demilitarisation
facility and logistics safety officer.  
(Takes over from International) 
 1 
4 2nd Shift Supervisor. Assistant technical manager.  1 
5 Engineer. Chief equipment engineer. 1
                                                          
11 Phase A – installation and operation of incineration facility designed to dispose of unstable and obsolete 
ammunition
12 Phase B – Upgrade ADF to include facilities for the recovery of TNT.   
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SER GRADE ROLE INT LOCAL
6 Deputy Engineer. Deputy equipment engineer.  4 
7 Lead Operators. Equipment operators supervisors.  4 
8 Equipment Operators. Operators of demilitarisation equipment.  18 
9 Labourers.  General duties personnel.  7 
TOTAL 3 35
4. Phase B - Administrative Support.   The following table provides an estimate 
of the manpower requirements for the second phase of the demilitarisation 
project.
SER GRADE ROLE INT LOCAL
1 Finance & Administration. Financial and administration officer. 1
2 Ammunition Accounts and 
Audits
Control, issue & receipt of ammunition  
stocks. Auditing of technical accounts. 
 2 
3 Clerical Support / 
Interpreters. 
Act as clerical support for the admini- 
strative and technical management staff. 
 4 
TOTAL 1 6
5. Summary.   The summary of manpower requirements for the operation of the 
proposed facility is as follows.   
SER GRADE Phase A Phase B 
International Local International Local
1 Director 1  1  
2 Technical Manager. 1  1  
3 Deputy Technical Manager. 1   1 
4 2nd Shift Supervisor.  1  1 
5 Engineer. 1  1  
6 Deputy Engineer.  1  4 
7 Lead Operators.  2  4 
8 Equipment Operators.  10  18 
9 Labourers.  5  7 
10 Finance & Administration. 1  1  
11 Ammunition Accounts and Audits  1  2 
12 Clerical Support / Interpreters.  2  4 
TOTALS 5 22 4 41
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ANNEX D 
TO CHAPTER 2 
ESTIMATED MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
CONSTRUCTION OF AMMUNITION DEMILITARISATION FACILITY
Note: These tables are designed to show local manpower that will be used in the 
construction/refurbishment phases of the ADF.  Costs for this activity are 
include in refurbishment and equipment installation charges.  
Table 1 – Estimated Manpower Requirements – ADF Refurbishment. 
SER GRADE ROLE INT LOCAL
1 Carpenter. Refurbishment of doors,  
panelling and windows. 
 2 
2 Glazier. Refurbishment of windows.  1 
3 Electrician.  Rewiring of Ammunition  
process Buildings. 
 2 
4 Construction. Repairs to flooring. 
Repairs to air and water  
supply system 
 3 
5 Labourer. General duties/assistants.  4 
TOTAL 12
Table 2–Estimated Manpower Requirements – Equipment Preparation & Installation. 
SER GRADE ROLE INT LOCAL
1 Construction. Laying of incinerator bed.  4 
2 Labourer. General duties/assistants.  2 
3 Electrician.  Equipment electrical installation.  2 
4 Plumber Equipment water supply installation.  2 
5 Crane operator. Large equipment handling.  1 
6 MHE operator Equipment handling.  1 
TOTAL 12
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    ANNEX E  
TO CHAPTER 2
ESTIMATED MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
DESIGN AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT OF AMMUNITION DEMILITARISATION 
FACILITY
Table 1 - ADF Supervisor Team.
SER GRADE ROLE INT LOCAL
1 Project Supervisor  
(Full time, probably a 
consultant development 
specialist)
 Donor/coordinator project 
Manager
 Contracts manager.  
1
2 Accountant.  
(Part-time) 
 Project finances.  1 
3 Secretarial. 
(Full time) 
 General clerical duties / Interpreter  2 
4 Driver. 
(Full time) 
 Supervisor team driver.  1 
TOTAL 1 5
Table 2 – ADF Supervisory Team. (Commercial) 
SER GRADE ROLE INT LOCAL
1 Project Manager. 
(Full-time international,  
non-technical)
 Project Manager. 
 Team control. 
 High-level Liaison  
      (Donors, NATO, political)
1
2 Deputy Project Manager. 
(Full time local,  
technically qualified.) 
 Act as Deputy Project Manager. 
 Manage all local staff  




 Financial administration and  
      planning. 
 1 
4 Construction  
engineering. 
(Part-time local) 
 Oversee refurbishment and 
construction phases.  
 1 
5 Demilitarisation  
equipment specialist. 
(Full time international) 
 Design of Phase A facility. 
 Supervision of selection,  
      procurement, shipping and  
      installation of demil equipment. 
1
6 Ammunition technical 
specialist.
(Full time international) 
 Phase A design assistants. 
 The production of procedures, 
regulations and instructions 
appertaining to demilitarisation  
 activity. 
1
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SER GRADE ROLE INT LOCAL




 Planning of in-loading, storage 
and logistics. 
 Storage licensing. 
 Liaison official to the BiH MoD. 
 EWI equipment commissioning. 
1
8 Clerical support 
(Full time locally 
recruited)
 General clerical duties for all 
staff.
 Act as interpreters as required. 
 2 
9 Driver  
(Full time locally 
recruited)
 General driving duties for team 
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CHAPTER 3  
ENVIRONMENTAL
1. DELIVERABLES 
1.1 The environmental impact of the establishment of a Demilitarization Facility.  
1.2 Recommendations as to the use of environmentally benign demilitarization 
techniques compliant with European Community environmental directives. 
2. BACKGROUND 
2.1 The Feasibility study has examined the type of demilitarization and scrap 
processing equipment necessary to operate an Ammunition Demilitarization 
Facility.  The environmental compliance of each type of equipment has been 
considered in accordance with European Union environmental legislation. 
Factors to be considered when identifying the impact on the local 
environment of the construction of such a facility have been identified.  It is 
recommended that a full environmental impact study be conducted as part of 
the project management phase of any future project, once a site has been 
finally selected. 
The environmental impact of current demilitarization activities, in particular 
Open Detonation have also been examined in order to demonstrate that, 
whilst these activities make an important contribution to reducing the existing 
stockpile there may be a significant environmental penalty.     
3. CURRENT DISPOSAL ACTIVITY 
3.1  General 
 At present EAF ammunition is disposed of by the following methods: 
 Logistic disposal at Government Ordnance Factories (GOF). 
 Disposal by Open Demolition and Open Burning, i.e. using serviceable 
high explosives to destroy unserviceable or surplus ammunition or burning 
ammunition (e.g. propellants). 
3.1.1 Disposal at GOFs 
Limited demilitarization activity at GOFs at P.S.Vitezit in Vitez and Binas d.d. 
at Bugojno was observed during a visit by TRLtd staff, accompanied by 
representative from the UNDP and Ministry of Defence.   The processes in 
these facilities utilises either locally manufactured machinery or equipment 
adapted from pre-war production and disposal processes.  All are were slow 
and inefficient and at Vitez, where an autoclave was being used to melt TNT 
explosive from mortar bombs, there was no evidence of any environmental 
protection measures in place to limit potentially unacceptable emissions to the 
environment.   The SFOR ATO also reported1 that demilitarization of Anti-
                                                          
1 Meeting with the SFOR ATO on Thursday 22 July 2004 
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Tank mines was currently conducted in GOF 18 at Doboj in the Republika 
Srpska but that, due to potential dangers posed by it’s proximity to local 
houses, this activity is likely to be halted soon and this facility was, therefore 
not visited.   Further discussion of the suitability of GOFs for future 
demilitarization is at Part 4 – Technical.  
3.1.2 Disposal by Open Demolition and Open Burning (OBOD) 
There are reported to be 16 demolition areas in use by SFOR and the EAF2
where unserviceable ammunition is destroyed by OBOD.   In Operation 
Armadillo, the stated aim of which is to “Support the Entity Armed Forces 
(EAF) with their efforts to reduce their current stocks of unserviceable, unsafe 
and surplus ammunition, in order to reduce the number of Ammunition 
Storage Sites (ASS) in BiH”,3  and in 2003 over 1100 tonnes of ammunition 
was destroyed”.  At this rate the 33,500 tonnes awaiting disposal, identified in 
Chapter 2, would take approximately 31 years to destroy.   These activities 
have also faced considerable opposition from the civilian population and it 
was recently reported in a local newspaper that more than 100 villagers in 
Velika Ribnica and Brezovaca blocked the road between Banovici and 
Zavidovici in protest at the use of a nearby range, where SFOR have 
conducted demolitions over the last 2 years.   According to villagers, since 
SFOR started to use the range damage has been caused to houses and 
stables and the local watercourse has become polluted and is unusable.  
They also claimed that the noise generated by these activities leaves local 
children in a “constant state of shock”4.
Further evidence of civilian opposition to the detrimental environmental 
effects of disposal by demolition is provided in a UNDP Needs Assessment 
Report, which recently noted that:
“The current practice of ammunition destruction has, to date, been greatly 
problematic.   Local populations residing in close proximity to destruction sites 
often complain and protest destruction activities.   Local residents cite two 
problems: first the loud noise and earth tremors that occur when destruction 
activities take place, and second, the increasing concentration of heavy 
metals that are accumulating close to areas where destruction takes place, 
which pose a hazard to both human and animal health.   Flying debris from 
ammunition destruction activities is also a concern.   Citizens’ protests have 
been increasingly vocal.   In Mostar, citizens recently cut off access with 
truckloads of sand to an area surrounding a destruction polygon in protest at 
activities, which left houses in the vicinity of the polygon damaged”5
4 SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS 
4.1 Those hazards noted above are not the only potential environmental hazards 
associated with the disposal of ammunition by OBOD.   A comprehensive 
summary of hazards and potential consequences is shown at Annex A.    
                                                          
2 Information provided by the SFOR ATO on 9 May 2004 
3 “SFOR Operation Armadillo”, SFOR Factsheet, February 2004.  
4 “Detonations From the Shooting Range Destroying Houses and Water Source”, Daily Voice, 15 June 
2004, p 12.  
5 UNDP Needs Assessment Report, 2003, p 54. 
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5 ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION 
5.1 BiH Legislation 
Environmental legislation in BiH is very immature and unenforced. No 
information could be found by the study teams of any plans to introduce such 
legislation in the immediate future.            
5.2 European Union (EU) Environmental Legislation 
There is a wide range of EU environmental legislation on the statute books of 
all EU members, which is all based on EU Directives from Brussels, to which 
the Government of BiH aspires to comply, in order to satisfy the requirements 
of international donors of financial assistance.  The one most applicable to 
demilitarization operations is the directive that lays down emission levels and 
rates.  All demilitarization equipment manufacturers are aware of this 
legislation in detail and can indicate to what level their products comply with 
this legislation. 
It is therefore recommended that EU environmental legislation relating to 
emission levels is used as the basis for any Invitations To Tender (ITT) 
submitted, as this is the most stringent legislation in the region.  The 
Ammunition Demilitarization Facility (ADF) Implementation Team should 
discuss this requirement with potential manufacturers and suppliers during 
the design phase of the project. 
6. ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE OF DEMILITARIZATION EQUIPMENT
6.1 Current BiH Equipment 
The BiH GOFs currently have a limited demilitarization capacity. This current 
capability is developed upon locally- manufactured equipment and redundant 
ammunition manufacturing equipment which has been adapted to 
demilitarization purposes. No Pollution Control Systems (PCS) are 
incorporated and therefore they do not meet any of the European Directives 
on Emissions. 
6.2 Proposed Demilitarization Technology 
The technology alternatives for the demilitarization facility PCS are discussed 
in detail in Chapter 4 - Technical.  Of the two alternatives for emission control, 
Bag House v Dry Ceramic Filtration, only the latter has a proven record of 
meeting the EU Directive.  Because of the dynamics of the situation, further 
detailed information should be gained from proposed suppliers during the 
tendering phase.   Details of the compliance of Dry Ceramic Filtration have 
been included in this report to illustrate the compliance is technically feasible; 
it does not indicate that this is the only available, complaint technology. 
6.3 Dry Ceramic Filtration Compliance 
The structure of ceramic filter media comprises a substantial thickness, 
10mm, of a very low pore size material.  These materials give filtration 
efficiencies that are higher than any other cleanable gas filter medium.  In the 
UK, three tests are used to classify gas filter media.  The tests, in ascending 
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order of discrimination, are for arrestance to BS6540, dust spot efficiency to 
BS6540 and sodium flame efficiency to BS3928.   
Filter media are rated according to the Eurovent (Eu) classification on grades 
from Eu1 to Eu 14 and the ceramic filtration medium used by the UK system 
at Shoeburyness is classified Eu 10. Previously ratings of Eu 10 and above 
had been achieved only by disposable HEPA filter modules.  Most bag filter 
media are rated in the range Eu 3 to Eu 8 and well-operated electrostatic 
precipitators can achieve Eu 8 standard.   
The sodium flame test is performed on a sample of the virgin filter medium 
that is challenged with an aerosol of sodium chloride.  The aerosol has a 
mean particle size of 0.09 micron, (particle number basis), 0.6 micron (particle 
mass basis).  A capture efficiency in excess of 95% is required to gain a 
rating of Eu10.  The UK ceramic elements typically achieve efficiencies of 
99%.  However, this efficiency is a measure of the performance of the virgin 
element only.  The conditioning process creates a composite layer of dust 
and medium at the filter surface.  This layer greatly enhances the removal 
efficiency of the filter to the extent that many operators find it difficult to collect 
an adequate sample for an efficiency determination.  (In the environmental 
assessment trials of the UK facility, the commercial company conducting the 
trials had to use non-standard equipment in order to gain any results at all).  
7. ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE OF SCRAP PROCESSING EQUIPMENT 
7.1 Necessity for Scrap Metal Processing  
There are 2 reasons why the introduction of a scrap processing is necessary. 
Firstly smelting, shredding, granulating or fragmenting of cartridge cases, 
shell bodies and other components is an essential element of ensuring that all 
scrap materials that leave the ADF will be Free From Explosives (FFE). By 
definition it is a fundamental requirement of demilitarization to “Render 
munitions unfit for their intended purpose”6  A further benefit of processing 
scrap metal is that cartridge cases and shell bodies are hollow and volume 
reduction (densifying) is required to make export viable. 
7.2 At the Unis-Prentis GOF in Vogosca, there is a working foundry that produces 
mortar bomb bodies and large calibre cartridge cases.   It does not have 
suitable pollution control equipment and will require upgrading to meet EU 
standards.   The Study Team was also made aware of metal recycling 
facilities at Zenica and Jelsingrad, but the extent of their compliance with EU 
standards is not yet known and their suitability should be included in the 
Environmental Impact Assessment recommended at paragraph 2 above. 
8 RECYCLING OF WOOD 
8.1 Much of the EAF ammunition stockpile is contained in wooden packaging. 
The demilitarization process will result in large amounts of scrap wood per 
day during Phase A. The Team have identified that a certain amount of 
serviceable packaging will require to be reused by the EAF to replace that 
which is broken or rotten and also to pack unpacked stock.  Although the 
recovered wood will have no financial value in BiH, the volume of wood 
                                                          
6 International Mine Action Standards, Chapter 04.10, First Edition, 1 October 2001. 
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arising from the demilitarization process makes it desirable that an 
environmentally benign disposal route should be considered.   
8.2 The most likely disposal route is chipboard production, however a number of 
important factors need to be considered such as the possible use of toxic 
wood-preservatives. Factors requiring consideration for wooden packaging 
recycling are at Annex D.   
9. CONCLUSIONS 
 Whilst they are necessary as an emergency measure current 
demilitarization techniques, especially OBOD of certain ammunition 
natures, present a significant environmental threat.   Although there will be 
a continued requirement for OBOD, to destroy unstable ammunition, its 
long term use can only be applied to specific munition types7.
 Environmentally benign demilitarization equipment that meets the 
requirements of applicable EU Legislation is available.   Its introduction in 
BiH would significantly lessen the environmental impact currently 
experienced.
10. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 That the appointed Executing Agency capacity build the BiH GOFs 
already undertaking demilitarization work with a view to attaining 
compliance with EU legislation. 
 EU environmental legislation relating to emission levels is used as the 
basis for any Invitation To Tender (ITT) for the emission control system for 
the proposed Explosive Waster Incinerator.
 A full Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) on the proposed technical 
solution is conducted prior to project implementation.
                                                          
7 In this context “Long Term” is assumed to be more than 5 years.  
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ANNEX A 
 TO CHAPTER 3 
HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH DISPOSAL OF AMMUNITION BY OPEN 
DEMOLITION AND OPEN BURNING8
SER HAZARD THREAT/IMPACT CONSEQUENCE 
1 Explosions Changes to local 
topography.
Open detonation will generate craters and the 
associated loss of quantities of soil and sub-soil.
Re-instatement of the local topography may not 
be possible using displaced soil. 
Possible effects  
on water table. 
Shock waves from open detonation may affect the 
local porosity of sub-soils and so impact on the 
efficiency of local wells and ground water 
resources 
Damage to third 
party assets. 
Shock waves from open detonation can be 
encountered locally but very rarely at considerable 
distances form the site.   Damage to civilian 
property may occur although predictive equations 
are available that should prevent such incidents. 
Disturbance to  
local wildlife 
Species disturbed by explosions are likely to have 
been displaced from the area, although other 
studies indicate an increase in wildlife, notably 
where the demolition area is a ‘protected area’ 
from human encroachment. 
Land
contamination. 
Metal fragments may cause sufficient 
contamination of local grazing land and/or present 
sufficient potential hazard to farm animals to 
render land unusable until cleared of scrap metal.   
Smoke and  
noise pollution. 
Open detonation and open burning will release 
smoke and toxic fumes to the atmosphere.   Local 
air pollution may affect health of civilians and 
animals.  Long term pollution caused by the 
release of smoke and toxic gases into the 
atmosphere.   Noise pollution may have a 
detrimental social effect on civilians, but this is 
usually due to the unusual frequency of the sound 





Open detonation and open burning may result in 
explosive residues contaminating soil and local 
watercourses – thus preventing use for 
agricultural and domestic purposes.   There is 
however contrary evidence to shows an increase 
in nitrate levels, and hence productivity9.
                                                          
8 Extracted from an Environmental Impact Study, conducted to support opposition to the use of 
National Parks for military training, including Open Detonation, by the UK Ministry of Defence, 
August 1996.  
9 “SALW – ammunition destruction – environmental releases from open burning (OB) and open 
detonation (OD) events”, 30 May 2004.  
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SER HAZARD THREAT/IMPACT CONSEQUENCE 
3 Fire Loss of agricultural  
land, wildlife habitat 
and species.  
Sparks and firebrands accidentally projected by 
open burning and open demolition may cause 
fires in local area resulting in the destruction of 
fauna and vegetation.  





soil and water.  
Vehicles and machinery used to transport 
munitions may require refuelling in the field and 
careless use can cause contamination by spillage 





Litter and ground 
contamination. 
Poor management may cause general waste 
materials, including human waste, which may 
cause contamination. 
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ANNEX B  
TO CHAPTER 3 
RECYCLING OF WOOD 
1. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
1.1 Wood is a naturally occurring building material. Waste wood has been defined 
as "all wood, wood fibre and bark that is discarded, unused or unwanted by 
manufacturing, construction or demolition operation, municipality, government 
agency or other organisation".10
2. TECHNOLOGY 
2.1 There are five major activities associated with reusing and recycling wood: 
refurbishing, processing, manufacturing, composting and incineration for 
energy from wood. Refurbishing is the act of cleaning and fixing a wood 
product without necessarily making a different product. Repairing pallets for 
resale is an example of refurbishing. Processing is the grinding or chipping or 
wood in preparation for use or for further manufacturing. Manufacturing is the 
act of creating a new product from processed wood. Using wood as a drying 
agent is a common practice in large-scale composting. Using wood as an 
energy source is also an option. Refurbishing requires that the broken boards 
of pallets be removed and replaced with new boards. The pallets are then 
sent to the marketplace. Refurbishing is not a technically skilled industry but 
is labour-intensive. 
2.2 Before waste wood can be processed by chipping or grinding, it must pass 
through a cleaning process. Non-wood materials such as nails, staples, 
plastic and bits of masonry often adhere to wood. These contaminants are 
easily removed through manual or mechanical methods. Vibration and 
flotation can also be used to separate and clean the contaminated wood. 
There are, however, non-wood materials that are chemically bound to wood 
such as creosote, paint, glues, varnish, urea formaldehyde resins and others. 
Processors of wood waste may require that loads of delivered material be 
sorted to remove most or all the chemically treated wood.  
2.3 At some facilities, accepted materials are loaded into a flotation tank in which 
wood material floats, while other material sinks. The flotation tank also 
provides the opportunity to rinse dirt, dust and other material from the wood, 
before processing. The wood is then loaded with a grapple or front-end loader 
onto a conveyor belt. In some systems, the conveying system is designed to 
vibrate. Non-wood materials to be processed later are put in storage piles 
adjacent to the unloading area. The wood on the conveyor is inspected and 
sorted manually to remove contaminated wood that should not be processed. 
The wood is conveyed past a large magnet to separate out additional pieces 
of metal, such as nails, staples and bits of flashing. Once past the magnet, 
materials move along an in-feed conveyor into the top of a hammer mill 
similar to those used in the lumber and wood products industries. Hammer 
mill processing produces small, uniform wood chips from multiple sizes and 
shapes of wood waste material. The wood materials pass from the base of 
the hammer mill past a second magnet that removes any remaining ferrous 
                                                          
10 “Wood Waste Generation and Management in Ontario", Ontario Ministry of the Environment, April 1991. 
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metal. The processed material then passes over a double-decker vibrating 
screen that separates over-sized pieces (the "overs") and under-sized pieces 
(the "fines") from the processed material. The processed wood material 
travels from the shaker screen to a conveyor that loads the material into a 
truck or into a storage hopper. 
2.4 Manufacturing technology varies according to the product that is being 
produced. Generally, all wood must be chipped or ground before 
manufacturing. Composting requires that wood waste be processed into 
suitable sizes. First, wood must be cleaned of contaminants such as nails 
through a magnetic process. Then, a double process of grinding may be 
required to reduce the size of the wood. The particles that are produced may 
be used as bulking or drying agents in both outdoor and enclosed vessel 
composting. Harnessing energy from wood waste requires the use of boilers 
and other equipment. Wood must be processed into three-inch diameters 
then chipped to a size less than 0.5 inches. Boilers, wood waste storage 
structures, feed conveyors and piping, exhaust and electrical systems must 
be installed. Small-scale energy from wood systems can be used to heat 
greenhouses in the winter. Larger-scale projects have shown that it is 
possible to garner enough energy for heating and domestic hot water 
purposes.
3. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS 
3.1 The diversion of wood waste from landfills can reduce the need for disposal 
space thus lengthening the lifespan of existing landfills. By reusing and 
recycling discarded wood we save trees thereby preserving wildlife habitat, 
minimising soil erosion and maintaining air quality.  
3.2 Pentachlorophenal (PCP), creosote, Chromated Copper Arsenate (CCA) and 
Ammonical Copper Arsente (ACA) are the most common preservatives used 
to treat all types of wood-based products which are designed to endure a 
harsh environment or  with longevity in mind. Such chemicals are commonly 
used in ammunition packaging and there is a clear need for tests prior to 
disposal.
3.3 Research into the environmental, health and safety effects of placing treated 
wood into or near aquatic or landscape environments is ongoing." It has been 
found that these chemicals can leach into water over a period of time, 
affecting small organisms. Skin contact can cause dermatitis. The U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency has found that the chemicals exceeded the 
risk criteria for tumour production. The risk is greater to those who apply the 
chemical than to those exposed to them.11
3.4 The US Academy of Natural Sciences found that when pressure-treated 
lumber is used in the building of piers and decks substantial amounts of 
arsenic, chromium and copper leach into surrounding bodies of water.12
3.5 Non-sustainable harvesting of trees (or clear cutting) can lead to degradation 
or destruction of both temperate and tropical forests. Wiser use - or reuse - of 
wood products can help to ensure the preservation of forests.  
                                                          
11 Wood Preservatives Decision Fact Sheet", EPA 
12 Dr. James Sanders, Benedict Estuarine Research Laboratory, 215-299-1199 
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1.1 Assess the overall condition of the BiH ammunition stockpile. 
1.2 Quantify the immediate, short term and long-term demilitarization requirements. 
1.3 Identify the potential technology for an environmentally benign Facility. 
1.4 Identify explosive safety factors for the development of a Facility and make 
recommendations.  
1.5 Develop process flows for the demilitarization and the scrap/salvage processes. 
1.6 Identify the explosive hazards in storage at, and transportation to the Facility and 
make recommendations. 
1.7 Identify the engineering dimensions of the project together with specific 
requirements.
1.8 Determine the project engineering phases of the development process and evaluate 
the relationships with other components of the project. 
1.9 Identify technical legal requirements. 
1.10 Identify appropriate capabilities for the destruction of weapons. 
1.1 Identify potential locations for the proposed Facility and on this basis put forward 
alternative schemes for the development of the project. 
2. CONDITION OF EAF ARMED FORCES AMMUNITION STOCKPILE
2.1 During the period 28 May – 11 June 2004 a project team member visited the six 
Ammunition Storage Sites (ASS) at which the EAF intend to consolidate the 
ammunition stockpile1.   Four of the sites, at Tuzla (NB 075), Gabela (EF 007), 
Grebez (WB 053) and Pazaric Krupa (EF 024) are run by the Federation Army and 
the remaining two at Rudo (EV 076) and Kula 1&2 (WV 096) are run by the Army of 
the Republika Srpska.   These sites are all former Yugoslav Army facilities that were 
built in the 1950’s but a significant number suffered serious structural damage during 
the conflicts of the 1990’s.    
2.2 The physical condition of the BiH ammunition is generally good on visual inspection, 
but the poor conditions in much of the storage are contributing to deterioration and 
there is already evidence of corrosion on some artillery shell. Of most significant 
concern is the lack of basic safety measures in storage as most ammunition is not 
stored according to its Compatibility Group, the purpose of which is to ensure the 
segregation of sensitive natures to prevent them contributing unnecessarily to the 
effects of an explosion or fire.  The resultant hazard is significantly exacerbated by 
                                                          
1 Recommended by the SFOR ATO on 21 May 2004. 
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the presence of a considerable amount of ammunition, which is not properly 
packaged, and further stocks that are stored in the open, between storehouses.   The 
buildings in which the ammunition is stored do not have Explosive Limit Licenses 
(ELL) and storage limits are governed only by the physical capacity of each store.   
Furthermore, many of the storehouses are not constructed to NATO standards.   An 
Explosion Consequence Analysis of the storage facilities at Rudo, detailed in Annex 
A to Chapter 2, revealed that the external and internal safety distances are severely 
compromised and an unplanned explosive event in one store would result in severe 
damage to the others and could lead to a major explosive incident2 in the storage 
site.
 The lack of a structured surveillance system, in particular the conduct of propellant 
stability testing which is described in Chapter 2 – Humanitarian, significantly increase 
the risk of an unplanned explosion if spontaneous ignition of propellant occurs.   
 In Rudo and Kula 2 there are unidentified chemicals, possibly a liquid propellant 
oxidizer, which presents both a significant fire and health risk, stored alongside other 
ammunition and some of the containers are leaking.   
 Examples of the condition of both ammunition and storage facilities are provided in 
the Photographic Supplement. 
2.3 The ammunition was manufactured in a number of countries including the former 
USSR, China, Romania and Yugoslavia.  Consequently it does not have the United 
Nations Serial Numbers required for transportation under international guidelines.   
The ammunition can be legally moved within BiH, as long as the government is 
prepared to underwrite the risk.  It could not however, be easily moved outside the 
borders of BiH for demilitarization at another nation’s demilitarization facility.   In 
order to gain UN Serial Numbers, a national body would need to be established a 
system for number allocation. 
3. AMMUNITION DEMILITARIZATION REQUIREMENTS
3.1 Establishing precise quantities of ammunition that require disposal is problematic 
since there appears to be no centralised authority to coordinate this task.  The EAF 
and SFOR have estimated that approximately 33,500 tonnes of surplus ammunition 
requires disposal.   Of the remaining stock, also estimated to be approximately 
33,500 tonnes, some will be required for use once the overdue EAF force 
restructuring has been finalised, but precise quantities are not known at present.   
The BiH government is also attempting to negotiate the sale of some surplus 
ammunition but the result of this venture will not be known until at least December 
20043.
3.2 If an enhanced system of propellant stability testing is introduced in the future it is 
likely to identify further stocks for disposal, which cannot at this stage be quantified.   
However, those stocks (or at least the propellant element), which fail propellant 
stability testing, will require urgent disposal action.   
                                                          
2 A single explosive event within a storage site caused by the propagation of explosions between individual 
explosive storehouses. 
3 Information provided by UNDP representative during a meeting on Thursday 22 July 2004. 
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4. POTENTIAL LOCATIONS
4.1 Options 
The Study Team considered a number of options for the location of the proposed 
demilitarization facility. Key factors that would influence the location recommendation 
were as follows: 
 Existing facilities. (Explosive limits, ammunition manufacturing and 
demilitarization activity). 
 Accessibility. (Logistics). 
 Utilities supply. 
 Land ownership issues. 
The Study Team concluded at an early stage that a ‘greenfield’ site was 
inappropriate due to: 
 Potential property rights issues.  
 The existence of suitable GOFs. 
The Study Team decided to examine a number of GOFs which were either redundant 
or had spare infrastructure capacity. 
4.2 Existing Facilities 
BiH possesses a small but encouraging demilitarization capability based in the 
following locations: 
 GOF No 26 - Vitez 
 GOF No 18 - Doboj 
 GOF Binas - Bugojno 
Additionally, one other site was considered that has not conducted demilitarization 
work but appeared to have potential: 
 GOF Unis Pretis (Vogosca) 
Many ammunition demilitarization facilities have evolved or been developed in 
government facilities and ammunition manufacturing bases for the following reasons: 
 The site is often government owned lessening development procedures. 
 Adequate explosive safety distances Outside Quantity Distances (OQD) already 
exist along with some explosive storehouses. 
 Reconstruction costs can be significantly reduced by the utilisation of existing 
facilities. 
 A local pool of semi-qualified labour often exists in the area. 
Due to a number of functional parameters4, the Study Team considered only the sites at 
Vitez and Vogosca further. 
                                                          
4 GOF 18 was discounted due to close proximity of civilian houses to demilitarization facilities (100m), 
documented in Chapter 3 – paragraph 3-1-1.   Binas was discounted as, although it has almost identical facilities 
to P.S.Vitezit it has only half the storage capacity and no propellant testing facility.      
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4.2.1 GOF No 26 (Vitez). 
The Vitez facility is a High Explosive (HE) and propellant manufacturing facility that 
also possesses a chemical laboratory.  The facility produces explosives for the local 
mining and construction industries on an ad-hoc basis. There seems to be no 
continuous demand for the facility’s production.   Largely, the facility, including the 
laboratory, is considered to be almost redundant.  
4.2.2 GOF Unis Pretis (Vogosca). 
This facility was a former manufacturer of artillery and mortar ammunition. It is 
situated in a vast area that is quite remote in a mountainous area that offers the 
potential of almost unlimited explosive storage capacity. The facility currently 
employs over 100 staff, principally at the foundry that manufactures mortar and 
artillery shell for the UK and US governments. 
A tabulated comparison of the sites is made at Annex C.   
The Study Team was unanimous in the conclusion that GOF at Unis Pretis was the 
best site for developments as an ADF. 
5. RECOMMENDED DEMILITARIZATION TECHNOLOGY
5.1 Open Burning / Open Detonation
Open Detonation (OBOD) is considered to be the simplest solution to the problem of 
ammunition identified as unstable during routine inspection or for propellant that fails 
stability testing.   However, the large quantities of surplus ammunition involved in the 
BiH situation will take many years to destroy by this method and the only viable 
option is to use industrial demilitarization technology.         
5.2 Industrial Demilitarization Technology and Options
5.2.1 General 
There are a wide variety of technology options available throughout the world.  This 
report does not aim to consist of a full evaluation of the advantages and 
disadvantages of each technology. It does, however, cover those technologies with a 
proven track record that are available Commercially Off The Shelf (COTS).  The 
study team consider that BiH is not an appropriate environment to take a “technical 
risk” in the adoption of new technology in parallel with trying to achieve significant 
production rates in the short term. 
Ammunition, explosive, propellant and pyrotechnic materials fall into three basic 
treatment categories as illustrated in the table below.  The first category is material 
that is easy and relatively inexpensive to treat.  Simple technologies exist and are 
proven and relatively inexpensive.  The second category is material that is more 
difficult or risky to treat and more expensive to design for.  In the second category, 
multiple technologies might be required, and more handling and manipulation of the 
items prior to final disposal increases the risk and the costs.  The third category is 
material that requires new development or technically challenging approaches to 
treat and, thus, becomes very expensive and risky.  Although materials in the third 
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category of “difficult and very expensive” are usually only a small percentage of the 
workload, they have the potential to absorb a disproportionate fraction of technical 
and financial resources. 
CATEGORY DESCRIPTION TYPE
1 Easy / Inexpensive 
(Minimal processing 
required) 
SAA up to 25mm 
Fuzes, Igniters and Detonators (No 
Boosters) 
Bulk Gun Propellant 
Bulk Explosives (Non TNT Based) 
Some Landmines 
2A Difficult / More Expensive 
(Pre-processing before 
Incineration) 
Cartridges and Mortars > 25mm but 
< 75mm 
Grenades 
Fuzes, Igniters and Detonators (With 
Boosters) 
Detonating Cord, Linear Charges 
2B Difficult / More Expensive 
(TNT Recovery) 
Projectiles > 75mm (TNT based fill) 
Demolition Charges 
Bangalore Torpedoes 
Mines (TNT Fill) 
A/C Bombs (TNT Fill) 






Projectiles (Non TNT Fill) 
Rocket Motors 
 Past international experience shows that in a phased programme it is best to develop 
a track record with the easy items to establish in the minds of potential sponsors that 
the project is a success.  More difficult items can then be added with less risk that 
unsuccessful tests will hurt the project.  Conversely, if difficult items are 
unsuccessfully attempted early, the results must be explained before the project will 
be deemed successful.  
The lowest risk approach to developing and operating the desired disposal facility is 
to implement the project by logical phases.  In keeping with the “easy items first” 
philosophy, the first phase should be the installation of a simple, proven explosive 
waste incinerator (EWI).  The first phase would involve the destruction of technically 
simple items (see table above), which would also address the need to destroy 
ammunition for SALW as a priority.  Metal components may be recovered as 
decontaminated scrap: separated brass may yield a higher value.  Bulk propellants 
and explosives will also be pre-measured into appropriately sized packages and fed 
to the EWI. 
In the second phase, there are two categories of items:  those that are capable of 
being incinerated with a small amount of preparation (Category 2a items) and items 
that contain salvageable quantities of TNT-based explosives (Category 2b items).   
Items with too much Net Explosive Weight (NEW) to be directly incinerated without 
risking the EWI will be prepared by accessing the explosive charges and exposing 
them.  This can be accomplished by disassembly, punching, shearing, drilling, 
sawing, etc.  Then the items can be fed to the EWI without the risk of high order 
detonations.  Many items larger than 75mm with TNT-based fillings can be 
processed though an autoclave process to reclaim the explosive.  The melted 
explosive will be re-solidified for other non-military uses such as construction, mining, 
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etc.  Both processes are included in the second phase since they are both fully 
developed and demonstrated. 
The third phase includes items that require high technology approaches, or for which 
processes need to be developed and demonstrated.  This category may include 
items such as some flares, smokes and dyes that cannot be incinerated within 
environmental standards.  It also includes complex munitions such as mines, rocket 
motors, etc, for which special one-of-a-kind machines must be created. 
It is also important to note that each of these phases build on the previous one.  The 
preparation processes fielded in Phase 2 require that an incinerator be installed in 
Phase 1.  For example, fuzes, primers and boosters from munitions disassembled for 
TNT melt-out will be processed in the EWI.  Further, many parts of items that 
originally start in the Phase 3 category will probably be moved to the second 
category as their nature, and configurations are better known.  Some parts of these 
items will naturally fit in another category as the item is disassembled.  For example, 
rocket motor fuzes might revert to Phase 1 incineration, and torpedo warheads might 
be moved to TNT recovery in Phase 2. 
If sufficient funding was available at early stage of project implementation, Phase 3 in 
entirety could be replaced by the exporting of these items to the existing European 
Demilitarization industry. This option could be considered subject to the following 
conditions:
 Donor support and available funding. 
 Identification of spare capacity and capability in exiting European Industry. 
 Assurance that the ammunition involved is safe to move.5
5.2.2 The following factors should be considered before any firm decision can be taken as 
to the most suitable technique or system to be adopted.  These factors should be 
considered in fine detail by the Project Management team for any demilitarization 
facility within BiH: 
 Chemistry of Explosives.   
 Stockpile degradation. 
 Stability in storage. 
 Knowledge of ammunition design. 
 Quantity for disposal. 
 Available technology. 
 Safe systems of work. 
                                                          
5 This will involve the obtaining of UN Serial Numbers for this ammunition, but this should not be seen as a 
significant obstacle. 
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 Production rates. 
 Environmental considerations. 
 Security. 
 Logistics. 
 Availability of suitably qualified and trained manpower. 
 Availability of ranges and demolition grounds. 
 Availability of transport.
 Commercial v Military disposal route. 
 Transparency and accounting. 
 Disposal of residue. 
 Scrap salvage. 
 National legislation. 
 Integrated approach. 
 Financial factors. 
5.2.3 The Demilitarization Cycle 
The following activities are considered to be part of the demilitarization cycle.  These 
activities cover all aspects of the demilitarization process; it must be emphasised that 
the destruction of the ammunition is only one process within the complete 
demilitarization cycle. 
 Initial storage location. 
 National ammunition account. 
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 Demilitarization production planning. 
 Decide destruction technique. 
 Call forward for demilitarization. 
 Transportation. 
 Receipt accounting into demilitarization facility storage. 
 Storage. 
 Unpacking operations. 
 Transport to pre-processing or destruction facility. 
 Pre-processing operations (including preparation of donor charges if OBOD 
used).
 Destruction. 
 Accounting and certification of destruction. 
 Scrap processing operations. 
 Scrap disposal. 
 Disposal of residue. 
 Maintenance and repair of specialist equipment. 
 Training of manpower. 
5.2.4 Pre-processing 
The ammunition that cannot be incinerated directly, Category 2a, requires processes 
and equipment required to disassemble them and prepare the relevant components 
for incineration. Preparation consists of disassembly of the item followed, in some 
cases, by exposing the explosive charge.  Opening up the explosive charge to the 
atmosphere reduces the confinement that can lead to high order detonations, which 
could damage an Explosive Waste Incinerator.  The exposed explosive then burns 
harmlessly, without detonations.  Exposing explosives can be done by sawing, 
shearing, punching, disassembly, etc.   
A variety of manual, semi-automatic, and automated equipment can be used to 
prepare the items for incineration.  Some operations, because of the explosive 
hazards involved, must be performed remotely with operating personnel behind 
protective barricades, blast walls, or protected by shielding integral to the equipment.  
This section of the report identifies preparation equipment based on past 
international demilitarization experience.  Equipment function and capabilities are 
briefly described at Annex A. 
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5.2.5 Recovery of TNT 
Traditionally there is little value in the recovery of TNT due to the competitive price of 
Ammonium Nitrate / Fuel Oil (ANFO) explosive on the world market. However, 
representatives at the GOF at Vitez, indicated that they would use the TNT in 
Ammonite explosive for commercial sale.  This requirement has been borne in mind 
throughout the study period. 
Many of the munitions in the BiH inventory contain TNT-based explosive 
compositions.  These materials have some commercial value if they can be 
recovered.  TNT-based explosives can usually be safely recovered by melting the 
explosives, collecting the run-out and re-solidifying the materials.  This process, in 
various forms, has been implemented and proven to be safe at installations 
throughout the world.  One process uses autoclaves and steam heat to power the 
process.  It is noted that this process is most effective with munitions above 
approximately 75mm in diameter.  Smaller munitions may also work, but the yield 
may not be worth the effort.  It is also noted that in order to prepare many of the 
munitions for this process, many of the pre-processing operations described above, 
for Category 2a ammunition, must be in place: fixed rounds must be pulled apart, 
fuzes must be removed, etc.  The process description is at Annex B. 
5.2.6 Destruction Technology 
Once the ammunition has been pre-processed (if necessary) then the energetic 
materials need to be destroyed.  The more traditional, and hence proven method, 
utilises some form of Explosive Waste Incinerator (EWI).  Each different type of EWI 
has advantages and disadvantages or is more suitable for one ammunition nature 
than the other.  This study has examined two serious competitive technologies in 
detail, and has summarised alternatives with a “higher technical risk”: 
 Rotary Kiln EWI    - Details at Annex C 
 Plasma Arc EWI    - Details at Annex D 
 “Higher Technical Risk” Technologies - Details at Annex E 
5.2.7 Pollution Control Systems (PCS) 
There are a number of pollution control technologies available, but an effective 
system requires an integrated approach.  The technologies that follow are currently in 
use in different demilitarization facilities around the world.   All PCS have the 
following requirements: 
 Interface with incineration system. 
 Process all gases arising from kilns. 
 Remove Volatile Organic Compounds (VOC). 
 Remove particulate matter. 
 Remove acid gas. 
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 Prevent or reduce dioxin formation. 
 Remove heavy metals. 
There are two competing, proven technical solutions. 
 Bag Houses    - Details at Annex F 
 Dry Ceramic Filtration   - Details at Annex G 
5.2.8 Disposal of Explosive Contaminated Waste 
Some demilitarization facilities utilise a “Car Bottom Furnace”, which operate at a 
feed rate of 100 – 350 kg/hour.  These are used to process the waste from the EWI 
to ensure that all explosive residues are destroyed.  They can be linked into the PCS 
of the main EWI. 
6. EXPLOSIVE SAFETY FACTORS
6.1 General
Based on the CSS Needs Assessment6 and safety advice from the SFOR ATO7, who 
has recently conducted visits to confirm the suitability for limited demilitarization 
activities, those GOFs, which are compared at Annex H, were identified as potentially 
suitable sites where industrial level demilitarization facilities could be constructed and 
operated.  Each still retains a significant reserve of former employees who are 
experienced in working with explosives and in an explosive environment.  Although 
they will require retraining on new equipment the Team considerers that explosive 
safety can be achieved through planning, procedures, training and monitoring.   
6.2 Outside Quantity Distances (OQD)
 An OQD is the minimum safety distance that must be maintained from any explosive 
store to vulnerable locations nearby, the most critical of which is civilian habitation.   
Within any ammunition storage area each storehouse is normally given a “license” 
which states how much and what type of explosives can be stored there.   They are 
normally renewed every 2-3 years and the licensing authority on a regular basis to 
confirm their validity, conducts routine inspections.    The OQD at all facilities listed in 
Annex H were adequate for the bulk storage of ammunition prior to the war, when the 
factories were producing ammunition to its maximum capacity, but have lapsed and 
there is no evidence of their recent renewal.   Providing no encroachment (i.e. where 
new building has occurred) within the distance originally specified ha taken place 
since the war the ammunition storage facilities within the factory should be capable of 
being re-licensed.   Although none was immediately apparent during the team’s visit, 
in those circumstances where encroachment has occurred, the OQDs must be 
recalculated to determine new explosive storage limits.  
                                                          
6 Needs Assessment on Small Arms and Light Weapons in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Centre for Security 
Studies, 2003, p54. 
7 Meeting with SFOR ATO on Thursday 22 July 2004. 
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At the time of the team’s visit in July 2004 the national authority for licensing could 
not be readily identified.   Further investigation by UNDP representatives8 has 
subsequently revealed that, according to a Government decision in 1996 
responsibility for the licensing and inspection of all GOFs was delegated to the 
Entities Ministries of Defence.   More recent reforms resulted in agreement that the 
ownership of GOFs should be transferred to the Entity Ministries for Energy, Mining 
and Industry but only the Republika Srpska completed the transfer process.   The 
Federation Government is still discussing the issue since the Laws on a new Ministry 
of Defence are not due to be enforced in mid-September 2004.   It is probable that 
the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations (MoFTER), the state level 
institution issuing license for production, export and import, will form an inspection 
committee, introducing a new inspection regime; they will require international 
technical assistance to introduce a safe and appropriate system. 
Whilst the process for reviewing the licensing arrangements at the potential sites 
should take only a relatively short period of time, it is critical to the future safety of the 
general public and must be completed during the early stages of project planning.  
6.3 Inside Quantity Distances (IQD) 
IQDs are those safety distances applied between individual explosive stores within 
any explosives area.   Their calculation is an integral component of the licensing 
procedure described above.   
6.4 Standing Operating Procedures (SOP)
SOP for the following areas will require development for the safe and efficient 
operation of an ammunition demilitarization and scrap processing facility: 
 General Explosives Safety. 
 Accident Procedures. 
 Ammunition Storage. 
 Ammunition Movement. 
 Ammunition Accounting. 
 Ammunition Processing Operations. 
 Scrap Processing Operations. 
 Quality Control. 
 Demolition Ground Orders. 
 Specific Equipment Operating Instructions. 
 Disposal of Residues. 
                                                          
8 Information provided by the UNDP on 30 July 2004. 
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6.5 Transportation to and Storage Hazards at the ADF 
The safe transportation of ammunition to the ADF will depend on whether the EAF or 
a civilian contractor is responsible for the movement of the ammunition.   In the case 
of the EAF procedures for the movement of ammunition are contained in Chapter 13 
to the ITP, issued by SFOR.   Civilian transport contractors will be governed by 
national legislation.   Storage hazards at the ADF will be regulated by national 
legislation and applied through the SOPs described above.       
7. PROCESS FLOWS
7.1 The team was unable to recommend any detailed process flows until the final 
decisions are taken on the technology to be used for the disposal of the ammunition.  
Process flows require development for the following generic areas: 
 Ammunition Accounting. 
 Ammunition Movement. 
 Ammunition Storage. 
 Pre-processing Operations. 
 Destruction Operations. 
 Disposal of Residue. 
 Scrap Processing Operations. 
 Administration Functions (including Certification of Destruction). 
8. ENGINEERING DIMENSIONS
A summary of the system requirements for the alternative pre-processing and 
destruction technologies is at Annex I. 
9. PROJECT ENGINEERING PHASES 
9.1 General 
The team was unable to recommend any detailed project engineering flows until the 
final decisions are taken on the technology to be used for the disposal of the 
ammunition.  The layout of the plant can be designed when anticipated quantities 
and production rates are established and the technology is chosen. 
9.2 Conceptual Design 
The team estimates that a conceptual plant design, to a 95% confidence level, could 
be completed in three months at a cost of approximately US $ 120,000.  This should 
be undertaken by a reputable demilitarization company in conjunction with a the 
Project Executing Agency.  The conceptual design should consist of: 
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 Overall Top Level Plant Layout. 
 Estimate of utilisation of current buildings, facilities and infrastructure. 
 Define process flows. 
 Preliminary equipment layouts for each processing building. 
 Compilation of detailed equipment list. 
 Development of firm cost estimates based on selected technology.  (The cost 
estimates contained within this study are designed to provide a “rough order of 
costs”.
 Identification of issues requiring additional development and engineering. 
 Planning for phased introduction and integration of equipment and processes. 
10. LEGAL REQUIREMENTS
10.1 Applicable BiH Legislation
See paragraph 5.2 above.
11. LOGISTIC SUPPORT 
11.1 Introduction 
The phased introduction of ADF will demand an input of between 10 and 20 tonnes 
of ammunition per working day9. Although in terms of mass this does not represent a 
large quantity of ammunition, the challenges to logistical support are examined 
below.
11.2 Ammunition Location 
Whilst most of the main roads to the current EAF storage locations are in good repair 
many of those inside the facilities are very narrow and in a poor condition.   
11.3 Security 
See Chapter 5 paragraph 3.2. 
11.4 Bulk Handling – Containment of Ammunition 
The vast majority of the BiH ammunition stockpile is stored in its primary containers 
and is not bulk packed in Unit Load Containers (ULC’s), such as palletised loads.  
Furthermore, many Explosive Store Houses (ESH’s) were designed and built for the 
manhandling of individual ammunition containers. Therefore the vast majority of the 
ESH’s have doorways less than 0.7m wide which prevents the immediate 
introduction of a ULC type storage and transportation system. 
11.5 Infrastructure 
Much of Bosnia’s infrastructure, including its roads and railways was devastated in 
the war, during which about 35% of the country’s roads and 40% of its bridges were 
damaged or destroyed.   Damage to the railway system was estimated at about $1 
billion.   The fourth donors’ conference for Bosnia and Herzegovina held in Brussels, 
Belgium, in May 1998, made improvement of infrastructure a continued priority for 
                                                          
9 Volume is dependent on prioritised type of ammunition for demilitarization. 
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future aid.   Currently the majority of the roads in BiH are in reasonable condition but 
congested. The rail system is slowly being renovated but in many places the track is 
in a very poor condition.    Although there is international assistance to upgrade the 
rail system, the remoteness of a significant element of the stockpile and the lack of 
bulk handling, preclude the use of the rail system to transport a large proportion of 
the ammunition stocks. 
11.6 Options for Containment of Ammunition During Transportation 
Ideally, the EAF should take on the task of ammunition supply to the ADF but due to 
the poor equipment levels, ongoing reorganisation and lack of funding, it is 
considered that they will experience financial difficulties undertaking this task. 
Therefore financial responsibility of ammunition transportation must rest with the 
Executing Agency or ADF. Essentially there are 3 options for the containment of 
ammunition for movement from storage to the ADF: 
11.6.1 Loose Boxed 
It is feasible to move the ammunition in bulk carrying vehicles loose in boxes utilising 
conventional bulk carrying vehicles.  
11.6.2 Palletisation 
To ease bulk handling it is possible to palletise into ULC’s on site prior to 
transposition. This would require a considerable increase in manpower requirements 
and the initial purchase of mobile, rough terrain Mechanical Handling Equipment 
(MHE) and ongoing requirements for pallets, furniture and banding. Additionally, 
pallet configuration design would be necessary since none currently exists. 
11.6.3 Containerisation 
The containerisation option proposes the use of demountable ISO containers that 
could be delivered to the storage area and loaded by hand. The loaded ISO 
container would then be delivered to the demilitarization storage area and would act 
as the storage container until the ammunition is required for disposal action. This 
proposed solution would require the one-time procurement of specialist vehicles, 
containers and equipment.  
11.7 Recommended Solution 
Each of these is examined stating advantages and disadvantages of each option at 
Annex J. Despite the challenges involved, the handling of loose boxes is probably the 
most economic option and will also offer employment opportunities for BiH citizens.  
The Team recommend that the EAF are responsible for the transportation of 
ammunition feedstock to the ADF under a performance-related repayment system 
operated by the Executing Agency or ADF.
The above recommendations are based upon an objective assessment of the ground 
situation and experience gained in the NATO PfP Albania 1 Demilitarization project. 
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Annexes:
A. Pre-Processing Equipment and Capabilities. 
B. TNT Recovery Process. 
C. Rotary Kiln Explosive Waste Incinerators.
D. Plasma Arc Explosive Waste Incinerators
E. Higher Technical Risk Technologies.
F. Bag House Pollution Control Systems.
G. Dry Ceramic Filtration Pollution Control Systems.
H. Advantages and Disadvantages of Possible ADF Sites. 
I. Engineering Dimensions to Possible Technologies. 
J. Advantages and Disadvantages of Movement Options 
Appendices: 
1. Estimated Production Rates. 
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ANNEX A  
TO CHAPTER 4 
PRE-PROCESSING EQUIPMENT AND CAPABILITIES
1. General.
The following pre-preparation equipment is that approved by the US government and 
in common use throughout many countries.  It has been included in this report to 
illustrate to proven and available technology.  The fact that it is referred to in this 
report in no way suggests that this is the only specific type / make that would 
be suitable.  There is also some equipment suitable for conversion available in the 
GOFs that could be utilised for pre-processing purposes. 
2. Pull Apart (APE 1001M1)
This operation separates the projectile from the 
cartridge case for fixed ammunition.  The 
assembled cartridge is manually loaded in a 
vertical, nose up orientation into the machine.  If an 
operational shield has been installed, the loading 
door closes and the cartridge case and projectile 
are separated.  If the shield is not installed, the 
operator walks around behind a blast resistant wall 
and remotely starts the machine cycle.  Upon cycle 
completion, the operator manually removes 
cartridge case and projectile from the machine.  
When the operational shield is installed, an optional 
high speed, automatic deluge system can be used 
to aid in extinguishing burning propellant 
accidentally initiated during pull apart. 
3. Fuze and Tracer Removal (APE 1002M3)
This operation unscrews the fuzes or tracers from artillery and mortar projectiles.  
This machine is used when it is not safe to manually unscrew the fuzes or tracers 
from the projectiles.  The operator manually loads two items at a time into the 
machine.  He then walks around behind a blast resistant wall and remotely starts the 
machine cycle.  Upon cycle completion, the operator manually removes the 
separated components from the machine.  
4. Debanding (APE 1042M3)
This operation is not a required operation for demilitarization, but may be used to 
recover higher value metals for recycling and cost recovery.  The operation is 
performed when removal of the gilding metal rotating bands from 57mm through 
155mm projectiles is justified due to increased value from separated scrap metals.  
The debanding operation must be performed before the projectiles are processed 
through the EWI.  The operator manually loads and unloads the machine.  
Operational shielding is not required. 
Fixed round pull-apart equipment. 
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5. Fuze Disassembly (APE 1118M2)
This operation removes the boosters from bomb, artillery, and mortar fuzes.  Booster 
removal is required for some fuzes to prevent damage to the EWI, caused by 
repetitive detonation of the larger boosters inside the EWI.  Booster removal is 
sufficient if separation from the fuze adequately vents the booster so it will burn out 
without detonation.  Otherwise the booster must be punched or sheared in the APE 
2196 in order to achieve adequate venting.  The operator stands by the machine and 
manually loads and unloads the fuzes and boosters.  The machine is fitted with an 
operational shield. 
6. Mortar Fin Removal (APE 1153M1)   
This operation removes the fins (with ignition cartridges) from mortars whose fins 
cannot safely be removed manually.  The machine can also remove ignition 
cartridges from the fins.  (The machine can also defuze projectiles and mortars, 
although it does not have as great a torque or production capability as the APE 
1002M3.)  Note that increment charges must be removed from the mortars in a 
previous operation.  The operator manually loads one munition item into the 
machine.  He then walks around behind a blast resistant wall where he remotely 
starts the machine cycle.  Upon cycle completion, the operator manually removes the 
separated components.
7. Grenade Pitch-In Barricade (APE 1213M1)
This barricade is located adjacent to hand grenade operations.   It provides a safe 
place for an operator to throw a hand grenade whose fuze may have been initiated.  
The barricade captures fragments and mitigates blast effects.  It is not suitable for 
impact-sensitive hand grenades. 
8. Depriming (APE 1229M1)
This operation punches the primers out of 37mm to 106mm cartridge cases.  This 
allows the primers to be demilitarised in the EWI.  The operator stands by the 
machine and manually loads the cartridge cases and unloads the cases and punched 
and primers.  The machine is fitted with operational shielding. 
9. Vice (APE 1065, 1204, and 1294)
This operation is performed when it is safe to manually remove fuzes, tracers, fins, 
booms, ignition cartridges, etc. from ammunition.  The individual items are manually 
loaded into the vice and clamped.  The operator then performs the required 
operation.
10. Hand Grenade Defuzing (APE 2156)
This operation removes the fuzes from hand grenades.  The operator manually loads 
the fuzed grenades onto a transport belt at one side of the machine.  The grenades 
are moved by this belt inside an operational shield where the fuzes are unscrewed 
and separated from the grenades.  The fuzes and grenades are retained inside the 
shield for sufficient time for an accidentally initiated fuze to time out and function 
before exiting the shield.  The operator manually unloads the transport belt. 
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11. Projectile Cutting (APE 2175)
This operation saws through the high explosive cavity of projectiles to expose the 
explosive so that the projectile sections will burn out in the EWI without detonation.  
The explosive in the projectiles must be adequately exposed (vented) to prevent the 
burn out process from accelerating into a detonation.  The degree of exposure 
(venting) required varies with explosive type and quantity.  TNT filled projectiles are 
relatively easy to vent and burn, while RDX based fillers are much more difficult.  In 
some cases, the quantity of RDX must be limited so that the explosive is consumed 
before the transition from burning to detonation is completed.  It is anticipated that 
the HEAT projectiles must be cut open regardless of calibre since defuzing generally 
does not provide adequate (or any) venting.  The saw machine is designed to be 
located in a blast containment operating bay, with operators located behind blast 
resistant walls on either side of the saw bay.  The machine has 10-foot long feed and 
discharge conveyors to accommodate this arrangement.  Larger calibre (75 mm to 
120 mm) projectiles are manually loaded one at a time onto the feed conveyor.  This 
conveyor moves the projectile into the saw machine where the projectile is cut into 
two pieces.  The cut pieces are removed by the discharge conveyor to the adjacent 
bay where an operator removes them from the conveyor.  Smaller calibre projectiles 
could be loaded and clamped into fixtures to allow gang sawing. 
12. Punching and Shearing (APE 2196)   
This operation punches or shears boosters, defuzed hand grenades, and 40mm 
M384 and M406 grenades.  This operation exposes and vents the explosives so they 
will burn without detonation in the EWI.  The operator stands in front of the machine 
and manually loads the munitions into two stations.  The punching or shearing 
automatically takes place inside an operational shield.  The machine automatically 
discharges the processed munitions down gravity chutes through the bottom of the 
shield.
13. Estimated Production Rates.
Estimated production rates for these equipments against selected BiH ammunition 
natures are shown at Appendix 1. 
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ANNEX B  
          TO CHAPTER 4
TNT RECOVERY PROCESS
1. This process description assumes that the munitions have been previously prepared 
for this process.  In general, munitions to be processed through a melt-out process 
will need to be in the following state: 
 Unpacked 
 Fixed rounds pulled apart 
 Defuzed 
 Nose closures removed 
 If applicable, burster wells removed, or munition sawed to expose explosive 
2. Each munition will then be loaded into a 
fixture that determines how many 
munitions of that type can fit inside an 
autoclave.  The fixture is then attached to 
an overhead crane, which transports the 
munitions to the autoclaves.   The upper 
autoclave door is opened (pneumatic 
actuators) and the fixture loaded with 
munitions is placed inside the autoclave.  
The autoclave door is closed and five 
psig steam is applied to the autoclave.  
The hot steam heats the outside of the 
munition shell causing the explosive 
inside the shell to melt and drain into 
melt kettles.  For large munitions, a 
steam lance can be applied to the inside 
of the munition to significantly speed the 
melting, but condensate can then 
contaminate the explosive.
Safety note: Minol-type explosives should never be 
directly exposed to steam.   
3. The melt kettles are connected to the autoclaves by a network of steam jacketed 
pipes and/or troughs.  The steam-jacketed melt kettles are equipped with stirring 
paddles.  A vacuum of 6 to 28 inches of Hg is drawn on the melt kettles to remove 
both explosive and water vapours.   The paddle mixer maintains a homogenous 
explosive mixture.  The desired vacuum range on the melt kettles and associated 
piping is maintained by a vacuum pump or steam-powered ejector, which draws up to 
125 CFM to achieve the desired vapour removal rate from the molten explosives.  
The molten explosives inside the melt kettle then drain through a steam jacketed 
manifold onto the belt flaker for cooling and solidification.  The manifold evenly 
distributes the explosive across the entire width of the belt.   
A typical ammunition autoclave 
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4. The belt flaker is a flat, horizontal belt conveyor.  It is equipped with a stainless steel 
belt that travels between 5 and 30 feet per minute.  After the molten explosive is 
deposited onto the conveyor belt, it is cooled 
by chilled water sprayed on the underside of 
the belt.  A pivoted roller mounted over the 
head pulley is used to break-up large pieces 
of solid explosive into “flakes.”  A plastic-
covered scraper placed just after the roller 
removes explosives that adhere to the belt 
surface.  The flaked explosive is then 
dropped onto a small chute with a vibratory 
feeder that guides the explosive into a 
shipping container or bag. 
5. The following major pieces of equipment 
inside the work area will be required: 
 Autoclaves
Autoclaves are used to melt and remove 
explosives from inside munitions by 
applying steam to the exterior munition 
surface. An autoclave is a thermally 
insulated cylinder fitted with a steam inlet and condensate drain.  An inverted 
dome is fitted into the bottom end of the cylinder.  A steam-heated funnel fitted 
with a seal matching the configuration of the munitions fixture is attached to the 
lower dome.  As molten explosive drains from the munitions, it drains into the 
funnel and out of the autoclave by the drain tube.  The other end of the autoclave 
is fitted with a hinged dome lid.  The lid is opened and closed by a pneumatic 
cylinder.  Autoclaves must meet the following general requirements: 
(1) The main body of the autoclave is 22 inches in diameter by 60-3/4 
inches long. 
(2) Configuration - Insulated, cylindrical, carbon steel pressure vessel with 
one fixed end and one openable end. 
(3) Rated for a maximum of 15 psig steam. 
(4) Capable of handling a large variety of  munitions ranging from 75 mm 
to 160 mm, and some types of large bombs.  This is accomplished by special 
fixtures designed for each munition type (kits). 
(6) Controls - Steam pressure and steam admission time, lid open/close, 
latch lock/unlock, air vent valve, vacuum-breaker valve.  
(7) Utilities Required - Approximately 15 cfm of air at 100 psig and 100 lb 
of steam per hour at 5 psig, per autoclave. 
 Melt Kettles
Melt kettles collect molten explosives, reduce moisture content by vacuum and 
deliver molten explosives to the belt flaker.  They also re-mix binary explosives 
A melt kettle 
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(such as Composition B) into a homogenous mixture prior to discharging onto the 
belt flaker.   Each melt kettle has a steam-jacketed hemispherical bottom with a 
removable steam-jacketed top cover.  The cover is equipped with a mixer motor, 
speed reducer, bearing housing and seal, mixer paddle and agitator, cleaning 
access port with sight glass, and two thermowells.  The bottom of the mixer bowl 
is fitted with two horizontal explosive outlets and the outer steam jacket is fitted 
with a condensate outlet.  The entire surface of the mixing bowl assembly is 
insulated.  Because the vacuum treatment process is usually a batch-type 
operation, a minimum of two mix kettles will be required.  Both mix kettles are 
connected to one vacuum pump and pneumatic control valves control the 
vacuum “flow” between the mix kettles.  Under normal conditions, each melt 
kettle will only be filled to only 60 percent capacity to provide enough volume or 
freeboard to break up foams produced during the vacuum process.  Each melt 
kettle must meet the following specifications: 
(1) Capable of mixing up to 180 gallons of explosive. 
(2) Shell and jacket are constructed from T-304 Stainless steel. 
(3) A two-inch diameter T-304 stainless steel calandria 
(4) A T-304 mixer paddle and agitator powered by a 10 hp,  TEXP Class 
I, Div I, Group C & D and Class II, Div I, Group E, F, & G gear motor 
with an output agitator speed of 25 RPM. 
(6) Dimensions - 48 inches diameter by 42 inches deep. 
(7) Pressure - The shell must be rated for full vacuum to 15 psig design 
pressure at 250o F temperature.  The jacket must be rated for 90 psig 
design pressure at 332o F. 
(8) Vacuum pump - A two-stage, water sealed, 10 hp, rotary type, 125 
cfm/28 inches Hg. 
 Belt Flaker   
A belt flaker cools molten explosives 
into solidified flakes for future 
processing or sale.  The belt flaker must 
meet the following conditions:
(1) Hydraulically driven, flat, 
stainless steel belt 48 inches wide 
by 32 feet long. 
(2) Variable and reversible 
speed drive ranging from 5 to 30 
feet per minute. 
(3) Three cooling zones, each zone is approximately 8 feet long and 
containing a set of water spray nozzles.  Water is cooled and circulated by a 
chilled water system.  Chiller has a capacity of approximately 208,000 Btu/hr 
capable of cooling water to 42oF.
A TNT Belt Flaker 
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(4) A deluge fire protection system is typically required. 
(5) A fume hood is required over the entire flaker belt to collect fumes 
from the molten explosive. 
(6) Utilities - Approximately 30 KW for the chiller, 27 lb/hr of 15 psig 
steam.  Three 1-hp circulating pumps, one 3-hp belt drive unit, and 
approximately 3 gallon per minute makeup water. 
 Vibratory Feeder
The vibratory feeder directs the flakes into shipping and storage containers.  The 
following requirements apply: 
(1) Pneumatically powered, variable speed 
(2) Approximately 5 ½ feet long by 12 inches wide. 
(3) Open flat tray with 3 inch high sides 
(4) Approximate 3,000 lb/hr of 1/8 inch thick flakes of 50 lb/cu-ft material. 
(5) Controls - Start/stop control 
(6) Approximately 15 cfm of 100 psig compressed air. 
 Scale
The scale weighs the containerised explosive to assure consistent packaging.  It 
is explosion proof, beamless and bench mounted, with gravity rollers on the 
platform. The capacity is 25 to 125 lb. measured in ½ pound increments on a dial 
read-out.
 Roller Conveyor
The roller conveyor is used to take away full containers of flaked explosives.  It is 
gravity powered, 24 inches wide by 6 ft. long. 
 Bridge Crane
The bridge crane allows operators to move fixtures full of munitions into the 
autoclaves.  It should be explosion proof with a 5 ton capacity minimum.   Span 
and travel will be determined by the building. 
 Fume Collector
The device collects fumes from the process and filters them through charcoal 
filters before release.  The size is dependent upon the system and the building. 
Pre-filters and HEPA filters or a wet scrubber system is typically installed prior to 
fan unit. 
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 Fixture Loading Equipment
The specific configuration of the fixture loading equipment depends upon the 
building design and the types of munitions to be processed.  It can be as simple 
as a manual loading table, or a more complex semi-automated system.  Where 
heavier munitions are involved, lift-assist devices are also required. 
 A mechanical equipment room to support melt-out operations is also required.  It 
is anticipated that the mechanical room may contain: 
(1) Steam boiler equipment (if not otherwise available). 
(2) Hydraulic power equipment. 
(3) Air compressor. 
(4) Water chiller. 
(5) Other ancillary equipment. 
(6) Inert material storage. 
 Production Rates.
For a pure TNT fill, a single autoclave can achieve the following production rates: 
SER CALIBRE TYPE PRODUCTION 
RATE PER HOUR 
1 75 mm -  90 mm Cartridge, mortar; projectile 24 - 30 
2 105 mm Cartridge, mortar; projectile 12 
3 120 mm Cartridge, mortar; projectile 10 
4 150 mm - 160 mm Cartridge, mortar; projectile 3 
5 Other Demolition Charges, 
Mines, Bombs 
Depends on size: 
750 lb bomb requires approx 
1.5 hour each 
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ANNEX C  
          TO CHAPTER 4
ROTARY KILN EXPLOSIVE WASTE INCINERATORS
1. INTRODUCTION. 
The Explosive Waster Incinerator (EWI) system can be operated on either a continuous or 
intermittent basis with appropriate start-up and cool down times.  Materials for treatment are 
semi-automatically fed into the kiln via 
a manually loaded feed system.  The 
materials are fed at rates based on 
safety requirements and heat and 
draft limitations established by 
empirical testing.  The materials enter 
the system at the cooler end of the 
kiln and progress toward the hotter 
end that contains the burner.  The kiln 
exit gas temperature is maintained by 
adjusting the burner using an 
automatic control system. 
2. COMPONENTS 
2.1 Rotary Kiln  
The rotary kiln is an unlined rotary furnace originally 
designed to destroy small arms and bulk explosives.  
The kiln (shown in Figures 2 and 3) is made up of 
four 5-foot long, 36-inch outer diameter retort 
sections bolted together.  The 2.5 to 3.5 inch thick 
walls of the kiln are designed to withstand small 
detonations.  The kiln contains internal spiral flights 
that move the waste in an auger-like fashion through 
the retort as the kiln rotates (see Figure 3 above).  
The flights also provide charge separation for the in-
process materials, and discourage sympathetic 
detonations and scattering of materials.  The kiln is 
equipped with a variable speed drive, which allows 
varying rotation speeds and material residence 
times.
The burner (is a combination proportioning burner designed to operate on fuel oil, natural 
gas or propane.  Combustion air is provided to the burner by a direct drive turbo blower.  The 
EWI support components consist of the retort, frame, trunnion, feed and discharge systems, 
and variable speed drive.  The retort assembly rests on trunnion assemblies.  The trunnion 
assembly consists of four rollers mounted on shafts, and pillow block bearings bolted to 
brackets on the frame.  Rotation of the retort is accomplished by friction between the kiln 
flanges and drive rollers.  A shaft and a sprocket/roller chain to the drive rollers connect the 
Figure 2.  Rotary retort section has an internal 
spiral flight to keep waste moving and to 
isolate explosives to minimize explosive 
propagation.
Figure 1:  The burner assembly is attached to the discharge housing 
(silver cylinder, centre).  Note the auxiliary control panel, right.
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variable speed rotation drive motor.  End sections are installed to match with the feed and 
discharge assemblies.  Two thrust roller assemblies restrict the longitudinal travel of the 
retort on the trunnion assemblies.  Thermal expansion is provided for by the gaps between 
the rotating portion and stationary portions of the rotary kiln.  
The frame assembly is constructed to support the trunnion assemblies, variable speed drive 
motor, retort assembly, feed and discharge assemblies.  The feed assembly is installed on 
one end of the frame assembly.  The feed assembly supports the feed chute, the feed 
conveyor, and the furnace exhaust stack.  Doors in the feed assembly permit interior 
inspection of the furnace retort and positive feed system charging into the retort.  The 
discharge assembly directs treated materials from the retort assembly onto the discharge 
conveyor.
The main control panel (Figure 
3) is located in the feed room.  
The control panel allows for 
adjustments of kiln and 
afterburner fuel flow rates, 
combustion air flow rates, and 
kiln rotation speeds.  The panel 
also monitors system draft 
pressures and system 
temperatures.  An Auxiliary 
Control Panel is located on the 
support stand near the burner 
assembly.  The Auxiliary Control Panel provides local control of the burner while making 
initial adjustments as well as during maintenance. 
There are two thermocouples continuously recording furnace temperatures.  The first 
thermocouple, located at the base of the exhaust stack (feed end), provides a reference 
temperature to the controller to 
maintain the preset operating 
temperature.  The temperature 
preset may be changed with each feedstock, if required.  The other thermocouple, located 
immediately above the burner flame, provides a reference temperature at the burner end of 
the furnace. 
A flame detector senses the presence of flame at the burner.  Upon flame failure, the sensor 
causes a flame-safeguard unit in the control panel to close the fuel solenoid valve, shutting 
off fuel flow to the burner.  It also activates visible and audible alarms at the control panel, 
and signals the local controller of the fault. 
2.2 Feed Systems 
Two feed systems can be utilized depending on the anticipated feed streams: the standard 
feed conveyor and the positive feed system. 
2.2.1 Standard Feed Conveyor System (Gravity Feed) 
The standard feed conveyor system consists of an inclined pan conveyor that moves items 
from the feed room through a reinforced concrete barricade wall to an elevated location 
above the feed chute.  Items drop off the conveyor end and slide by gravity down a feed 
Figure 3: The main control panel displays operating parameters and allows 
system control 
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chute into the first section of the rotary kiln. The standard feed conveyor system is simple, 
rugged, well controlled, safe and requires little training or maintenance. 
2.2.2 Positive Feed System (PFS) (Pan/box Feed)  
The positive feed system (Figures 4 and 5) feeds bulk granular and powdered explosive 
materials into the kiln by injecting containers of these materials by use of a ram.  The PFS 
can also be used to feed sheared or punched items (Phase 2a items) if spilling explosives or 
dusting are concerns.  Open-top steel pans or consumable boxes can be fed with this 
system.  The PFS eliminates the chance of explosive propagation back to the loading point, 
and positively controls the feed rate to insure that only one container may be placed in the 
furnace at any one-retort spiral flight spacing. 
Fig 4: An operator feeds small arms 
(28,000 rounds per hour) to the EWI.
Fig 5.   The PFS is used to feed bulk PEP materials while 
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3. SOLIDS DISCHARGE SYSTEM 
Metal components from configured items or small arms are discharged from the furnace onto 
the discharge conveyor.  The discharge conveyor transports this material through a hole in 
the reinforced concrete barricade wall to a discharge point. 
3.1 Afterburner 
The purpose of the afterburner (shown 
in Figure 7) is to raise the temperature 
of the exhaust gases exiting from the 
kiln to ensure the complete 
combustion of any remaining 
hazardous and/or incompletely 
combusted material.  The afterburner 
is capable of heating 2,400 SCFM of 
air at 400-1100 F to 1800 F with a 
minimum residence time of one 
second.  It is a refractory-lined, 
horizontal cylinder supported by five 
weight-bearing saddles attached to 
the foundation.  The afterburner is 
divided into two sections or chambers.  
The first section is the mix chamber, and includes the burner, rotary kiln exhaust inlet, and a 
baffle plate.  The burner is a cold air baffle type designed to operate at 35% stoichiometric 
air.  The baffle plate is located between the mix chamber and the residence chamber.  The 
baffle plate provides a restriction that increases the velocity and enhances the mixing of the 
heated exhaust to ensure a uniform temperature distribution prior to entering the residence 
chamber.  The residence chamber   provides the residence time at the operating 
temperature.
3.2 Pollution Control System 
Following the afterburner, the APCS consists of 
various units, including the gas cooler, bag-
house, draft fan, and exhaust stack. The gas 
cooler cools the hot exhaust gases from the 
afterburner down to the operating temperature 
of the fabric bag-house.  The bag-house is a 
fabric filtration collector, used for final 
particulate cleansing of the gas stream.  The 
bag-house has a total filter area of 
approximately 1356 square feet.  The gas 
stream is pulled through the APCS by a draft 
induction fan, which keeps the entire system 
under a negative draft to minimize fugitive 
emissions.  Exhaust gases then exit out the exhaust stack.   Note:  While no indication of 
munitions chemistry has been made available to EDE, we are aware that some WW II era 
munitions contain mercury in primers, etc.  Equipment to eliminate mercury exists and can 
be included in the APCS train if required.  Since Equipment costs depend on the quantities 
involved, mercury vapour control has not been included in the cost estimate below. 
Figure 7 - Afterburner 
Figure 8 – Pollution Control System 
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Note on Oxides of Nitrogen (NOX)
Oxides of nitrogen (NOX) have two general sources: thermal NOX is created when incinerator 
temperatures are high enough to create NOX from atmospheric nitrogen; species NOX is 
formed from nitrogen contained in the incinerated materials, such as munitions.  Incinerating 
munitions can create some of each; as the munitions ignite, a spike of NOX is created.  Then 
there is a lull in NOX emissions until the next charge ignites.  Although the EWI is capable of 
complying with all emissions regulations, given enough investment in equipment, it has been 
EDE’s experience that it is not cost effective to meet some of the instantaneous NOX
emissions regulations while burning munitions.  EDE has designed NOX control systems and 
examined many others.  It would be expected that a NOX control system would cost in excess 
of $1 million US, and would possibly still not meet all standards.  Although many equipment 
manufacturers claim that NOX control is feasible, they frequently retract their claims in the 
face of the non-steady-state, widely fluctuating NOX emissions.  A very expensive NOX control 
system was installed in Lubben, Germany, but still did not meet all European standards. 
NOX controls are typically not required in the U.S. as the total NOX emissions are so low.  
Since the European standards are based upon parts per million--or instantaneous 
measurements--they are more difficult to achieve while burning munitions, which do not reach 
steady state.  The system described and estimates herein assumes that an agreement can be 
reached with regulators to manage total NOX emissions, and that NOX control systems will not 
be required. 
4  CONTINUOUS EMISSIONS MONITORING
A system can be installed to allow continuous monitoring of regulated emissions such 
as oxygen, CO, CO2, NOX and SOX, in the stack.  The system is readily available and 
does not require advanced technology.  It samples stack emissions on a timed basis 
and sounds an alarm in the control room when preset levels are exceeded.
5  EQUIPMENT LIST AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
EWI Overall specifications 
 Nominal processing rate of up to 220 lbs of TNT equivalence per hour 
 Operates continuously or intermittently 
 Barricaded for operator safety (not included in equipment cost estimate 
below)
Rotary Kiln Retort Sections 
 ASTM A217 grade WC9 steel  
 3.25 inches thick centre sections, 2.25 inches thick end sections 
 approx 36 inches OD 
 approx 60 inches long 
 approx 8,000-10,000 lbs shipping weight, each 
 spiral flights spaced at 30 inches, varying heights 
Frame Assembly/Trunnion Assembly 
 Variable speed drive adjustable from 1.0 to 3.5 rpm  
(options available for faster or slower rotation) 
 Framing of 12 inch I-beams 
 Includes drive and idler trunnions, thrust rollers, charge end assy and discharge 
end assy. 
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Burners and Controls 
 Natural gas, propane or oil-fired (select one) proportioning burner 
 Flame detector interlocked with fuel supply 
 Temperature feedback loop  to control burner 
 Continuous temperature recording 
 Includes low-pressure centrifugal combustion air blower 
 Main control panel in control room, auxiliary panel near burner stand 
 Main control panel purged and pressurized to reduce hazards 
 Visible and audible alarms to signal upset conditions 
Feed System--Standard Conveyor 
 Inclined pan conveyor type (8 inches wide) 
 Transfer feed materials through barricade 
 Deposits items in gravity feed chute 
Feed System--Positive Feed System 
 Eliminates line of sight exposure of operators 
 Designed for loading bulk powder or explosives, punched/sheared items 
 Cycle time approximately once per retort revolution 
 Accommodates consumable containers 
Solids Discharge System 
 Conveys residual materials (metal scrap) from discharge end 
 40 pound load per lineal foot 
 Approximately 20 feet long, 18 inches wide 
Afterburner
 Sub-stoichiometric burner to run on same fuel as furnace burner 
 2,400 SCFM 
 1,800 F maximum temperature (1400-1600o F nominal) 
 1 second residence time 
 Baffle design to provide mixing and residence time 
Gas Cooler 
 Air-to-air heat exchanger design 
 Stainless steel construction 
 Reduce 2,400 SCFM to 250o F 
Bag-house
 Fabric filtration media 
 Air to cloth ration of approximately 4:1 
 Self-cleaning, “pulse-jet’ system 
 Closed dust collection drum 
Draft Fan 
 6,700 CFM at 30 inches water column 
 300o F operating temperature 
 Manually adjusted outlet damper 
 Severe duty, TEFC, class F insulation motor 
 50 hp, 3 ph, 60hz, 208-230/460 VAC 
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Emission Stack 
 A36 carbon steel 
 30 feet minimum height 
 20 inches diameter 
Power/utility requirements 
 Electricity: 208-230/460 VAC, 60 HZ, 150 KVA, total 
 Burner fuel: 10,000 gallon fuel oil tank, (30 day supply, one-shift operations) 
 Steam: none 
 Water: none 
 Compressed air: 10 CFM at 90 psig 
 Other:  none 
      Site preparation 
      The following considerations must be made when preparing the site for installation: 
 The entire retort a suitable barricade wall, typically reinforced concrete, must 
enclose area 
 The feed room and scrap collection area must be separated from the retort area 
by suitable barricade walls 
 Footings and foundations are required for this equipment 
 Weather protection over retort area not required 
 Lighting must be provided 
 Lightning protection must be provided 
 Grounding system is required in any location where live explosives are included 
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ANNEX D  
TO CHAPTER 4 
PLASMA ARC EXPLOSIVE WASTE INCINERATORS
1.1 General
Plasma arc technology has been around since the 1960’s.  The technology was 
originally developed for and used by the Aerospace Industry for the simulation of re-
entry conditions on space vehicles.  The technology was then picked up by the 
specialty metals business and used for the development of high purity metal 
components.   During the late 1980’s the U.S. Government funded considerable 
research in applying the technology to the most difficult to treat waste produced by 
our society.  These wastes included nuclear waste, very toxic chemical waste, and 
excess military ordnance.  Elsewhere in the world other governments and 
organizations were also in the process of applying plasma technology to the 
treatment of these wastes. 
The interest in the technology arises from the high temperatures capable of being 
produced by the technology.  These high temperatures, on the order of 12,000 F are 
sufficient to melt any inorganic compound and thoroughly destroy any organic 
constituents.  The effluent streams resulting from a plasma treatment system are also 
much more benign than currently used technology.  The resulting slag has been 
proven to be very benign and non-leachable.  In addition to the resulting slag, the 
emissions resulting from plasma arc technology are much less than resulting from a 
fossil fuel fired system.  Plasma technology gas volume emissions are typically 10% 
of a comparable fossil fuel fired system and emission have been proven to meet 
even the most environmental standards and regulations.  In addition to the 
environmental and operational benefits listed, the U.S. Army has also found that the 
operational cost associated with a plasma system for the destruction of ordnance are 
comparable to those of the standard 1236 deactivation furnace.  
Because of the advantages associated with the technology, the U.S. Army has 
contracted with MSE to build two separate plasma treatment systems for the disposal 
of energetics.  The first was a fixed facility to be used for the destruction on 
pyrotechnic devices as well as other materials.  This facility will be installed at the 
Hawthorne Army Depot in Hawthorne Nevada.  The second was a transportable 
system to be used for energetic devices around the DoD complex. 
Many people are constantly looking for that elusive “silver bullet” technology.  Plasma 
technology is not that silver bullet.  However plasma technology represents a good 
environmentally friendly and cost competitive alternative technology for the 
destruction of energetics and energetic devices.  As with other incineration 
technologies, Plasma is not a blast chamber and is not designed for high order 
detonations.  Therefore, the system is meant to be used in conjunction with other 
pre-processing technologies, just as the APE 1236 incinerator. 
1.2 Performance Capabilities 
A mobile plasma treatment system that could be used in BiH can provide the destruction 
capability in a de-mil system operation.  The system requires pre-processing of some 
components as any other EWI, however it has the flexibility with proper pre-processing to 
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treat the majority of the items present.  With proper pre-processing and operation the 
system is capable of meeting the following production levels: 
SER NATURE PRODUCTION 
RATE
1 TNT 140 kg/hr 
2 Fuzes 1000/hr 










1.3 Plasma Technology 
The major system components of the Mobile Plasma Treatment System are: 
 Primary chamber; 
 Primary chamber feed system; 
 Plasma arc torch; 
 Secondary combustion chamber; 
 Pollution Control System
The primary chamber is a sealed vessel in which the plasma treatment process takes 
place.  The vessel consists of a water cooled dome, spool piece, and hearth sections 
with ports installed in the dome and spool for the plasma torch, process offgas, feed, 
oxidation air, and viewing cameras.   During operation, the plasma torch heats and 
oxidises the feed material using a high temperature plasma gas, creating a molten 
pool in the primary chamber hearth.  In addition to the torch gas, supplemental 
oxidation air is supplied to the chamber to help maintain an oxidising atmosphere and 
keep the oxygen content above stoichiometric conditions.  Once the hearth is full, it is 
tapped and the molten slag pours into drums where it cools into a glassy-ceramic 
solid.
The primary chamber feed system consists of separate feeders for ordnance and soil.  
Ordnance devices are fed to the primary chamber using a conveyer belt feeder that 
dumps the ordnance through a rotary valve into a feed tube.  A pneumatically actuated 
rammer then feeds the ordnance through the side of the primary chamber vessel into 
the hearth.
The soil and flux materials are fed to the top of the furnace using a flexible screw 
conveyor and hopper. The material is conveyed to the top of the primary chamber, fed 
through a valve, and dropped into the plasma hearth.
The plasma arc torch system consists of a 500 kW non-transferred arc torch, a plasma 
gas supply system, a closed loop deionised cooling water supply system, and a power 
supply.  The torch assembly has four water-cooled circuits; the outer housing or ram, the 
cathode, the anode, and the ball assembly. Deionised water kept in a closed loop system 
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is used to cool the plasma torch during operation.  The D.I. water is kept cool using a 
plate and frame heat exchanger fed by the plant cooling water supply. Because it is 
easier to ionise than the plasma torch gas, helium is used as the torch gas for ignition.  
Also, a small flow of argon is maintained during operation as a shroud gas to keep the 
tungsten electrode from oxidising.  Immediately after ignition, the torch gas is switched 
from helium to the main torch gas.  The torch can be positioned in the primary chamber 
with a three-axis, electrically powered motion control system.  Pinhole cameras installed 
in the dome and spool sections of the primary chamber allow operators to control torch 
position and view the plasma arc. 
Hot combustion gases generated during the plasma treatment process are drawn off the 
top of the primary chamber and routed to the Secondary Combustion Chamber (SCC) 
via a refractory lined pipe.  The SCC is a horizontal vessel consisting of two refractory 
lined chambers.
The first chamber is a mixing section in which combustion gases are mixed and heated 
to over 2000 0F. A diesel/air fired burner is mounted on the inlet end of the mixing section 
with the burner flame directed horizontally into the chamber.  Combustion gases, from 
the primary chamber, enter the mixing section tangentially to the burner flame to provide 
a turbulent atmosphere for mixing.  The combustion gases and diesel/air products then 
enter a plug flow section designed to ensure a two-second residence time through the 
SCC.  The combination of high temperature and residence time in the SCC ensures 
complete combustion of any remaining organic material or products of incomplete 
combustion (PICs).  
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ANNEX E  
          TO CHAPTER 4
“HIGHER TECHNICAL RISK” TECHNOLOGIES
1. “Silver II”.
An electro-chemical oxidation process. The organic waste is treated by the 
generation of highly oxidising species in an electro-chemical cell.  The cell is 
separated into two compartments by a membrane that allows ion flow but prevents 
bulk mixing of the anolyte and catholyte.  In the anolyte compartment a highly 
reactive species of silver ion attacks organic material ultimately converting it to CO2,
H2O and non-toxic inorganic compounds.  The UK trials have been conducted by 
AEA Technologies: 
 Advantages.
(1) Can be applied to a wide range of explosives. 
(2) No toxic waste produced. 
(3) Operates at low temperatures. 
(4) The reaction can be stopped at any stage. 
(5) Can handle waste products from other demilitarization technologies. 
(6) Can deal with continuous feed. 
 Disadvantages.
(1) Only reached development stage.  No production facility has ever 
been built or tested. 
(2) High electrical requirements. 
2. Biological Degradation.   
The use of “bugs” to “eat” explosive compounds.   
 Technically feasible. 
 Prototype systems available. 
 Requires extensive storage capacity whilst bio-remediation is taking place. 
 Limited applications. 
 Often requires an element of mechanical breakdown. 
3. Chemical Processing.    
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The use of chemical solvents to breakdown the explosive compounds. 
 Limited applications. 
 Often requires an element of mechanical breakdown. 
4. Open Pit.
Waste material is placed on a tiled floor in a purpose built pit equipped with 
perforated air pipes to supply forced air to the system.  A turbulent air current is 
created above the fire that re-circulates the combustion gases and particulates, 
which assists in full oxidation of the evolving gases.  The principle has been tested, 
but no large scale trials have yet being conducted. 
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ANNEX F  
          TO CHAPTER 4
BAG HOUSE POLLUTION CONTROL SYSTEMS
1. Following the afterburner, the APCS consists of various units, including the gas 
cooler, baghouse, draft fan, and exhaust stack. The gas cooler cools the hot exhaust gases 
from the afterburner down to the operating temperature of the fabric baghouse.  The 
baghouse is a fabric filtration collector, used for final particulate cleansing of the gas stream.  
The baghouse has a total filter area of approximately 1356 square feet.  The gas stream is 
pulled through the APCS by a draft induction fan, which keeps the entire system under a 
negative draft to minimise fugitive emissions.  Exhaust gases then exit out the exhaust stack.   
Equipment to eliminate mercury exists and can be included in the APCS train if required.  
2. Oxides of nitrogen (NOx) have two general sources: thermal NOx is created when 
incinerator temperatures are high enough to create NOx from atmospheric nitrogen; species 
NOx is formed from nitrogen contained in the incinerated materials, such as munitions.  
Incinerating munitions can create some of each; as the munitions ignite, a spike of NOx is 
created.  Then there is a lull in NOx emissions until the next charge ignites.  Although an 
EWI is capable of complying with all emissions regulations, given enough investment in 
equipment, it has been international experience that it is not cost effective to meet some of 
the instantaneous NOx emissions regulations while burning munitions.  NOx control systems 
have been designed and many others examined.  It would be expected that a NOx control 
system would cost in excess of US 
$1 M, and would possibly still not 
meet all standards.  Although many 
equipment manufacturers claim 
that NOx control is feasible, they 
frequently retract their claims in the 
face of the non-steady-state, widely 
fluctuating NOx emissions.  A very 
expensive NOx control system was 
installed in Lubben, Germany, but 
still did not meet all European 
standards.
3. The European standards 
are based upon parts per million--or 
instantaneous measurements-and 
they are very difficult to achieve while burning munitions, which do not reach steady state.  
The system described and estimated herein assumes that an agreement can be reached 
with regulators to manage total NOx emissions, and that NOx control systems will not be 
required.
(The above comments regarding NOx emission standards apply equally to the 
alternative Dry Ceramic Filtration PCS described later). 
A typical incineration pollution control system. 
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ANNEX G  
          TO CHAPTER 4
DRY CERAMIC FILTRATION POLLUTION CONTROL SYSTEMS
1. A UK Demilitarization Facility is the only known facility to use this form of PCS. It 
meets all current and anticipated European Union environmental legislation standards.  It is 
an integrated system with the following components: 
a. Afterburning.
 Oxidises entrained organic compounds, ash and metal fragments. 
 Needs to be above 8500C for over 2 seconds to destroy VOC. 
 The VOC burn to CO2, H2O and acid gas. 
 Organic particulate destroyed. 
 Oil consumption of 15 kg per hour. 
b. Quench Cooling.  There is a requirement to cool hot gases after the 
afterburner before they flow into the next stage of the PCS.  This is to protect the 
usually steel structure from heat treatment effects that could weaken it: 
 Cools gas from 12000C to 5000C.
 H2O injection and evaporation used. 
 H2O consumption of 400 litres per hour. 
c. Acid Gas Adsorption.
(1) Sodium Bicarbonate used as the medium: 
 It operates effectively over a wide temperature range. 
 It produces a safe and inert solid for disposal. 
 It reacts well with NOX.
 It is readily available. 
(2) The Sodium Bicarbonate reacts with the acid gas in the constantly 
renewing fixed bed formed on the ceramic filtration rods.  (See later). 
(3) The relevant chemical equations are: 
 NaHCO3 + HCl  = NaCL + H2O + CO2
 NaHCO3 + HF  = NaF + H2O + CO2
 2NaHCO3 + SO2 + ½O2  = Na2SO4 + H2O + 2CO2
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 2NaHCO3 + NO2   = Na2NO3 + H2O + 2CO2
d. Ammonia Injection.
 Assists in the NOX reduction. 
 Injected into afterburner. 
e. Activated Carbon Adsorption.
 Required for adsorption of Hg. 
 Process gas is drawn through a bed of activated carbon granules. 
 The gas residence time is just less than 3 seconds. 
 The fixed bed requires renewal on a bi-annual basis. 
f. Dry Ceramic Filtration.
 Removes particulate down to one micron. 
 Supports a bed of sorbent for gas adsorption. 
 The filters are generally 1.0m x 0.06m. 
 Typically 256 filter elements giving a filtration area of 48m2.
g. On-line Monitoring.
(1) Fully auditable by national authorities. 
(2) Principles: 
 IR absorption  (CO, NOx, H2O)
 Tribo-electric  (Particulate) 
 Flame ionisation  (VOC) 
 pH of solution  (HCl, HF) 
 Velocity   (Flow Rate) 
 Zirconia Electrode  (O2)
 Thermocouple  (Temperature) 
 Pressure   (Diaphragm Strain) 
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(3) Requires data processing system to calculate and display emission 
rates, concentration and history.
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ANNEX H  
TO CHAPTER 4 
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF POSSIBLE SITES
SER LOCATION ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES 
1 UNIS-PRETIS 
Vogosca




 Existing ammunition manufacturing 
facility, largest pre-war capacity 
and largest site. 
 Government-owned site 
 Adequate (almost unlimited) 
storage facilities. 
 Large semi-qualified labour pool 
available.
 Operational foundry 
 Some infrastructure damage 
to storage locations  
 Basic level of physical 
security 
 Close to only 2 current EAF 
storage locations 
 Ammunition movement may 








 Existing explosive manufacturing 
facility.
 Government owned site. 
 Adequate storage facilities. 
 Large semi-qualified labour pool 
available.
 Relatively accessible. 
 Ongoing demilitarization activity 
co-located with TNT recycling 
facility (mortar bombs only)10.
 Reasonable infrastructure. 
 Propellant testing facility 
 Central to all EAF sites 
 Poor physical security. 
3 BINAS 
Bugojno




 Existing explosive manufacturing 
facility.
 Government owned site. 
 Adequate but limited storage 
facilities.
 Relatively accessible. 
 Ongoing demilitarization activity 
reported by director (hand 
grenades and anti-tank mines 
only)11.
 Reasonable infrastructure. 
 Central to all EAF sites. 
 Poor physical security 
 Smallest site 
                                                          
10 No objective evidence presented on potential capacity – estimated to be 600 mortars per week   
11 No objective evidence presented on potential capacity – no demilitarization activity evident during visit.   
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ANNEX I  
          TO CHAPTER 4
ENGINEERING DIMENSIONS TO POSSIBLE TECHNOLOGIES
1. Site Preparation
The site preparation requirements will be similar for all technologies. The following 
are essential: 
 Operating buildings must be sized based on the process and immediate 
feedstock (ammunition) storage requirements.  This will directly influence the 
Internal and External Safety Distances. 
 Operating buildings should contain loading bays, unpacking areas, immediate 
storage areas and blast resistant operating bays. 
 Routes should be sufficiently large to allow for the transportation of the largest 
ammunition containers. 
 Outdoor lighting is required. 
 Lightening protection is required for all buildings holding or processing 
ammunition. 
 Fire protection and a suitable alarm system are essential. 
 Static earth systems are required in all processing and destruction areas. 
 Conductive flooring is required in processing areas. 
2. Pre-Processing Technologies.
2.1 General 
Nearly all pre-processing equipment will have the following engineering related 
support:
SER TECHNICAL AREA REQUIREMENTS 
1 Electrical Power 208/490V AC 
600 kVA 




3 Water NIL 
4 Compressed Air 400 - 600 scfm  
@ 125 psig 
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SER TECHNICAL AREA REQUIREMENTS 
5 Oxygen NIL 
2.2 Autoclave 
SER TECHNICAL AREA REQUIREMENTS 
1 Electrical Power Standard 




3 Water / Steam I5 psig Steam @ 
< 1200C
4 Compressed Air 100 psig 
5 Oxygen NIL 
6 Hydraulic 1000 psig 
In addition to those at Paragraph 1 above, the following additional requirements are 
necessary for the safe operation of an autoclave system: 
 Watertight floors. 
 Deluge Fire Protection System. 
2.3 Typical Processing Equipments. 
Again the US APE systems have been used as an example: 









1 1001M1 Pull Apart  21 5,400 66 
2 1002M3 Defuze/Detrace  11 1,200 68 
3 1042M2 Debanding  24 3,600 103 
4 1153M1 Disassembly  7 550 62 
5 1213M1 Grenade Pitch-In  9 1,700 19 
6 1229M1 Deprime  14 3,200 80 
7 1294 Vice  6 200 64 
8 2156 Hand Grenade Defuzer 25 4,400 142 
9 2175 Projectile Saw 36 1,500 163 
10 2196 Shear 32 5,000 119 
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3. Destruction Technologies.
3.1 Rotary Kiln EWI 




1 Electrical Power 208-230/490V AC 
60 Hz 
150 kVA 





3 Water NIL 
4 Compressed Air 10 scfm @ 90 psig 
5 Oxygen NIL 
In addition the following should also be noted: 
 The entire retort a suitable barricade wall must enclose area. 
 The Feed Room and Scrap Collection Area must be separated from the retort area by 
suitable barricade walls. 
 Footings and foundations will be required. 
3.2 Plasma Arc EWI 




1 Electrical Power 720 kW 
2 Diesel Fuel 50 litres/day 
3 Water 4 litres/min 
4 Compressed Air 40 scfm 
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1.1 Develop a financial model for the proposed Facility. 
1.2 Quantify the projects key fixed costs including equipment and appropriate 
building and infrastructure renovations 
1.3 Estimate operating costs taking into consideration local labour market 
conditions and international staff requirements. 
1.4 Compare the different legal structures available for the management of the 
proposed Facility and their taxation implications. 
1.5 Carry out a preliminary study on the international market for the various 
grades of scrap that could be produced. 
1.6 Examine future funding options for both the building and operating phases of 
the proposed facility and list conditions, which may have a bearing on those 
options – e.g. ownership of assets, disposal or profits.”  
2. FINANCIAL MODEL
2.1 Project Phases. 
The financial model of the ADF (the Model), at Annex B, was created in order 
to estimate the financial requirements to create and operate the proposed ADF. 
The Model broke down the various stages needed to create the ADF. 
2.1.1 Pre-implementation Phase (PiP)  
In this phase, the project executors and the Project Supervisory Team (PST) 
would be responsible for drawing up the detailed specifications and work plans 
for the creation of the ADF in BiH. Initially based in Sarajevo, the PST will 
develop the necessary technical specifications of the capital equipment from 
which the tender documents would be drawn up.  
There is considerable lead time (approximately 18 months) between the 
specification of the capital equipment, its tender, order and subsequent delivery 
to BiH. During this period, the logisticians would be able to start planning the 
ADF feedstock delivery. Additionally, the upgrading of the Propellant Testing 
Laboratory could commence and OBOD operations to destroy unstable 
ammunition should continue. 
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2.1.3 Implementation Phase (IP) 
The implementation phase consists of the site preparation and the installation 
of the process equipment. By this time the PST will be advanced with their 
plans covering the different aspects of the ADF including logistics and 
feedstock management. The latter part of the IP will involve the commissioning 
of the ADF by the equipment providers. 
2.1.4 ADF Operational Phase 
This phase commences with the full operation of the ADF at the selected GOF. At 
that point the PST would complete the necessary documentation for the capital 
equipment and legal ownership will have been transferred. 
2.2 Assumptions. 
In creating this financial model, the following assumptions were made; 
 Financial/Taxes: 
o No customs or other tariffs will be applied to capital items.  
o EWI fuel costs are tax free Local.  
o VAT will be recoverable.  
 Existing GOF facilities, logistic support and security are provided at no 
additional charge to the project. 
 Estimated costs (labour, offices and contractor fees) will not suffer significant 
inflation in the next two years. 
 Health and safety measures and EWI pollution control systems are maintained 
to European Emission Standards. 
 Where possible, the phased replacement of international staff by local staff 
occurs at the earliest opportunity. 
The model indicates that a significant portion of the costs is incurred in project 
management and staffing with international technical experts. However the 
Team believe that it is possible to replace almost all the international staff with 
local experts once they have received appropriate “on the job” training.  
The only other area for significant cost reduction is that of the fuel costs for the 
EWI. The Model has assumed that the EWI will burn diesel fuel. It also 
assumes that no government excise duty will be applied and that a significant 
discount for a long term bulk order will be obtained. It was beyond the technical 
scope of this study to determine whether the EWI could obtain other sources of 
fuel either through import or by using an alternative type of fuel such as the 
heavy oil residues from the refinery.  
2.3 Analysis.
Analysis of financial aspects concludes that the proposed BiH ADF should be 
able to process the munitions for just under US$570 per tonne based on the 
assumption of an amortisable life of 7 years1. When the revenue generated for 
the export of the recovered metals is taken into consideration, this cost is 
reduced by 13% to US$527 per tonne. As previously mentioned, as the ADF 
                                                          
1 This figure includes capital expenditure of the EWI and pre-processing equipment. 
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should remain a non commercial (GOF) operation this sale of recovered metals 
will not attract any form or taxation. The average cost per tonne of ammunition 
for demilitarization at a European facility is very broadly US$800 – US$1,200 
per tonne depending on the type of ammunition. 
Given the size of the BiH stockpile and the possibility of the cost of 
demilitarization of within the existing European market2, it is very probable 
that the ADF could compete in the international marketplace in the long term. 
The Study Team recommends that, computerised financial and ammunition 
stockpile management is installed at the commencement of the project and 
tight controls are maintained over all aspects of the financial management of 
the project. Once the ADF is commissioned, and the operating staffs have 
determined appropriate operating procedures, then careful observation of the 
cost variances will ensure that strict financial controls will be achievable. 
2.4 Cost Effectiveness.  
Overall the operational costs of the proposed ADF are likely to be significantly 
lower than that of similar facilities in Europe. There are approximately 16 
demilitarization plants of varying capabilities in Europe: France, Italy, Spain, 
UK, Norway, Germany and Sweden. Most of these facilities currently have 
spare capacity but clear obstacles to the export of the entire stockpile for 
demilitarization are identified in the technical chapter of this Study Report. 
3. PROJECT KEY FIXED COSTS
3.1 Project Management Costs 
The Executing Agency will incur overheads associated with the strategic 
management of the project. For budgetary purposes a figure of 15% should 
be added to the project costs. A project contingency of 15% should also be 
included in the budget but only released on a case by case basis by the 
project sponsors. 
The following estimated Project Management costs are including mandatory 
insurances and contributions and subsistence. A breakdown of the manpower 
requirements can be found in Annex I to Chapter 2. 
Table 1 – Project Supervisory Team.
PST Costs US$K Per Annum 
Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 3 Yr 4-7 
Staff costs 384.0 384.0 192.0 768.0
Staff accommodation 18.0 18.0 18.0 72.0
PST support Office 32.0 7.2 7.2 28.8
Transport 40.0 3.6 3.6 14.4
Total 474.0 412.8 22.8 883.2
                                                          
2 Once the dangerous element of the local stockpile is destroyed. 
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3.2 Demilitarization Equipment Costs
The following is an example of the probable Phase A demilitarization pre-
processing equipment costs: 
Table 2 – Pre-processing Equipment.
SER APE FUNCTION QTY COST EA $ TOTAL $ 
1 1001M1 Pull Apart  2 75,000 150,000
2 1002M3 Defuze/Detrace  1 14,000 14,000
3 1042M2 Debanding  1 6,800 6,800
4 1153M1 Disassembly  1 40,700 40,700
5 1213M1 Grenade Pitch-In  1 8,200 8,200
6 1229M1 Deprime  1 18,800 18,800
7 1294 Vice  1 8,300 8,300
8 2156 Hand Grenade Defuzer 1 3,700 3,700
9 2175 Projectile Saw 1 25,800 25,800
10 2196 Shear 1 90,500 90,500
11 VAR Spare Parts, oils & Lub. 1 56,000 56,000
Total 422,800
Note: Includes shipping and export licensing. 
Table 3 – Demilitarization Equipment.
The following is an example of the probable Phase A demilitarization pre-
processing equipment costs: 
SER APE FUNCTION 
(APE NO) 
QTY COST EA $ TOTAL $ 
1 NA Site Design/Preparation 1 125,000 125,000
2 1236 EWI with basic PCS 1 1,675,000 1,675,000
3 NA Shipping / Insurance 1 95,000 95,000
4 NA Civil Engineering 1 350,000 350,000
5 NA Installation 1 175,000 175,000
6 VAR Spares 1 100,000 100,000




3.3 Scrap Processing Equipment Costs
 It is not intended to include any scrap processing equipment in Phase A. 
There may be a requirement in the proposed Phase B operation but it is 
anticipated that the foundry at Unis-Pretis and existing facilities at Zenica and 
Jelsingrad will suffice. 
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3.4 Ammunition Storage Costs
Apart from buffer feedstock which will require permanent accommodation, 
ISO containers will act as storage for the munitions for demilitarization. The 
maintenance costs for both the permanent storage and ISO containers are 
considered to be insignificant. 
3.7 Physical Security Costs
Costs in improving protective security measures should be borne by the GOF. The 
existing security of a military guard force is considered adequate and there is no 
anticipated significant expenditure in physical security.  
4. OPERATING COSTS
4.1 Ammunition Demilitarization Facility  
It is proposed that the Executing Agency contracts the ADF to demilitarize the 
ammunition on a fixed rate of cost per tonne. This is the industry norm since 
payments are performance related and provide minimal financial risk to the 
sponsors.
Therefore all ADF costs associated with demilitarization are rolled up into this 
one figure.
5. LEGAL STRUCTURES AND TAXATION IMPLICATIONS
5.1 Discussion. 
The Study Team examined various legal frameworks under which the ADF 
would operate, these included: 
 Operation within existing GOF structure. 
 Commercial operation. 
 Legal entity operated by Executing Agency. 
In utilising any of the above structures, the entity then has to comply with a 
variety of policies concerning technical, accounting, financial, certification and 
also comply with the BiH government regulations. These regulatory issues will 
impose a significant administrative burden on a business with penalties and 
possible sanctions for those who are regarded as having breached them. 
The operation of the proposed ADF within the existing GOF structure 
minimises political and technical risks.  
However, when considering the development of an indigenous ADF, it is 
fundamental to recognize that from its inception to the operations defined by 
Phase A, it cannot be considered as a commercial project. Whilst it is 
envisioned that some recovered metals will be saleable thus generating some 
cash, it can only be considered as a donor funded aid project and not 
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commercial at this stage. Therefore the ADF cannot be regarded as a project 
which will generate a corporate taxation liability from its activities.  
Accepting this initial non-commercial status, the ADF would be an eligible 
project to be funded and managed by for example, NATO's Partnership for 
Peace (PfP) Trust Fund or UNDP Sarajevo.    
Given the level of funding required for the ADF, and its importance to the 
nation, the Study Team recommends that acquiring direct support from the BiH 
government must be a prerequisite for its implementation. 
The Study Team regard the Albania demilitarization project model as being 
ideal for replication in BiH. Phase A operations has no commercial activity 
therefore, this management model is regarded as being totally appropriate.
5.2 Recommendations. 
The Study Team recommends that the proposed ADF is operated within the 
existing structure of the GOFs. 
5.3 Phase B – Commercialisation. 
The Team is aware that similar projects to proposed ADF have been operated 
on a commercial basis. There will be nations whose armed forces are willing to 
enter commercial contracts for the destruction of their own munitions. This is 
often the case with smaller nations where the construction and management of 
their own indigenous facility is not economic or alternatively the appropriate 
expertise is not available. This is certainly the case in BiH. 
Progressing to commercial operations of the ADF has been termed “Phase B” 
and the industry specific knowledge of the Team confirms that it is a realistic 
option for the ADF. 
Fundamental to the design of this study has been the over-riding importance of 
the rapid destruction of the unsafe munitions stored in residential areas.  
In order to take the ADF to Phase B, additional capacity building is needed to 
ensure that the ADF complies with international agreements as well as 
increase its logistics capabilities. This would, by definition, reduce the capacity 
of the enlarged ADF to deal with the BiH feedstock designated as critical for 
processing. 
This commercialisation does not necessarily mean that the ADF will generate 
“profit” in the accounting sense of the term. Appropriate commercialisation 
would generate revenues which would be reinvested in the ADF in the form of 
upgrading equipment and enlarging its capacity. The conversion to profit 
generation, as opposed to revenue generation, might create issues regarding 
donor support, repayment and taxation which then contradict the underlying 
philosophy behind the ADF.  
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6. INTERNATIONAL SCRAP METALS MARKET
6.1 Current Market Prices
The International scrap metals market is notoriously erratic. The calculations 
given in this report are based on benchmark average market prices during Q2 
of 2004. In the case of export from BiH, shipping charges should be 
considered as well as haulage to the port. Both of the factors will erode 
income from sales. Indicative pricing for international shipping based on a 
bulk-load of 20,000 tonnes is as follows: 
Europe (1) - US$10 per tonne. 
Europe (2) - US$  6  per tonne. 
Asia`  - US$30  per tonne. 
6.2 BiH Legislation
There does not appear to be any legislation in place preventing the exporting 
of scrap metals.
6.3 Possible Income from National Sales
Due to the pollution problems outlined in paragraph 5 of Chapter 3 it is not 
proposed to dispose of any of the salvageable metals in BiH. 
6.4 Possible Income from Export Sales
Table 7 – Possible Income from Export Sales
Assuming that it is possible to identify an export for the salvageable metals 
income during Phase A is as follows: 
OUTPUT TONNES US$ TOTAL
METAL TYPES DAILY ANNUALLY PER
TONNE
US$
Ferrous 7 1,610 38 61,180 
Non-ferrous 1 345 632 218,040 
Total 8 1,955 279,220 
6.5 Summary 
The disposal of recoverable metals in a way that will generate some income 
presents the ADF with a challenge. The relative remoteness of BiH and the 
lack of a local, environmentally friendly disposal route will currently 
necessitate export of the materials at a lower than international market value 
due to the logistic effort required.  The solution may be found in an 
international partner company with specialist capability in this market. 
7. BIH’S MACRO-ECONOMY 
 An analysis of the macro-economic factors within the BiH economy is at 
Annex D for information. 
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8. SUMMARY 
The Study Team consider the construction and development of an ADF in BiH 
as financially viable and sustainable in terms of demilitarization activity over at 
least a decade.  The cost per tonne to demilitarize ammunition compares very 
favourably with that of the European demilitarization industry. A phased 
approach, with costs spread over up to 7 years, is more likely to be 
manageable by the donor community.
A summary of  costs spread over the initial project lifespan is at Table 8 
below.
Table 8 – Financial Summary
Item
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4-7 Totals
Capital Equipment
Installation of EWI 2,680,000 0 0 0 2,680,000
Pre-processing equipment 422,800 0 0 0 422,800
Sub total 3,102,800 0 0 0 3,102,800
In Country Project Management
Supervisory Team 474,000 412,800 220,800 883,200       1,990,800
Sub total 474,000 412,800 220,800 883,200 1,990,800
Propellant testing
Capital equipment 65,000 0 0 0 65,000
Running costs 18,000 18,000 18,000 72,000 126,000
Sub total 83,000 18,000 18,000 72,000 191,000
ADF Operation
EWI Running costs 0 355,680     711,360 2,845,440 3,912,480
Pre-preparation costs 0 231,192     462,384     1,849,536 2,543,112
Other ADF Overheads 0 320,112     640,224     2,560,896 3,521,232
Sub total 0 906,984 1,813,968 7,255,872 9,976,824
Totals 3,659,800 1,337,784 2,052,768 8,211,072 15,261,424
Project Overheads
Executing Agency costs at 14% 512,372     187,290     287,388     1,149,550 2,136,599   
Total Budget 4,172,172 1,525,074 2,340,156 9,360,622 17,398,023
Contingency at 15% 625,826     228,761     351,023     1,404,093 2,609,704   
Grand Totals 4,797,998 1,753,835 2,691,179 10,764,715  20,007,727
Cost US$
Annexes:
A. ADF Financial Summary. 
B. ADF Project Implementation – Schedule to Phase A. 
C. Financial Analysis. 
D. BiH - Analysis of Macro-economic Factors. 
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ANNEX A 
TO CHAPTER 5 
EWI RUNNING COSTS
Introduction
1. The following data is based on the Study Teams experience of EWI 
operation, typical throughputs and recovery materials that have a significant financial 
value:
2. The numbers below are calculated based on one year of operation with one 
8-hour shift per day and fuel consumption of 30 gallons per hour (240 
gallons/day).
Labour: 1 supervisor at $ 7.5/hr (estimate at $60/day) x 2,080 hrs = $   15,600  
6 labourers x $ 6.25/hr (estimated at $50/day) x 2,080 hrs = $   78,000 
Power: $ 0.12/kwh (based on BiH high rate 150kw/hr) x 2,080 hrs =  $   37,440 
Fuel:  $ 51/hr (estimated at $0.34/litre) x 2,080 hrs =    $ 106,080 
Estimated Operating Costs for 1 year =     $ 237,120 
*Capital equipment amortization = Costs / years of service 
(Unable to estimate years of service without detailed stockpile 
information)
Income from recoverable metals 
3. Income from scrap is based entirely on the munitions that are being 
processed.  Thus, it is difficult to estimate the amount of each particular 
material that will be generated.  However, based on the Study Teams 
experience an average of 1,000 lbs of mixed metal can be expected per hour. 
Prices below are just approximations since the market fluctuates regularly. 
Aluminium:    $ 0.38 to 0.52/lb 
Yellow Brass:    $ 0.49/lb 
Steel:     $ 0.13/lb 
TNT:     $ 0.5/lb 
Any payments for Demil: unknown 
Estimated income from full time operation - 1,000 lbs x 2,080 hrs x $0.13 
(steel) = $270,400 
Operating Costs minus scrap income minus demil payments = cost or profit 
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ANNEX C 
TO CHAPTER 5 
FINANCIAL ANALYSIS 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4-7 Totals
1. Capital Equipment
a) Explosive Waste Incinerator
Site Design/Preparation 125,000 0 0 0 125,000
EWI with basic PCS 1,675,000 0 0 0 1,675,000
Shipping / Insurance 95,000 0 0 0 95,000
Civil Engineering 350,000 0 0 0 350,000
Installation supervision/management 175,000 0 0 0 175,000
Spares Packaging 100,000 0 0 0 100,000
Continuous emissions monitoring 160,000 0 0 0 160,000
Sub total 2,680,000 0 0 0 2,680,000
b) Pre-processing equipment
Pull Apart 150,000 0 0 0 150,000
Defuze/Detrace 14,000 0 0 0 14,000
Debanding 6,800 0 0 0 6,800
Disassembly 40,700 0 0 0 40,700
Grenade Pitch-In 8,200 0 0 0 8,200
Deprime 18,800 0 0 0 18,800
Vice Ammunition 8,300 0 0 0 8,300
Hand Grenade Defuze 3,700 0 0 0 3,700
Projectile Saw 25,800 0 0 0 25,800
Shear 90,500 0 0 0 90,500
Spare, oils & Lub. (Bulk purchase) 56,000 0 0 0 56,000
Sub total 422,800 0 0 0 422,800
TOTAL CAPITAL EQUIPMENT 3,102,800 0 0 0 3,102,800
Propellant Testing (Illustrative)
HPLC 28,000 0 0 0 28,000
Autosampler 25,000 0 0 0 25,000
IT Support 12,000 0 0 0 12,000
Consumables 18,000 18,000 18,000 72,000 126,000
Sub total 83,000 18,000 18,000 72,000 191,000
2. In Country Project Management
Personnel 384,000        384,000        192,000        768,000 1,728,000
Accommodation 18,000 18,000 18,000 72,000 126,000
Support Office Costs 32,000 7,200 7,200 28,800 75,200
Dedicated Transportation 40,000 3,600 3,600 14,400 61,600
Sub total 474,000 412,800 220,800 883,200 1,990,800
3. ADF Operation
a) EWI Running costs
Manpower (Incl  tax and Ins) 0 140,400        280,800        1,123,200 1,544,400
Electrical Power 0 56,160          112,320        449,280 617,760         
Fuel (Assumed diesel) 0 159,120        318,240        1,272,960 1,750,320
Sub total 0 355,680       711,360       2,845,440 3,912,480
b) Pre-preparation costs
Manpower (Incl  tax and Ins) 0 124,488        248,976        995,904 1,369,368
Power/Fuel 0 35,568          71,136          284,544 391,248         
Consumables/Miscellaneous 0 71,136          142,272        569,088 782,496         
Sub total 0 231,192 462,384 1,849,536 2,543,112
c) Other ADF overheads
Feedstock Transportation 0 250,000 500,000 2,000,000 2,750,000
ADF Logistics 0 52,000 104,000 416,000 572,000         
Building and Equipment Maintenance 0 18,112 36,224 144,896 199,232         
Sub total 0 320,112 640,224 2,560,896 3,521,232
TOTAL ADF OPERATION 0 906,984 1,813,968 7,255,872 9,976,824
ADF Totals 3,659,800 1,337,784 2,052,768 8,211,072 15,261,424
Project Overheads
Executing Agency costs at 14% 512,372        187,290        287,388        1,149,550      2,136,599
Total Budget 4,172,172 1,525,074 2,340,156 9,360,622 17,398,023
Contingency at 15% 625,826        228,761        351,023        1,404,093 2,609,704
Grand Totals 4,797,998   1,753,835   2,691,179   10,764,715  20,007,727
Chapter 5 - Financial Page 5-D-1 
ANNEX D 
TO CHAPTER 5 
Taxation.
1. The Dayton agreement makes the two entities responsible for taxation. The 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development describes the tax system in 
both entities as "onerous and complex."
It is not absolutely clear to what extent taxpayers comply with the law or whether 
revenues are increasing. Payroll taxes average approximately 50 percent of 
gross salary. Legislation that remains valid calls for the payment of "war taxes" by 
returning displaced persons or refugees.  Such taxes are often arbitrarily 
administered, with fluctuating rates, and are used to dissuade ethnic minorities 
from returning to their homes.  
Investment.
2. There has been little reform or alteration of revenue and budget policies. The 
fiscal policies of the central and entity-level governments have been largely 
irrelevant when compared with the effect of foreign aid on the economy. In certain 
areas, including Sarajevo, reconstruction aid and spending by SFOR soldiers and 
local employees of international organizations have greatly boosted the local 
economy. Other areas, however, have benefited little from the $1.6 billion in 
international reconstruction aid pledged in 1996. Initially, nearly all of the money 
went to the Federation.  Through 1997, the Republika Srpska receiving only 
approximately five percent of the aid due to the leadership's failure to abide by 
the Dayton agreement.  The January 1998 emergence of the new, more 
cooperative Republika Srpska government, however, may lead to increased 
reconstruction aid for the entity. In 1996, remittances by Bosnian citizens working 
abroad totalled $424 million.  
International aid and foreign remittances are largely responsible for boosting the 
average wage to approximately $194 per month and cutting unemployment 
nearly in half from its 1996 level of 90 percent.  In the Republika Srpska, 
however, the average wage is approximately $40 to 45 per month, and 
unemployment is still 80 percent.   
There has been little progress in transferring social welfare responsibilities from 
state-owned enterprises directly to the government.  The social safety net is not 
self-sustaining and depends on contributions from multinational institutions and 
other external stakeholders.  
Banking.
3. In June 1997, the Bosnian parliament passed a "Quick Start" package of laws 
that included a Central Bank Law. The bank, which formally began operations 
two months later, is independent and will operate for its first six years as a 
currency board. This means that it can only issue currency that is backed by an 
equivalent amount of foreign reserves. As such, monetary policy is largely out of 
the central bank's hands. The bank consists of one unit in the Republika Srpska 
and another in the Federation.  Each unit holds their own reserves.   
As of June 1997, there were 27 licensed banks in the Federation and 11 in the 
Republika Srpska. These include 17 state-controlled banks, all of which are 
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insolvent and base their lending on connections rather than on due diligence. 
Most private banks are small, undercapitalized, and incapable of meeting growing 
deposit and lending needs. Nevertheless, private banks now account for the 
majority of new loans extended. Accounting and regulatory standards are still not 
market-based and need to be updated. In October 1996, the Federation created 
a Federation Banking Agency responsible for licensing and supervision.  By June 
1997, it had refused to renew of licenses for 20 banks and indicated that some of 
the weaker banks were being sidelined.  There has been little progress on 
banking reform in the Republika Srpska.  
Currency Stability. 
4. After Bosnia's declaration of independence in 1992, the Yugoslav National Bank 
refused to provide Bosnia with Yugoslav dinars. The fledgling state planned to 
introduce a Bosnian dinar in July 1992, but this was delayed until October 1994, 
when the new currency entered circulation at a rate of one new dinar to 10,000 
old Yugoslavian dinars.   
Under the Dayton Accords, monetary policy is the responsibility of the central 
government. The Central Bank has begun to issue an interim currency, the marka 
(KM), which is fully convertible and, under the rules of the country's currency 
board, pegged at parity with the German mark. The KM is used throughout 
Bosnia for non-cash transactions. Cash payments are currently made in the 
temporary currencies established in the two entities, German marks, Croatian 
kunas (in Bosnian Croat-controlled areas), and Serbian dinars (in Bosnian Serb-
controlled areas).   
Political squabbles over the design of a permanent currency have delayed its 
implementation. In January 1998, High Representative Carlos Westendorp 
exercised his power to impose the designs of Bosnian currency. The Bosnian 
marka was to enter into circulation in April 1998.   
Capital Market. 
5. In July 1997, the government and its London Club commercial bank creditors 
agreed that the country would accept responsibility for $404 million of debt, or 
10.58 percent of the $4.2 billion owed by the former Yugoslavia. To cover this, 
Bosnia will issue $150 million of German mark-denominated bonds, with principal 
repaid over 20 years with a seven year grace period.  Interest will be charged at a 
fixed rate of two percent for the first four years and rise to 3.5 percent by the end 
of the seventh year. For the last 13 years, interest will be payable at less than 
one percent over the benchmark London Interbank Offer Rate. Bosnia will pay 
the remaining $254 million of debt by issuing a second tranche of bonds that will 
be amortized over 12 years.  These bonds will only be issued, however, after per 
capita income has risen above $2,800 or at least ten years after the issuance of 
the first tranche of bonds.  
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1.1 Examine the security factors for the weapons and ammunition storage at, and 
movement to the proposed Facility(s). 
1.2 Make recommendations for the physical security of the weapons and 
ammunition storage at the proposed Facility(s). 
2. PHYSICAL SECURITY THREATS 
The Study Team undertook a general security review of a number of sites 
containing weapons and ammunition as an element of this Study.  Overall, it 
is assessed that there have been insignificant improvements in the security of 
storage sites since SFOR intervention. Inadequate physical security, coupled 
with poor accounting standards, does not effectively prevent pilfering of 
weapons and ammunition from storage sites. 
Access denial systems are primitive and largely ineffective. Whilst each 
storage site possessed accounts that appeared to be accurate, the Study 
Team could not identify centralised, consolidated ammunition or weapons 
accounting systems and therefore it are unlikely that the EAF’s have an 
accurate strategic picture of the situation. 
2.1 Ammunition and Weapons Storage Sites 
The current security conditions that prevail at ammunition and weapons 
storage location are superficial and therefore inadequate. Common 
inadequacies are as follows: 
Perimeter security Perimeter security at storage sites is cursory and does 
not preclude intrusion by unauthorised personnel.  
Some sites are still protected by anti-personnel mines, 
which is a very significant hazard where perimeter 
fences are incomplete. 
Guard force All sites have a permanent armed guard force that is 
probably an effective deterrent. However, often young 
recruits, in inappropriate small numbers, are used to 
guard these sites and it is unlikely they could 
effectively fend off any armed attack.1
Storehouse security Storehouse security is large cursory and ineffective: 
 Inappropriate padlocks. 
 Inactive intruder detection systems. 
                                                          
1 According to the OSCE undermanning is due to a lack of available manpower – 20 August 2004.  
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 Insufficient internal and external lighting. 
 Broken windows and ventilation systems often 
present points of access to buildings. 
2.2 Ammunition Transportation 
There appears to be little routine movement of ammunition in BiH except to 
GOFs for demilitarization. The Study Team received conflicting information on 
security arrangements during transportation but the norm appears to include 
armed guards with convoys.
The Study Team could not identify any specific procedures to be used for the 
transportation of ammunition. 
2.3 Government Ordnance Factories (GOFs) 
Overall, the security situation at the possible sites (GOFs) for development as 
an ADF is more satisfactory than other sites visited in BiH because the sites 
are operational facilities. 
The sites have security systems comparable to those of demilitarization 
facilities in Europe with the additional benefit of armed guards. Some repairs 
to perimeter fencing may be necessary to prevent accidental access but this 
may prove difficult as in some locations anti-personnel mines have not been 
cleared.
3 SUMMARY 
Overall security precautions at the weapons and ammunition storage sites are 
inadequate. The Study Team have made general recommendations to bring 
the facilities up to a minimal standard.  
Security arrangements at the working GOFs (potential demilitarization 
facilities) is considerably better and appropriate for demilitarization work. 
4 RECOMMENDATIONS  
The following recommendations are made in concern with the security issues. 
 A 100% technical audit of the weapons and ammunition stockpile is 
undertaken by a competent, external organisation the aim of which is to 
construct:
o Accurate weapons and ammunition accounts. 
o Capture weapons serial numbers. 
o Ascertain priorities for the propellant-testing programme. 
o Make a detailed assessment of the technical condition of the 
stockpile. 
 That weapon and ammunition storage site security is enhanced to provide 
a basic level of effective security. Specifically: 
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o A trained guard force of the appropriate strength. 
o The repair or enhancement of perimeter fences and barriers. 
o The repair or installation of external site lighting. 
o The repair of ESH windows and ventilation.  
 That the planned weapons and ammunition site reduction programme 
designed by OHR is revaluated and dovetailed to the ammunition 
demilitarization plan. There is very significant hazard in overloading 
ammunition storage beyond AASTP-1 licensing limits in than an 
unplanned explosive event would have catastrophic effect on the site and 
local populations. See Chapter 2 – Humanitarian.  
 As an element of the ADF development, a “transportation by road” training 
programme is provided to the EAFs logistics organisations, to mitigate 
risks from accidents and incidents during transportation. 
 BiH signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 8 
September 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999.  It is, 
therefore, non-compliant with the terms of the Treaty and it is strongly 
recommended that urgent action is taken to remove anti-personnel mines 
from ammunition storage sites and GOFs. 
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CHAPTER 7  
TRAINING 
1. DELIVERABLES 
1.1 Evaluate training levels of BiH ammunition specialists and make 
recommendations for training requirements to international best practices. 
2. BACKGROUND 
2.1 The Study team initially reviewed the Regulations applicable to the training of 
ammunition specialists in the EAF. They also collated information gathered, 
on the current qualifications of those EAF staff employed in ammunition 
management duties, from a range of sources including the SFOR ATO, 
SFOR inspectors and the EAF staff at the ASS. Analysis of ongoing 
ammunition management and demilitarization activities, as well as those 
future requirements identified in the Study, has been conducted to identify 
what training deficiencies exist that may jeopardise the safe execution of 
these duties.   Particular attention has been paid to the most urgent training 
requirements, which are those necessary to eliminate the critical safety 
infringements identified in Chapter 2 - Humanitarian, since they pose an 
immediate and severe risk to the safety of the civilian population. 
2.2 Current manning levels, at similar military ASS within the UK, have been used 
as a guide to planning the minimum requirements for BiH ammunition 
specialists and to illustrate international best practice with regard to the safe 
management of ammunition. 
3. ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT TRAINING LEVELS 
3.1 Regulatory Requirements 
The regulatory requirements, including the required training levels for those 
undertaking ammunition duties are laid down in Chapter 13 of the ITP.   The 
ITP is published on behalf of the Commander of SFOR (COMSFOR) and is 
intended to give clear direction on compliance with the military aspects of the 
General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), which was signed in 1995.   
The mandatory requirements of Chapter 13 have been drawn from NATO 
publications regarding the safe storage, movement, classification and 
disposal of military ammunition and are intended to be implemented by all 
armed forces in BiH.
Part 1 of the ITP, entitled Ammunition Programme Management, requires the 
EAF Corps Commander to appoint and Armed Forces Ammunition Manager 
(AFAM) who has prime responsibility for the “Development, implementation 
and monitoring of ammunition and explosives technical training”.   It further 
specifies that “only those individuals with sufficient technical training and 
experience should be employed within Ammunition related appointments”.   
The Compliance Schedule at Annex H to Chapter 13 requires the EAF to 
“present the strategy to develop Ammunition and Explosives Specialist 
Training by December 2004.”               
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 3.2 Current Duties 
EAF staff are employed in the following key areas of ammunition 
management and demilitarization activities: 
 Storage of ammunition at ASS. 
 Routine inspections to verify the condition of stored ammunition. 
 Movement of ammunition by road to demolition sites. 
 Destruction of ammunition by Open Detonation. 
 Licensing of ammunition stores. 
 Ammunition accounting. 
Should the recommendation, to urgently introduce the conduct of propellant 
stability testing; it is highly probable that a large amount of propellant will 
require destruction by Open Burning in the near future.   It will therefore be 
necessary to ensure that suitably trained EAF personnel are available to 
conduct this activity.
3.2 SFOR Supervision 
Whilst it is evident that some suitably qualified Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
(EOD) personnel, from SFOR units under command, supervise the conduct of 
Open Detonation activities by EAF staff there is no evidence to suggest the 
remaining activities listed above are similarly supervised.   The Study team 
also noted that within the SFOR technical inspection team, which 
accompanied the Study team during visits to ammunition storage facilities, 
there were no ammunition specialists.      
3.3 Ammunition Training 
During the visits discussed in Chapter 4 –Technical, to those Ammunition 
Storage Sites (ASS) at which the EAF intend to consolidate the ammunition 
stockpile, the team discussed technical training with the commanders and 
staff to ascertain those who were qualified as ammunition specialists.   
Further discussions were also held with senior EAF and SFOR staff at liaison 
meetings held during the same period.   No evidence could be found that any 
of these personnel had received formal training in ammunition management.   
Only one individual, the commander of NB 075 at Tuzla, confirmed that he 
had received training in ammunition management before the war and was 
attempting to apply the principles taught.   The benefit of this experience is 
clear, since the ASA at Tuzla was one of only two where the overall standard 
of management was reported to be adequate, although not fully compliant 
with NATO standards. 
  At military ASS in the UK it is a mandatory requirement that all staff employed 
in ammunition management duties have been formally trained at the Army 
School of Ammunition1. The average number of trained ammunition staff 
                                                          
1 UK Ammunition and Explosives Regulations, Volume 2, Part 4, Section 2 dated November 1995  
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employed at a single ASS in the UK, comparable in size to those examined 
by the Study team, is as follows:2
 1 x Manager 
 2 x Supervisors 
 3 x Storekeepers. 
Furthermore, either a supervisor or the manager is on call 24 hours a day to 
offer technical assistance in the event of an emergency.
Recent scrutiny of the last five annual ammunition inspection reports, for each 
of six ASS locations in UK3, demonstrates the value of employing properly 
trained staff.  No major safety infringements were documented and a 
considerable number of inspectors’ comments specifically commended the 
high levels of proficiency and competence staff had shown in the execution of 
their ammunition management duties.      
3.4 Planned Training  
During a meeting with the SFOR ATO4 it was reported that a 3-week training 
course in Conventional Munitions Disposal, for 32 members of the EAF, will 
commence in September 2004.   It is likely that this training will be conducted 
by Turkish specialists but it could not be confirmed that this course will meet 
NATO standards.   He added that if successful these soldiers will then be 
permitted to undertake limited destruction of unserviceable and surplus 
ammunition by Open Detonation.    The SFOR ATO also reported that he was 
investigating the availability of places on the Commonwealth and Foreign 
Ammunition Technician course at the Army School of Ammunition in the UK, 
for eight EAF personnel.   Further investigation by the Study Team has 
recently revealed that this course is historically oversubscribed and there may 
be a considerable delay before places can be allocated.            
4. TRAINING REQUIREMENTS 
4.1 General 
EAF training requirements fall into two categories as follows:   
 Short-Term – to redress the urgent issue of unsafe conditions and 
practices concerning ammunition storage, which currently prevail.   
 Long-Term – to allow the EAF to implement the requirements of Chapter 
13 to the ITP.    
4.2 Short-Term Training 
Those EAF personnel directly involved in the safe storage of ammunition 
require immediate training to be conducted in country.   This training should 
                                                          
2 Discussion with UK MOD Ammunition Technical staff on 6 September 2004. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Meeting held on Thursday 22 July 2004. 
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address storage, movement, inspection and accounting of ammunition to 
NATO standards and can be conducted by a suitable commercial provider at 
much lower costs than those charged by equivalent military training 
establishments.   The successful implementation of this training will require 
the timely execution of the following approach: 
 Conduct a Training Needs Analysis (TNA). 
 Devise and prepare training course. 
 Deliver in-country training. 
4.3 Long-Term Training 
In order to establish a cohesive strategy for future ammunition management, 
from which the EAF will be capable of meeting the requirements of Chapter 
13 to the ITP, a higher level of training will be required, in order to develop a 
core of experienced ammunition specialists,5 who could themselves 
undertake formal inspections and training.   Given the duration and 
specialised nature of this training it is likely that it can only be conducted at a 
military establishment, such as the Army School of Ammunition in the UK.  
Suitable individuals to fill these roles can be identified during the TNA 
described above, which should also recommend the most appropriate 
courses available at NATO military training establishments. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 Urgent training is required to improve the safety of ammunition in storage 
at all EAF locations and eliminate the critical safety infringements 
identified at Chapter 2 – Humanitarian. 
 It is highly unlikely that the EAF will succeed in meeting the December 
2004 deadline of the Compliance Schedule specified in Annex H to 
Chapter 13 of the ITP, to present the strategy to develop Ammunition and 
Explosives Specialist Training.    
6. RECOMMENDATIONS  
 That a short-term ammunition management-training course for EAF 
personnel is conducted at the earliest opportunity.  This training should be 
conducted in country by a competent organisation. 
 The introduction of long-term training of ammunition specialists at a 
suitable NATO military training establishment is introduced to develop a 
core of experienced ammunition specialists within the EAF.6
 In the interest of expediency, it is recommended that UNDP/SFOR 
endeavour to arrange direct bilateral support for the training aspect, 
therefore excluding training as an element of the proposed ADF project. 
                                                          
5 Ammunition Technicians (AT) and Ammunition Technical Officers (ATO). 
6 The UK Army School of Ammunition, German Ammunition School at Aachen or Canadian National 
Defence School of Ammunition are examples of the most appropriate and effective training 
establishments. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 PROJECT DIARY 
1. DELIVERABLES 
1.1 The final report should include a diary of activities for the Project Team. 
2. DIARY
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CHAPTER 9 
STUDY TEAM
1 TERMS OF REFERENCE REQUIREMENT 
1.1 General
The complex and highly technical nature of the Feasibility Study demanded that a 
composite team be assembled with individual expertise in the various technical 
areas.   Key members of the Study Team had significant knowledge and experience 
from Albania, in the development and execution of weapons and ammunition 
demilitarization projects, where the challenge of removal and destruction of surplus 
weapons and ammunition was almost identical to the situation faced today in BiH.   
1.2 TOR Requirements
1.2.1 Project Manager / Political Consultant.    
The Project Manager (PM) should be experienced in the management of 
multi-disciplined consultancy projects.   It is likely that s/he will have worked 
for an international organisation at a senior level, and it is highly desirable, but 
not essential, that the individual has specialist knowledge of BiH.   The PM 
may be “double-hatted” as one of the specialist consultants. 
1.2.2 Technical Consultant.    
The consultant will be a qualified Ammunition Technical Officer, or equivalent, 
with both Explosive Ordnance Disposal and Demilitarization experience.  The 
individual will be familiar with the technology available and the demilitarisation 
techniques to be used.   The individual will be capable of analysing the 
recommended engineering processes in terms of explosive safety and 
developing a comprehensive explosive safety plan. 
1.2.3 Financial Consultant.    
The financial consultant should have experience of operating in the Central 
and Eastern European financial environments and have knowledge of BiH.
The individual should have advised at governmental level and have worked 
with major donor institutions including UNDP, the European Union or the 
World Bank. 
2. RELEVANT EXPERIENCE
The relevant experience of the consultancy team members has been included 
to reinforce the credibility of this report and is shown at Annex A. 
Annex:
A. Feasibility Study Team – Relevant Experience.
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            ANNEX A
   TO CHAPTER 9 
RELEVANT EXPERIENCE OF STUDY TEAM PERSONNEL 
1. Project Manager. 
Mr William DG Hunt MBE, MIExpE
William Hunt is the CEO of TRLtd. 
Pre TRLtd projects include: 
Project Supervisor - NATO PfP Trust Fund for AP Mine Stockpile Destruction 
 Country manager, NATO sponsored project to destroy 1.7m stockpiled 
APM.
 Designing, implementing and monitoring the technical demilitarization 
solutions. Facilitating internal verification. 
 Capacity building indigenous workforce. 
 Development and training in demilitarization procedures. 
 Coordinating and monitoring the primary contractors involved. 
 Developed and maintained the National Plan of Action for Ammunition 
demilitarization for the government of Albania. 
Consultant  - NAMSA/Government of Canada 
 Designed Albania NATO PfP project for the demilitarization of 11,000 
tonnes of ammunition for SALW. (Project implemented in 2003/4) 
 Designed Albania project to demilitarize 1.6m anti-personnel mines. 
Consultant - Mission for Addressing Small Arms in Niger 
   UNDP/ERD Field Mission, Niger 
 Technical consultant for field mission tasked with the research and design 
of a pilot weapons collection programme and also to draft a National Plan of 
Action to address small arms and light weapons issues. 
 Undertook research up to and including ministerial level as well as in the 
field.
 Research included security issues at regional, national and local in the 
N’Guigmi region. Liaison with the Lomé centre and PCASED. 
British Army – Full Career as Ammunition Technician and Ammunition 
Technical Officer. 
Full career in the British Army retiring as Ammunition Technical Officer  (ATO). 
Class1 Ammunition Technician (AT).  Involved principally involved in counter-terrorist 
operations (overt and covert) in the field of: 
 Counter Improvised Explosive Device (IED) operations. 
 Search for munitions and weapons. 
 Render-safe of improvised IEDs. 
Key appointments held include: 
Chapter 9 – Study Team  Page 9-A-2 
 Operations Manager for DERA Demilitarization. 
 Second-in-Command of 521 EOD Squadron. 
 Senior Ammunition Technician of 321 EOD Unit. 
 Military Advisor to HM the Sultan of Brunei. 
2. Technical Consultant 
Mr Paul Carrahar Msc.
Mr Carrahar formally joined TRLtd in 2003 as the operations manager. Responsible 
for operational and financial planning of all Company projects world-wide. 
HSE/Quality Advisor  Sakhalin 
 Consultant EOD HSE advisor to the Sakhalin II project in Far East Russia. 
 Overseeing training of 250 indigenous deminers to IMAS/ISO 9000 series 
standards.
Training Manager  South Africa 
 Led an EOD Training Team in the creation and delivery of an Improvised 
Explosive Device Disposal (IEDD) training course in South Africa, for 21 
military that achieved a pass level of 85%. 
 Additionally responsible for successfully designing and acquisition of suitable 
IEDD weapons and other equipment to form an effective counter - IED 
structure and capability.
Project Manager  United Kingdom      
 Managed a team of 6 ammunition technicians that successfully completed a 
series of special military projects, including an inspection and refurbishment 
programme for surface to air guided missiles.    
 Assisted in the development and procurement of new ammunition natures, 
with specific responsibility for managing the production of supporting technical 
publications.   
British Army – Full Career as Ammunition Technician and Ammunition 
Technical Officer. 
Full career in the British Army retiring as Warrant Officer (WO) Class1 Ammunition 
Technician (AT).  As a Senior Non-Commissioned Officer (SNCO) and WO 
principally involved in counter-terrorist operations (overt and covert) in the field of: 
 Intelligence gathering on terrorist operations. 
 Counter Improvised Explosive Device (IED) operations. 
 Search for munitions and weapons. 
 Render-safe of improvised IEDs. 
 Specific responsibility for the planning and implementation of a 
technical inspection programme for over 1,600 MOD ammunition and 
explosives storage locations.
  Assisted in the technical inspection of major ammunition storage 
locations, worldwide.   Key technical advisor to senior police officers 
on emergency procedures related to major terrorist incidents. 
Managed the investigation of all Army related ammunition accidents 
and incidents.   Additional responsibility for all radiation safety matters, 
including the safe storage and use of all radiographic equipment 
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3. Technical Consultant 
Mr Trevor Lawrence  
Trevor Lawrence served in the British Army as a Class One Ammunition Technician 
(AT). He is highly qualified and experienced in all aspects of Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal including Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (IEDD).  Since leaving the 
forces he has developed a second career in commercial Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal (EOD), specialising in Humanitarian Demining, Quality Management and 
Explosives Safety Management .   His experience includes: 
Senior Technical Advisor (STA)   Worldwide 
 TRLtd EOD and explosive trials technical representative for Cranfield 
University.
 Conducting technical trials involving munitions and explosive devices on 
behalf of the UK MoD and civilian customers.  
 Writing of technical standards, procedures and reports. 
Conducting Quality Assurance and Quality Control 
 Supervisor of multi-national QA/QC personnel. 
Technical Advisor   Kosovo 
 Technical Supervision of 15 demining teams working in a large range of 
minefields in the NW of Kosovo. 
 Responsible for survey, planning of clearance, implementation and technical 
supervision of clearance. 
 Planning and conduct of internal QA/QC. 
British Army – Ammunition Technician  
Served 15 years in the British Army as a Class 1 Ammunition Technician (AT).  
Involved in Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and all aspects of Ammunition 
Management including: 
 Technical inspections of military ammunition storage facilities. 
 Licensing ammunition storage areas. 
 Providing advice on the safe movement and storage of ammunition.  
4.  Financial Consultant 
Mr Chad Lasson 
Chad Lasson is the El Dorado Inc Contracts Administration Manager of over 4 million 
dollars of design and turnkey projects coordinating, estimating and tracking costs, 
scheduling, and delivery of equipment throughout the US and overseas.   His 
experience includes: 
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 Financial Planner and Contracts Administrator for a multi-million dollar 
demilitarization turnkey project for Albania. 
 Contracts Administrator for over 3 million dollars of contracts in support of 
Eco Logic/PMACWA development of alternative technologies for 
demilitarization of chemical munitions. 
 Contracts Administrator on 3.3 million dollar project to recover magnesium 
from obsolete flares for joint U.S. Army/US Navy program. 
 Project coordinator for providing Transportable Flashing Furnace for 
Kaho’olawe, Hawaii, remediation project for explosive contaminated 
materials. 
 Provided engineering review of Russian chemical munitions demilitarization 
program with on-site assignments in Moscow. 
 Test Engineer for agent access equipment approaches for modified baseline 
for chemical munitions demilitarization. 
 Design Engineer for agent access equipment utilizing a burster adapter press. 
 Program Manager for providing replacement retorts to Taiwan Arsenal 203 for 
Explosive Waste Incinerator. 
 Mechanical engineering design for igloo door opening mechanism for 
chemical agent munitions storage.
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Example of damaged and leaking ESH at EV 076 – Rudo 
Photographic Supplement Page 4 of 9
Example of corroded ammunition at EV 076 – Rudo 
Further example of corroded ammunition at EV 076 – Rudo 
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Unpackaged propellant stored at EV 076 - Rudo
Poor physical security – flimsy main gate at EV 076 - Rudo
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View towards nearest civilian habitation (300m) at EV 076 – Rudo
(used for Explosion Consequence Analysis in Chapter 2) 
General view of a potential demilitarization site at Unis-Pretis
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The study team examine a potential demilitarization site at Unis -  Pretis 
The study team assessing a storage facility at P.S. Vitezit
Photographic Supplement Page 8 of 9
Locally manufactured demilitarization equipment in use at P.S Vitezit
Hand grenades awaiting demilitarization at Binas d.d. 
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